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This research compared the employment of the skills and attributes needed by 
information systems security professionals in an information systems security work 
environment with those taught in NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance Education. Using two surveys the goal of this research was to determine if the 
skills and attributes identified in the CISSP were employed in an information systems 
work environment and if these skills were taught in colleges and universities designated 
as NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. 
The skills and attributes within thelO domains of the CISSP were identified by 23 
questions contained in two surveys, one to information systems security professionals 
working in the field and one to information systems security faculty in NSA designated 
Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. The CISSP 
domains cover the following areas of information security responsibilities: 1) Access 
Control Systems and Methodology, 2) Telecommunications and Network Security, 3) 
Security Management Practices, 4) Applications and Systems Development Security, 5) 
Cryptography, 6) Security Architecture and Models, 7) Operations Security, 8) Business 
Continuity Planning and Disaster Recovery Planning, 9) Laws, Investigations, and 
Ethics, and 10) Physical Security. The CISSP domains were chosen as the defining 
criteria for the development of the operational definitions after an extensive review of 
literature in the field of information security. 
The surveys were developed over three phases: the pilot phase, the validity phase, and the 
reliability phase. The breakdown of the domain descriptions into questions was 
accomplished during the pilot survey phase. 
Albert L. Fundaburk 
Requests for participation in the survey were e-mailed to 800 information systems 
security professionals and 321 information systems security faculty. There was a 67% 
information systems security faculty response rate and a 20% information systems 
security professional response rate. 
This research indicated that information systems security professionals working in an 
information systems security work environment employed or addressed the skills and 
attributes identified in the 10 domains of the CISSP. This research also indicated that the 
skills and attributes taught in the curriculum ofNSA Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education had no association with the skills and attributes 
employed, or addressed, by information systems security professionals in an information 
systems security work environment. There was one exception, Domain 4, Applications 
and Systems Development Security, which indicated there was an association between 
how the skills and attributes were employed in an information systems security work 
environment and were taught in NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance Education. 
The findings of this research can be used as a baseline to develop information systems 
security curriculum. Further research is needed to determine the differences, if any, in the 
skills and attributes identified in the various information security certifications, the 
correlation between the skills and attributes identified in each of the information security 
certifications, and any differences in the employment of these skills and attributes 
between certified and non-certified information systems security professionals. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Problem Statement and Goal 
In recent years, there has been a dramatic shift in the way computers are used. The 
advances in computer security have not kept pace with the phenomenal advances in 
computers and networking. Due to these advances the need is continuous for trained 
security professionals. To address this need the National Security Agency (NSA) 
established the Centers of Academic Excellence in Infonnation Assurance Education 
program. 
Recent high-profile computer attacks, like those against the Web sites of Yahoo 
and Amazon.com, while not necessarily typical, raised security concerns at 
companies and universities. With the Internet established as a fact of life for 
businesses, and networked computers increasingly indispensable to our daily 
lives, people who know how to protect computers are a hot commodity. 
Unfortunately, academic programs that teach such expertise are lagging far 
behind this demand (McCollum, 2000, p. 38). 
The Internet has allowed a world so interconnected that work cannot be accomplished 
without computers, and computers cannot perfonn effectively without a measure of 
security. Due to the shortage of infonnation systems security professionals a need exists 
for a comprehensive program to educate more individuals in the field of Infonnation 
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security (Chin & Frincke, 1997). Employers expect graduates to have the proper technical 
and non-technical skills to ensure success. The rapidly evolving information systems 
environment requires up-to-date education. 
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Although professional certifications in information security are based on a common 
body of knowledge, there is still a fundamental difference of opinion as to what 
constitutes a common body of knowledge. Many practitioners of information security 
feel that to further define information security and to legitimize its existence there should 
be accredited college curricula (Saita, 2002). Information security as a field has not 
matured sufficiently to develop processes associated with performing specific 
information security job tasks. Until these tasks are identified and related job standards 
produced, effective standardized information security curricula can not be developed 
(Reynolds, 1998). 
The National Security Agency's Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance Education identified 37 universities as meeting the standards required for 
recognition as Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. One 
of the standards for compliance stipulated that schools must have curriculum mapped to 
National Security Telecommunications and Information Security Committee (NSTISSC) 
4011 National Training Standardfor Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) 
Professionals, an eight year old document (Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education, 2002). The NSTISSC focus was to provide standards 
for practical vocational skills. Mainstream colleges and universities have goals that may 
or may not be compatible with those of the standards dictated by NSTISSC (Yasinsac, 
1999). The Security Certification Consortium (ISC)2 was instrumental in the 
development ofthe Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), the 
most comprehensive certification for information systems security professionals (Dugan 
& Prencipe, 2001). A comparison of the NSTISSC required standards and the CISSP 
domains indicated there was no standard for Access Control Systems and Methodology, 
Domain 1 of the CISSP, in the NSA document, and other domains were covered 
haphazardly. Although CISSP was not the only certification available for information 
systems security professionals, it was the only broad top-down certification covering 
theoretical knowledge of 10 domains recognized to be required for information security 
certification and for many organizations the CISSP was considered to be the gold 
standard in information security (Dugan & Prencipe, 2001). It was this theoretical 
requirement that needed to be the baseline for identifying skills and attributes for a 
common body of knowledge in information security, which determined whether 
academia was providing education in this common body of knowledge. 
This research examined the 10 CISSP domains from within the information systems 
security work environment to determine which skills were deemed necessary and then 
examined existing NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education curriculum to determine which skills and attributes from within the 10 
domains were being taught. An on-line survey was developed to identify the skills and 
attributes of an effective information systems security professional using the 10 domains 
of the CISSP examination. Using empirical methods the goal of this research was to 
determine if existing curriculum in colleges and universities designated as NSA Centers 
of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education was consistent with the 
needs of an information systems security work environment. 
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Relevance and Significance 
Kim and Choi (2002) stated that the determination of key educational requirements 
for information systems security professionals by experts in the field was important in the 
development of an information systems security curriculum. Golshani, Panchanathan, 
Friesen, Park, & Song (2001) observed that a formal definition ofthe basic principles of 
information security did not exist and that this lack contributed to an unstructured 
approach to information security. 
As of 2002, information systems curriculum was driven by the National Security 
Agency's Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. The 
award of this designation was dependent upon meeting 10 specific criteria for 
measurement. 
The number one criteria for designation mandated that the academic program of the 
university be tied to NSTISSI 4011, with courses mapped to NSTISSI 4012,4013,4014, 
and 4015. The other criteria included: 
1) the academic program must be multidisciplinary 
2) the university must have information security plans and programs in place 
3) the university must encourage research in information security 
4) the university must share knowledge 
5) the faculty must be active in research 
6) the library must contain up-to-date reference materials 
7) the program must have declared programs of certification or tracks 
8) there must be a declared center for information security maintained by the 
university 
9) the faculty must be obtained across departmental lines (Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education, 2002). 
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The National Training Standard for Information Systems (INFOSEC) Professionals, 
NSTISSI 4011, (1994), consisted of seven areas: a) Communications Basics, b) 
Automated Information Systems Basics, c) Security Basics, d) NSTISS Basics, e) 
Systems Operating Environment, f) NSTISS Planning and Management, and g) NSTISS 
Policies and Procedures. Although this document was information security specific the 
material was dated and did not cover information security as it related to current issues. A 
comparison ofNSTISSI 4011 and the CISSP domains identified areas not covered 
(CISSP Certification Common Body of Knowledge Study Guide, 2000). Individual 
courses must be mapped to NSTISSI4012, National Training Standardfor Designated 
Approving Authority, NSTISSI4013, National Training Standard for Systems 
Administrators in Information Systems Security, NSTISSI4014, National Training 
Standardfor Information Systems Security Officers, and NSTISSI 4015 National Training 
Standardfor Systems Certifiers. In a report of the 1998 annual meeting of the National 
Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education, Reynolds (1998) stated that 
information security education must avoid the parochial mind-set of using what is best 
for government as a baseline for the information security profession. 
A search of existing literature supported the need for a standard curriculum in 
information security. Bishop (2000), in particular, identified this need in two 
specific articles. In his presentation to the National Colloquium on Information 
Systems Security he defined information security as it applied to academia and 
stated the goal of undergraduate, graduate, and doctorate education was to "learn 
broad principles, and see how to apply them" (Bishop, 2000). In a presentation to 
the National Colloquium on Information Security Education, he outlined the 
following shortcoming of existing curriculum. At the undergraduate level 
curriculum is more focused on application of principles as opposed to the critical 
analysis ofthose principles. This tends to provide graduates with a distorted view 
of computer security. Students who want a deeper understanding of these 
principles are relegated to independent study or graduate courses. Graduate 
courses tend to focus on the design and specification of secure systems but rarely 
implement the designs. Computer security should apply both to be successful 
(Bishop, 1997). 
Barriers and Issues 
The analysis of information security presented a number of significant problems. 
These included: 
1) addressing the interdisciplinary nature of information, and 
2) defining the depth and scope of knowledge which will satisfy the designation of a 
security professional. 
This research performed a rigorous review of information security skills and attributes 
in preparation for determining the depth and scope of knowledge required. 
Research Questions 
This research provided answers to the following questions: 
1) Are the skills and attributes identified in the CISSP used in an information 
systems security work environment? 
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2) Are universities designated as National Security Agency Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education providing these skills? 
Limitations and Delimitations 
The following limitations to the research were noted: 
1) Only participants who held a CISSP certification and worked in an information 
systems security environment participated in the information systems security 
professional survey. 
2) Only participants who have taught or were teaching an information security 
course in an NSA designated Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance Education institution participated in the information systems security 
faculty survey. 
The following delimitations to the research were noted: 
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1) Only security professionals on the CISSP Web list, February 2003, participated in 
this research. 
2) Only faculty from universities designated as NSA Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education as of February 2003, participated 
in this research. 
The following assumptions to the research were noted: 
1) The 10 domains ofthe CISSP fairly define skills and attributes needed in an 
information systems security environment. 
2) Academic institutions designated as NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education are familiar with the 10 domains of the CISSP. 
Definition of Terms 
According to Krutz and Vines, (2001) the following definitions apply to infonnation 
security: 
Access control 
The process of limiting access to the resources of a particular system to 
authorized users, programs processes or other systems. 
Access control matrix 
A table in which each row represents a subject, each column represents an object 
and each entry is a set of access rights for that subject to that object. 
Access control mechanism 
Hardware or software features, operating procedures, management procedures, 
and combinations that are designed to detect and prevent unauthorized access and 
to pennit authorized access to a particular system. 
Access level 
The hierarchical portion ofthe security level that identifies the sensitivity ofthe 
data and the clearance of authorized users. 
Accountability 
The property that enables activities on a system to be traced to individuals who 
may be held accountable for their actions. 
Assurance 
The degree of confidence that security needs are satisfied. 
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Authenticate 
To verify the identity of a user, device, or other entity as a prerequisite for entry 
into a protected system or to verify the integrity of data that has been stored, 
transmitted, or otherwise exposed to unauthorized modification. 
Authenticator 
The means used to confirm the identity or to verify the eligibility of a station, 
originator, or individual. 
Bell-La Padula model 
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A formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of 
access control rules. 
Biometrics 
An automated means of identifying or authenticating the identity of a living 
person based on physiological or behavioral characteristics. 
Certification 
The comprehensive evaluation of the technical and non-technical security features 
of an information system that establishes the extent to which the system meets a 
specified set of security requirements. 
Clark-Wilson commercial security policy 
The policy established to maintain consistency between the internal data and user 
expectations. 
Computer cryptography 
The use of a crypto-algorithm in a computer, microprocessor, or microcomputer 
to perform encryption or decryption in order to protect information, or to 
authenticate users, sources, or information. 
Contingency management 
Establishing actions to be taken before, during, and after a threatening incident. 
Contingency plan 
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A plan for emergency response, backup operations and post-disaster recovery 
maintained as part of a security program that will ensure the availability of critical 
resources and facilitate the continuity of operations in an emergency situation. 
Countermeasures 
Any action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure that reduces the 
vulnerability or threat to a system. 
Crypto security 
The security or protection resulting from the proper use oftechnically sound 
crypto systems. 
Crypto-algorithm 
A well-defined procedure or sequence of rules used to produce a key stream or 
cipher text from plain text or vice-versa. 
Cryptography 
The principles, means, and methods for rendering information unintelligible and 
for restoring encrypted information to readable form. 
Data integrity 
The property that data meet an expected level of quality. 
Data security 
The protection of data from any unauthorized modification, destruction, or 
disclosure. 
Denial of service 
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Any action that prevents any part of a system from functioning in accordance with 
its intended purpose. 
Disaster 
A sudden unplanned, catastrophic event that brings about damage or severely 
diminishes an organization's ability to provide critical business functions for 
some undetermined period of time. 
Disaster recovery plan 
Written procedures for emergency response, extended backup operations, and 
post-disaster recovery after a loss of computer resources andlor physical facilities. 
Domain 
The unique context in which a program is operating or a set of objects that a user 
has the ability to access. 
File protection 
The aggregate of all processes and procedures in a system designed to inhibit 
unauthorized access, contamination, or elimination of a file. 
Formal security policy model 
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A mathematically precise statement of a security policy that represents the initial 
state of a system, the way a system progresses from one state to another, and the 
definition of a secure state of the system. 
Graham-Denning model 
This model operates on eight primitive protection rights that can be issued by 
subjects, with effects felt on other objects or SUbjects. 
Handshake 
A dialog between two entities for the purpose of identification and authentication. 
Individual accountability 
The ability to positively associate a user with the time, method, and degree of 
access to a system. 
Information flow control 
A procedure to ensure information transfers within a system are not made from a 
higher security level to a lower security level. 
Least privilege 
The principle that requires each object to be granted the most restrictive set of 
privileges needed to perform authorized tasks. 
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Mandatory access control 
A means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity of the object and 
the clearance of the subject desiring access. 
Modes of operation 
Object 
A description of the conditions under which an information system functions 
based on the sensitivity ofthe data and the authorizations ofthe user. 
A passive entity that contains or receives information. 
Password 
A protected/private character string that is used to authenticate an identity. 
Penetration 
The successful act of bypassing the security mechanisms of a system. 
Permissions 
A description ofthe type of authorized interactions a subject can have with an 
object. 
Physical security 
The application of physical barriers and control procedures as preventive 
measures or countermeasures against threats to resources and sensitive 
information. 
Protocols 
Protocols are a set of rules and formats, semantic and syntactic, which permit 
entities to exchange information. 
Recovery planning 
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The advance planning and preparations that are necessary to minimize loss and to 
ensure the availability of the critical information systems of an organization. 
Recovery procedures 
The actions necessary to restore computer capability and data files to a system 
after a systems failure. 
Reliability 
The probability of a system performing its mission adequately for a specified 
period of time under expected environments and operating procedures. 
The probability that a particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability of a 
system. 
Risk analysis 
The process of identifying security risks, determining their potential, and 
identifying areas in need of safeguarding. 
Risk management 
The total process of identifying, controlling, and eliminating or minimizing 
uncertain events that might affect system resources. 
Security measures 
Elements of software, firmware, hardware, or procedures in a system to satisfy 
security specifications. 
Security policy 
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The set of laws, rules, regulations, and practices that regulate how an organization 
manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information. 
Security policy model 
A formal presentation that identifies the set of rules and practices that regulate 
how an organization manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information. 
Spoofing 
An attempt to gain access to a system by posing as an authorized user. 
State variable 
A variable that represents either the state of the system or the state of some 
system resource. 
System integrity 
The quality that a system has when it performs its intended function in an 
unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized 
manipulation of the system. 
Tampering 
An unauthorized modification that alters the proper functioning of a system in a 
manner that degrades its security or functionality. 
Technical attack 
An attack perpetrated by circumventing or nullifying hardware and software 
protection mechanisms. 
Technical vulnerability 
Threat 
A hardware, firmware, communication, or software flaw that leaves a system 
vulnerable to attack. 
Any circumstance or event that has the potential to cause harm to a system. 
Threat analysis 
The examination of all actions and events that might cause harm to a system or 
operation. 
Threat monitoring 
The analysis, assessment, and review of audit trails and other data that are 
collected for the purpose of searching for systems events that might constitute 
violations or attempted violations of system security. 
Trusted computer system 
A system that employs sufficient hardware and software assurance measures to 
enable its use for simultaneous processing of a range of sensitive or classified 
information. 
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Un-trusted process 
A process that has not been evaluated or examined for adherence to security 
policy. 
A person or process accessing an infonnation system either by direct or indirect 
connections. 
UserID 
17 
A unique symbol or character string that is used by a system to identify a specific 
user. 
User profile 
Patterns of user activity that can be used to detect changes in nonnal operations. 
Vulnerability 
A weakness in system security procedures, systems design, implementation, or 
internal controls that could be exploited to violate systems security. 
Vulnerability assessment 
A measure of vulnerability that includes the susceptibility of a particular system 
to a specific attack. 
Summary 
The rapidly evolving infonnation systems environment requires up-to-date 
infonnation security curriculum. The speed in which the infonnation systems 
environment changes in regard to security makes it extremely difficult for a university 
curriculum to prepare students for working in the world of information security_ The 
problem was that current schools and universities recognized as Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education were mapping curriculum to an eight 
year old document. 
This research provided answers to the following questions: 
1) Are the skills and attributes identified in the CISSP used in an information 
systems security work environment? 
2) Are universities designated as National Security Agency Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education providing these skills? 
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To answer these questions, this research examined the 10 CISSP domains from within 
the information systems security work environment to determine which skills were 
deemed necessary and then examined existing NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education curriculum to determine which skills and attributes 
from within the 10 domains were being taught. With the 10 domains ofthe CISSP as a 
baseline an on-line survey was developed to identify the skills and attributes of an 
effective information systems security professional. Using empirical methods the goal of 
this research was to determine if existing curriculum in colleges and universities 
designated as NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education 
was consistent with the needs of an information systems security work environment. 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
19 
The review of literature examined several aspects of infonnation systems and 
infonnation security. The introduction and historical overview explores infonnation 
technology and its relationship to organizations. The second section defines infonnation 
technology. The third section investigates infonnation systems security. The fourth 
section identifies specific certifications in infonnation security. The fifth section explores 
curriculum design in infonnation technology. The sixth section explores specific 
curriculum development in infonnation systems security. 
Several steps were used for the purpose of reviewing existing literature and 
research. Initially, the following databases were used: ACM Digital Library, Applied 
Science and Technology, Computer Abstracts, Computer and Infonnation Systems 
Abstracts, Pro Quest, and EBSCOhost. The searches were conducted by focusing on 
keywords used in each of the databases. The keywords used were: infonnation 
technology (IT), infosec, infonnation security, infonnation security education, computer 
security, computer security curriculum, infonnation systems curriculum, CISSP, 
infonnation systems security certification and infonnation systems security requirements. 
The second step required reviewing all documents, journals, texts, and books, 
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identified using these keywords, for applicability to the research. In all cases the listed 
references in these documents, journals, texts and books were analyzed and those meeting 
the criterion were requested from the library at Bloomsburg University and again 
reviewed for applicability to the research. 
The third step required reviewing the documents pertaining to the research and rating 
them using the following categories: relevance, date of article, and type of publication 
(refereed, non-refereed, commercial, or in-house). 
The review of literature revealed limited research on the actual tasks required for 
success as an information systems security professional. Although numerous articles 
discussed information security curriculum, very few were empirical in nature, nor 
rigorous in the research used in developing the curriculum. 
As early as the 1990s there were predications showing an increased demand for 
information security. To this end the National Colloquium for Information Systems 
Security Education (NCISSE) set forth the following goals in 1998: 
1) to bring together industry, government, and academia to define current and 
emerging requirements for security education 
2) to discuss future direction of information security education at the 
graduate and undergraduate level 
3) to form an advisory group to act as a forum for continued communications 
4) to encourage colleges and universities to teach information systems 
security courses in various curricula to meet the needs of 21 st century 
consumers 
5) to increase course offerings to meet the growing demand for information 
systems security professionals (Reynolds, 1998, p.l) 
The NCISSE is not an implementing body, but does offer suggestions to industry, 
government, and academia. The suggestions offered in 1998 included: 
1) Develop standards for what information systems security professionals 
should know and be able to do 
2) Information systems security as a field has not matured sufficiently to 
develop processes associated with performing specific job related tasks. 
Until the processes are identified and related to performance standards, 
effective standardized training cannot be designed. Core processes 
associated with job related tasks must be developed. 
3) Develop credentials for skills 
4) Develop standards or metrics for IT infrastructure security with heavy 
reliance on those for other more established infrastructures 
5) Identify the role of "best practices" in the profession and address the 
question "whose best practice" 
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6) Overcome resistance among information security to the standards of rigor 
and discipline that are expected of other professions (Reynolds, 1998, p.2) 
Davis and Dark (2002) presented a report to NCISSE addressing information 
assurance curriculum development. This report detailed the participants, processes, and 
procedures of two curriculum workshops held in 2001. These workshop participants 
included stakeholders from government, industry, and academe. The workshops used the 
input of these stakeholders to determine the curriculum outline for both graduate and 
undergraduate education. Although the workshops produced a creditable document, the 
data collection was neither rigorous nor empirical. The following suggestion as outlined 
by the 1998 NCISSE, "Develop standards for what information systems security 
professionals should know and be able to do" (Reynolds, 1998) has yet to be fulfilled. 
Historical Overview 
Although research, primarily federally funded, was common in the 1970s, its 
emphasis was on confidentiality, especially in the government which dominated security 
technology. 
Building on the 1960s and 1970s efforts to model information flows and protect 
schemes in computer systems, the National Security Agency (NSA) developed the 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, known formally as the Orange 
Book, and the Trusted Product Evaluation program. In the 1980s the NSA 
established an outreach organization, the National Computer Center, to promote 
the Orange Book. Activities associated with the Orange Book were intended to 
foster broader development, acquisition and use of more secure computing 
systems by addressing the problem of limited information and understanding 
through dissemination of criteria for security product development and product 
certification. The criteria had limited impact because of their narrow technical 
assumptions, bureaucratic conduct associated with product evaluation and 
certification, the application of export controls to associate products and 
mismatch with the commercial marketplace (Blumenthal, 1999, p.525). 
During the 1980s the growing use of databases led to an increased scrutiny in 
integrity. The Computer Security Act of 1987 provided a foundation for information 
security with an emphasis on privacy and security plus sensitivity to the needs of both 
civilian and military perspectives. It was in the 1990s, with the widespread use of 
networked information systems, that the focus led to availability. The federal 
government recognized the impact of information security on the national infrastructure 
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in July of 1990 by implementing the National Policy for the Security of National Security 
Telecommunications and Information Systems. This directive established the initial 
policies and organizational structure to guide the conduct of activities to secure the 
national information infrastructure (NSTISSI, 1990). 
The growth of information systems technology and the corresponding threats have 
been further recognized by the government. In July of 1996, Executive Order 13,010 
established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection to assess and 
respond to threats across interdependent infrastructures: telecommunications and 
information services, electric power, oil and gas distribution, transportation, water, 
banking and finance, emergency services, and government services (Blumenthal, 1999). 
However, in a report of the 1998 annual meeting of the National Colloquium for 
Information Systems Security Education, Reynolds (1998) cautioned against using what 
is best for government as a baseline for the information security profession. In October of 
2001, Executive Order 13,231 renamed the National Security Telecommunications and 
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Information Systems Security Committee, established by National Policy for the Security 
of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems, as the Committee on 
National Security Systems. The subcommittee established to deal explicitly with 
information security was the Subcommittee on Information Systems Security with the 
overall responsibilities to: 
1) develop, formulate, and recommend operating policies, objectives and 
priorities required to achieve broad information systems security 
2) maintain an understanding ofthe security initiatives that are undertaken 
with the private sector in accordance with national policy 
3) provide a forum for the exchange of security guidelines 
4) oversee the development of the annual assessment on the security status of 
national security systems 
5) develop information systems security guidance 
6) interact with various subcommittees on implementation of appropriate 
security protective measures 
7) provide reports and identify actions and topics that require the attention of 
the committee (National Security Agency, 2001). 
The areas most pertinent to the objectives and goals as identified by this literature 
search included: 
1) Information Technology 
2) Information Systems Security 
3) Certification 
4) Curriculum Design 
5) Information Systems Security Curriculum 
Information Technology 
To understand the role of information security on the existing and future network 
infrastructure it is necessary to understand the impact of information technology on the 
organization. 
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Torkzadeh and Doll's (1999) empirical research on the impact oftechnology on work 
supported the research findings that the success of information technology can potentially 
be measured through its impact on work at the level of the individual end-user. 
Organizations were concerned about how the millions spent on information technology 
influenced organizational and individual performance and were looking for a means of 
validating this expense. The explicit objective of Torkzadeh and Doll's (1999) research 
was to development an instrument that: 
1) identifies the multidimensional nature of information technology's impact 
at the level of the individual end-user 
2) is short, easy to use and appropriate for both academic research and 
practice 
3) can be used with confidence across a variety of applications and contexts 
(p.328). 
Torkzadeh and Doll's (1999) research reported on an initial effort to conceptualize the 
extent of the impact for the following dimensions of information technology: 
1) Task productivity: the extent that an application improves the user's 
output per unit of time. 
2) Task innovation: the extent that an application helps users create and try 
out new ideas in their work. 
3) Customer satisfaction: the extent that an application helps the user create 
value for the firm's internal or external customers. 
4) Management control: the extent that an application helps to regulate work 
processes and performance (p.329). 
Based on an extensive literature review the researchers generated 39 items to measure 
the aspects of this impact. The pilot study involved generating a structured interview 
questionnaire and process to assess the validity of the instrument. The responses to the 
questionnaire were reviewed with these objectives in mind: purification, 
unidimensionality, reliability, brevity, and simplicity. Eighty-nine usable interviews were 
obtained using this pilot study process. The initial 39 question survey was reduced to a 
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four factor, 12 item instrument and verified the four dimensions of information 
technology's impact on work. This four factor, 12 item instrument was distributed to 409 
end-users across a wide spectrum of industries and the results analyzed to further validate 
the instrument's reliability. 
The final analysis of the survey indicated that the survey did have adequate reliability 
and validity. Torkzadeh and Doll (1999) recommended further research to confirm the 
measurement model, evaluate the stability of the instrument, and develop standards for 
evaluating specific applications. 
Organizations were increasingly confronted with changing strategic issues brought 
about by deregulation, globalization, ubiquitous connectivity, and the convergence of 
industries and technologies. The ability of an organization to respond to these issues 
depends on having sophisticated and technical infrastructure. There was a gap, in even 
the most competitive organizations, between emerging strategic direction and information 
technology's ability to support it. Working with more than 500 senior executives, 
Prahalad and Krishnan's (2002) research identified the nature and seriousness of this 
disconnection. These senior executives, when asked about their capacity to lead change in 
their organizations, identified the quality of the information technology infrastructure as 
an impediment to this effort. The most common constraints centered on legacy 
infrastructure, incompatible databases and applications, poor quality of data, restricted 
scalability, and business processes trapped in vendor software modules. A lag in 
information infrastructure often stymied key dimensions of strategic needs. 
Attempts to create business models enabled by technology have shown mixed results. 
Companies with a high degree oftechnology acumen failed because they underestimated 
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the complexities of logistics, while companies with an understanding of logistics failed in 
their ability to attract customers, and link suppliers and partners using technology 
(Prahalad & Krishnan, 2002). 
Among the many causes of this disconnect between managerial imperatives and 
information infrastructure capabilities were the changes in business environment and 
technology, management's approach to information technology, and the role information 
technology played in the strategic process. Over the last decade the changes in 
technology that significantly affected the organization included: 
1) the public network infrastructure 
2) operating systems 
3) database management 
4) business applications (Prahalad & Krishnan, 2002, p.26). 
With the exception of business applications there seemed to be a convergence in many 
of these technology changes. The key to acceptable change in business applications was 
to design the system to take into consideration the cost of change and the time to 
implement. In many instances business application changes were implemented with a 
standard user interface and no regard for future needs. To improve efficiency many 
organizations adopted large enterprise applications predestined by the vendor. This 
required vendor participation when change was implemented. Over the last five years, 
companies have invested over $300 billion in these enterprise systems, with less than 
adequate return. These solutions were seen as a quick fix to the legacy inspired problems 
(Prahalad & Krishnan, 2002). 
Prahalad and Krishnan's (2002) research identified three questions that senior 
business managers need to ask before implementing information technology investments: 
1) Does the application architecture and underlying infrastructure in the 
enterprise reflect the company's strategic vision? 
2) What are the inherent risks and impediments to change embedded in our 
information infrastructure? 
3) What does a viable portfolio ofIT capabilities look like (p.27)? 
It also identified a common framework for understanding the capabilities, 
impediments, and risks associated with the information technology application 
infrastructure: 
1) What is the role of application in strategy? 
2) Is knowledge about the business process domain stable or evolving? 
3) How much does the application get changed? 
4) Where do we source the application? 
5) What is the nature of the data? 
6) What are the quality problems (p.29)? 
For each application system in the infrastructure the need remained to determine 
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whether the business processes encompassed in that application are core to organizational 
strategy. 
Increasingly, information technology managers struggle with conflicting strategic 
imperatives of innovation, efficiency and flexibility. However, without the active 
understanding of the technical and organizational impediments to tying IT to the 
organization'S strategic tasks, the disconnection between efficiency and flexibility cannot 
be bridged (Prahalad & Krishnan, 2002). 
The evolution of society from industrial based to knowledge based has increased the 
importance of IT and IT professionals in providing organizational information. The 
challenges of managing IT in this environment will continue to increase in complexity. It 
is impossible to define an effective business strategy that does not rely on IT: 
Today, information technology is Ubiquitous. It is integral to processes internal to 
the firm, product design, delivery of services, and inter-organizational relations. It 
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is the lifeblood of the organization, shrinking the effects oftime and distance and 
altering the very nature of work (Benamati, 1999, p .144). 
Although very little research has directly addressed the problems ofIT change and 
how management copes with it, broadly related issues have been considered. Research 
has also investigated organizational issues caused by a changing environment. The 
purpose of Benamati' s (1999) research was to test the theory that changing dimensions of 
the environment cause management problems for IT organizations. 
Benamati (1999) used a field survey to determine the extent to which subject 
organizations had experienced 39 specific problems on recent major development, 
implementation, and support efforts underway during three prior years. The questions 
used a scale of 1 - 7 where 1 meant "to no extent" and 7 meant "to a very great extent". 
A pilot study was conducted with five IT professionals to validate the survey, which was 
to ensure the survey was clear, concise, and that the items portrayed their intended 
meanings. The results were incorporated in the final instrument. There was some question 
as to the instrument validity process as five IT professionals to validate 39 questions may 
not be sufficient. The survey instrument was mailed to a random population of 1,000 IT 
professionals. The first mailing identified 874 non-respondents. A second mailing 
resulted in a usable sample of 246 responses. 
The analysis proceeded in two stages. The first employed confirmatory factor analysis 
(CF A) to examine the problem and coping mechanisms categories proposed in the 
revision of the environmental impact theory. The second stage used the results of the first 
to test the hypothesis about the relationship between problems and coping mechanisms 
(Benamati, 1999). 
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Model generation is the most common used application of CF A. In this approach, an 
initial model was tested for fit against collected data. If fit was not adequate the model 
was adjusted and re-tested. Benamati (1999) used three determiners of statistical fit: 
1. A chi square ratio 
2. Bentler and Bonnet's non-formed fit index 
3. Bentler's comparative fit index. 
The final result of the study found nine of the preliminary problem types supported in 
the research, while two were not. 
As IT is considered a strategic resource and given to changing at a rapid rate the 
management ofIT has increased in importance. Benamati's (1999) research identified 
problems that occur due to this change and the coping mechanisms being applied to these 
problems. It also discussed the relationships between IT problems and coping 
mechanisms. The recognition of changes brought about by the risk of intemetworking, 
and identifying the coping mechanisms dealing with these changes, is extremely 
important to any research on the implementation of information security. 
Information Systems Security 
The importance of information systems security was confirmed by the 2002 CSIIFBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey. This survey clearly showed a marked increase in 
computer security incidents and a significant rise in financial losses. It identified an 
increase in total annual losses attributed to computer security incidence from $100 
million in 1997 to $456 million in 2002. Over the past five years the total losses have 
exceeded $1 billion. In 2002, 91 % of the respondents detected security breaches 
compared to 90% detected in 1999. Comparisons of the surveys from 1996 through 2002 
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show a significant increase in the Internet as a frequent point of attack (POA) (The 
International Infonnation Security Foundation (I2SF) , 2002). The IT Risk Management 
Series (1999), compiled by Ernst & Young, found 66% of the respondents not using the 
Internet would begin to utilize it, and 83% respondents using the Internet would increase 
usage, if security concerns were adequately addressed. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) established new infonnation security architecture 
entitled Technical Frameworkfor Information Management (TAFIM). It was the defining 
document in Department of Defense Goal Security Architecture (DGSA). However, it has 
not been implemented, although a number of events have been identified as required for 
future implementation. Feustel and Mayfield (1998) have provided numerous challenges 
as to how DGSA concepts can be implemented efficiently, including exploring the 
implications of some of the wider range of security issues brought about by 
implementation. 
In 1993 the DoD identified a new set of requirements which would lead to a major 
alteration in DoD's approach to information security. The requirements stated that DoD 
must: 
1) Support infonnation processing under multiple security policies of any 
complexity or type, including those for sensitive unclassified infonnation 
and multiple categories of classified infonnation. 
2) Be sufficiently protected to allow distributed infonnation processing 
(including distributed infonnation systems management) among multiple 
hosts on multiple networks in accordance with open systems architecture. 
3) Support infonnation processing among users with different security 
attributes employing resources with varying degrees of security protection, 
including users of non-secure resources if a particular mission so dictates. 
4) Be sufficiently protected to allow connectivity via common carrier 
(public) communications systems (Feustel & Mayfield, 1998, p.4). 
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Further supporting these requirements, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
issued the following policy with respect to Defensive Information Operations: 
1) Information, information-based processes, and information systems (such 
as command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems, 
weapons systems, and infrastructure systems) used by'the US military 
forces will be protected relative to the value of the information contained 
therein and the risks associated with the compromise of or loss of access 
to the information. 
2) Information systems defense relies on four interrelated processes. These 
include a process to protect information and information systems, a 
process to detect attacks or intrusions, a restoration process to mitigate the 
effects of incidents and restore services, and a response process (Feustel & 
Mayfield, 1998, p.4). 
One significant change in DoD policy was its movement away from a dedicated 
infrastructure to public switched networks. The establishment ofthese requirements 
indicated that DoD had a clear understanding of information security protection from 
both a government and commercial standpoint. This switch required that accessibility 
alone be provided by the public network with all other security requirements placed at the 
endpoints of the network. DoD's organizational structure has much in common with the 
commercial sector. It has payroll, human resources, invoicing, purchasing, and 
accounting. However, DoD has many unique policy elements such as the protection of 
classified information (Feustel & Mayfield, 1998). This type of access control was 
regulated on a need to know basis. While access control was specifically focused on the 
management of information sharing, such controlled sharing was difficult at best in a 
shared-resource environment. Feustel and Mayfield (1998) identified four options to 
manage shared-resource access: 
Current sharing options include: 1) uncontrolled sharing wherein systems operate 
in an unprotected mode, 2) discretionary sharing in which information owners can 
designate under their own authority who may share access to the owned 
information, 3) "systems high" sharing in which all data and programs can be 
treated as having sensitivity of the most classified information and programs on 
the system and all users must be cleared to this sensitivity level, and 4) the 
uniform application of system wide, non-discretionary access controls, often 
referred to as mandatory access control (p.6). 
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DoD's mandatory access control systems were difficult to implement and were often 
of little interest to commercial operators. 
DoD recognized the cost effectiveness of using off-the-shelf software as in 
requirement three above. The challenge was to implement the system in such a way that 
security policy implementation and enforcement were: 
1) relatively transparent to the user's program 
2) highly intuitive when the user abides by the security policy 
3) only obvious when the user does not abide by the policy (Feustel & 
Mayfield, 1998, p.7). 
Feustel and Mayfield (1998) maintained that implementation of policies emphasizing 
access control and prevention of information flow seem simple compared to assuring that 
the security policies are executed properly and that the change in DoD requirements 
indicate a change in philosophy within the government regarding information 
management. 
Information security should protect confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information systems. With the widespread use of the Internet and understanding the 
nature of this use as being information intensive, information security was a growing 
spending priority among most companies. Gordon and Loeb (2002) introduced a model 
which took into account the vulnerability of the information to a security breach, as well 
as the risks and return on investment ofthese risks. The results of this analytical research 
suggested that to maximize the expected benefit from investment to protect information a 
company should only spend a fraction of the expected loss. 
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The importance of information security is noted by the large amount of research, most 
of which was focused on the technical aspects. Gordon and Loeb's (2002) article sought 
to derive an economic model that determined the optimal amount to invest in information 
security. This model specifically considered how the vulnerability affected the optimal 
amount of resources that should be devoted to securing that information. 
Gordon and Loeb's (2002) research considered a one-period model ofa firm 
contemplating the provision of additional security to protect given information sets. The 
increased security could be with respect to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Gordon defined an information set as characterized by the loss conditioned on a breach 
occurring, the probability of a threat occurring, and the probability that a threat, once 
realized, would be successful. 
Some of the outcomes supported by Gordon and Loeb (2002) included: 
1) For a given potential of loss, a firm can be better off concentrating its 
resources on high-vulnerability information sets. 
2) A firm should be careful in deciding where to concentrate information 
security resources. 
3) The optimal investment in information security is always less than or 
equal to 36.79% of the loss that would be expected in the absence of any 
investment in security (p.4S3). 
Gordon and Loeb's (2002) analysis showed that: 
For a broad class of security breach probability functions, the optimal amount to 
spend on information security is an increasing function of the level of 
vulnerability of such information. Our analysis also shows that for a second broad 
class of security breach probability functions the optimal amount to spend on 
information security does not always increase with the level of vulnerability of 
such information (p.4S3). 
Future empirical research should assess whether organizations actually invest in 
information security consistent with the outcomes of this article. 
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To successfully defend against security breaches organizations developed security 
policies. The practicality of an infonnation policy depended on whether that policy was 
enforceable and at what cost. Some class enforcement mechanisms work by monitoring 
execution steps of some system and tenninate the execution if it is about to violate the 
security policy being enforced. 
For the most part these general purpose applications-dependent security policies have 
attracted the most attention. However, special purpose security policies are increasingly 
important (Schneider, 2000). The importance of application-dependent and special 
purpose policies, defined as execution monitoring (EM), was explained using the 
Principle of Least Privilege which states that each principle is given the minimum access 
needed to accomplish the task. The practicality of this, or any, security policy is 
dependent upon enforceability and cost. 
Schneider (2000) defined the above application-dependent security policies as 
follows: 
1) Access control defines safety properties. The set of proscribed partial 
executions contains those partial executions ending with an unacceptable 
operation being attempted. 
2) Infonnation flow does not define sets that are properties, so it does not 
define sets that are safety properties. Not being safety properties, there are 
no EM enforcement mechanisms for exactly this property. 
3) Availability, if taken to mean that no principle is forever denied use of 
some given resource, is not a security policy (p.35). 
However, Schneider (2000) noted availability that rules out all denials in excess of 
some predefined maximum wait time was considered a security policy and real systems 
security policies were best written in modules, or a collection of simpler policies. 
Schneider (2000) further noted that large single entity policies were difficult to 
35 
implement and comprehend. Beyond comprehension there were other advantages to 
collections of small policies: 
1) Having a collection allows different enforcement mechanisms to be used 
for different automata (hence the different security policies) in the 
collection. 
2) Security policies specified by distinct automata can be enforced by 
distinct system components (p.46). 
Some significant benefits accrue from having the source of all of an automaton's 
input symbols as a single component. These include: 
1) Enforcement of a component's security policy involves trusting only that 
component. 
2) The overhead of an enforcement mechanism is lower because 
communication between components can be reduced (Schneider, 2000, 
p.42). 
Schneider (2000) believed a precise characterization was given for the class of 
security policies enforceable with mechanisms that work by monitoring system 
execution, and automata were introduced for specifying exactly that class of security 
policy. 
Another major information security concern involved e-commerce. Many 
organizations were using e-commerce to tap a far-reaching global market. Inexpensive 
access and the graphical interface of the Internet provided tremendous opportunities for 
companies to expand using e-commerce to conduct business across their customer base. 
However, there were impediments to the success of this expansion. Rose (1999) 
identified six commonly recognized categories of technological impediments to e-
commerce: 1) download delays, 2) limitations of the interface, 3) search problems, 4) 
inadequate measurement of Web application success, 5) security (or perceived security) 
weaknesses, and 6) lack of Internet standards. Although the six recognized impediments 
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to e-commerce were important, the security weakness impediments were most relevant to 
this research. 
Although the customer has established an Internet connection to the retailer and the 
transmission of data is within bounds, threats to e-commerce still exist. The most 
common of these threats is security. This threat exists for both the customer and the 
retailer. According to Rose (1999) there was sufficient technology to secure the data from 
the client to the server. However, there appeared to be serious security issues in 
preventing hackers from attacking the client and server themselves. 
Transaction security was primarily concerned with either privacy or the guarantee that 
sender and receiver are who they are supposed to be. The infrastructure of the Internet 
was such that messages were being passed in a shared domain. Anyone with access to 
that domain could view all the messages being sent. Under these conditions it was best to 
assume that unauthorized users were viewing these messages (Rose, 1999). Although the 
encryption or authentication technology existed to combat this, many companies were 
slow to use this technology. Thus, a primary weakness in Internet security was the 
failure to use either encryption or authentication. Encrypted messages, when used 
correctly, were better protected from all but the most dedicated criminal interceptor. 
Using these technologies secured the transaction process to the point that the biggest 
dangers to security occurred after the data was transferred to the retailer's server (Rose, 
1999). 
Conducting e-commerce created the potential of greater access to the corporate 
databases. However, security threats to the retailer's server and access by disgruntled 
employees existed whether or not the organization conducted e-business. While 
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sophisticated firewalls and other security measures existed, many hackers appeared to be 
one step ahead of available security (Rose, 1999). 
These perceived threats were seen by customers as real, so that customers were not yet 
comfortable with sending personal information across the Internet. In spite of existing 
technologies it was estimated that 6 million Americans have been victims of e-commerce 
fraud or related credit card misuse. He maintained that in spite of the existing security 
technologies, Internet security was a serious threat to business-to-consumer e-commerce 
and that transactional security was a managerial rather than a technical problem (Rose, 
1999). 
Intrusion detection systems were in their infancy. Within discussion of network 
intrusions or penetrations it was not always clear as to what constituted misuse, or which 
types of misuse could be construed as illegal. Rosenthal (1999) defined computer misuse 
as "the performance of an action that is not desired by the system owner, one that does 
not conform to the system's acceptable use andlor security policy". Regardless of the 
determination of criminology, the number and complexity of computer and network 
attacks were growing at an alarming rate with very little being done to effectively prevent 
them. However, the damage caused by this misuse can be contained with the 
implementation of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). IDS has become more 
sophisticated since its introduction, and in the years 1997 and 1998, the market for IDS 
grew from $40 million to $100 million, primarily due to the steady increase in computer 
breaches. The use of IDS cannot be implemented in a haphazard manner and be expected 
to be effective. The implementation requires careful planning, phased deployments, and 
specialized training (Rosenthal, 1999). According to the National Institute of Standards 
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and Technology (NIST) there are three viable ways to justify the costs of implementing 
IDS. These are: 
1) The first way rests on the fact that intrusion-detection technology can 
detect attacks that cannot be prevented. Sophisticated hackers with 
experience and know-how can penetrate most networks because ofthe 
existence of network vulnerabilities that cannot be fixed (e.g. legacy 
computers with operating systems that are no longer updated or patched). 
Even current and updatable systems are often neglected because of 
inexperienced administrators or the absence of a viable policy or 
procedure to ensure that available system updates and patches are applied 
correctly and in a timely manner. 
2) The second wayan organization can justify an IDS is obvious; intrusion-
detection technology can prevent attackers from probing the network. A 
network that does not have operational intrusion-detection resources is an 
open invitation for attackers to probe for existing weaknesses without fear 
of retribution, knowing that vulnerabilities will eventually be found and 
possibly exploited. 
3) And finally, intrusion-detection systems can provide proof of attack and 
can characterize and verify both internal and external threats. This leads to 
intrusion accountability, and it provides a third way to justify their 
existence (Rosenthal, 1999, p.37). 
To be effective there must have been a comprehensive review of existing security 
policies and procedures, and thought must have been given to how IDS will fit into the 
overall security plan and the security goals of the organization. At a minimum the 
security goals should have included: 
1) Confidentiality: only authorized users can read or copy a given file or 
object. 
2) Control: only authorized users can decide when to allow access to 
information. 
3) Integrity: only authorized users can alter or delete a given file or object. 
4) Authenticity: correctness of attribution or description. 
5) Availability: no unauthorized users can deny authorized users timely 
access to files and other system resources. 
6) Utility: fitness for a specified purpose (Rosenthal, 1999, p.37). 
The open systems architecture of the Internet created an environment in which hackers 
and attackers exploited security vulnerabilities locally or from a distance, although 
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research indicated that more than three quarters of all misuse activities originate from 
within an organization (Rosenthal, 1999). 
Rosenthal (1999) defined network or systems intrusions as "any set of actions that 
attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of a resource" and 
broke down these intrusions into two main categories: 
1) Misuse intrusions, which are well planned or orchestrated attacks that 
target a system's weak points, but can be detected by watching for certain 
actions being executed on certain objects or systems. 
2) Anomaly intrusions, which are deviations from established normal system 
usage patterns that can be detected by creating a "normal use" profile of 
the system being monitored and comparing deviations from that profile 
(p.38). 
Computer intrusions were classified with respect to six different and distinct motives: 
1) Government and military: attempting to access information of national 
strategic importance. 
2) Business: attempting to gain a competitive advantage by obtaining design 
or source code information. 
3) Financial: attempting to obtain direct financial gain by stealing credit card 
information or stealing/transferring money from bank accounts. 
4) Terrorist: attempting to cause damage by attacks on computers rather than 
by way of traditional methods. 
5) Grudge: personal retaliation resulting in the destruction of computing 
resources. 
6) Fun: attempting to gain access for enjoyment rather than personal gain or 
profit (Rosenthal, 1999, p.38). 
Rosenthal (1999) described the protocols that encompass most attacks, which he 
stated were usually in this order: 
1) Reconnaissance: information gathering. 
2) Probe and attack: identify weaknesses and deploy attack tools. 
3) Toehold: exploits known weaknesses and secures entry to the system. 
4) Advancement: migrate from an unprivileged to a privileged account. 
5) Stealth: install "backdoor" tools, and covers an attacker's tracks. 
6) Listening post: establish a listening or monitoring posture. 
7) Takeover: expand intruder control from single host to multiple hosts or 
networks (p.38). 
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These sophisticated attack scenarios and innovative penetration methods required 
extremely complex detection mechanisms to which IDS systems had not yet evolved. 
Although IDS technology was seen by many as a "cure all" many IDS products were still 
in the development stage. Intrusion detection was not without its pitfalls and problems, 
and these continued to detract from the effectiveness and dependability of the intrusion 
detection process (Rosenthal, 1999). 
Information security was not the only aspect of security needing definition. The 
American Society for Industrial Security convened the Fourth Annual 
AcademiclPractitioner Symposium to create an undergraduate and graduate program in 
industrial security in which the chair, stated "There are no clearly illuminated paths to 
good security education" (Longmore-Etheridge, 2000). Prior to the symposium a pre-
survey was used to identify content for future security courses and information systems 
security emerged as a major player: 
The topics from the survey results were: physical security, personal security, 
information systems security, investigations, loss prevention, risk management, 
legal issues, emergency planning, fire protection, crisis management, disaster 
management, counterterrorism, competitive intelligence, executive protection, and 
violence in the workplace, crime prevention, crime prevention through 
environmental design, and security architecture and engineering (Longmore-
Etheridge, 2000, p.63). 
Symposium participants were divided into groups to create graduate and 
undergraduate courses. The graduate group identified the core areas that they would like 
to see in security curriculum. These core areas included: 
1) Legal and Investigative Aspects of Risk Management 
2) Information Security, and Information Systems Threats and Security and 
Security Concepts and Organizational Leadership 
3) Design of Integrated Systems 
4) Business Functions of Security 
5) Special Issues and Current Trends 
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6) Methodology (Longmore-Etheridge, 2000, p.63). 
The undergraduate group finalized the core areas to include: 
1) Business and Organizational Security Risk Management 
2) Physical Security Systems; Integration and Analysis 
3) Personnel and Information Security System 
4) Security Management in the Business Environment (Longmore-Etheridge, 
2000, p.64). 
In addition to developing a core of courses for undergraduate and graduate education, 
the security industry tried to develop a security body-of-knowledge. This body of 
knowledge defined who security professionals were, what security stood for, and its 
diversity of topics. This body-of-knowledge used the following model to define 
requirements: 
1) Determine Objectives 
2) Design Protection Systems 
3) Evaluate the Protection Systems 
By using this structure, roles and responsibilities were defined so others can recognize the 
value security adds to the organization (Longmore-Etheridge, 2000). 
Certification 
The CISSP was a broad top-down certification (Dugan & Prencipe, 2001) created by 
the International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC)2 which 
was supported by the Computer Security Institute, Information Systems Security 
Association, the Canadian Information Processing Society, as well as other industry 
presences (Sumner & Werner, 1997). (ISC) 2 was instrumental in the development of the 
CISSP, which was considered the most comprehensive certification for information 
systems security professionals. 
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A new certification was developed by the (ISC/ in 2002 which addressed the need for 
certification as a practitioner in systems security. It also encompassed seven domains of 
information security, some of which were similar to the CISSP domains. This 
certification stressed the need for a practitioner of information security whereas CISSP 
outlined a more general and deeper knowledge of information security. Both were 
recognized as definitive certifications in the field of information security and were 
essential to the development of the domains used by this research in identifying tasks 
performed in an information systems security environment. For many organizations the 
CISSP was considered to be the gold standard in information security (Dugan & 
Prencipe, 2001). 
The study guide for the CISSP Common Body of Knowledge (CBK) domains was 
considered the key to obtaining the CISSP certification. This study guide outlined CBK 
requirements for certification as an Information Systems Security Professional. Krutz 
and Vines (2001) have written extensively on mastering the 10 domains listed in the 
CISSP CBKs. Their CISSP Preparatory Guide is one of the few books with detailed 
knowledge ofthe requirements needed to become a CISSP certified security professional. 
Other certificating bodies include the International Information Security Foundation 
which formed a committee to develop and promulgate generally accepted security 
principles. The outcome of this committee was the document known as the Generally 
Accepted Systems Security Principles (GASSP). This document was produced in 1992. 
Rather than another ad hoc effort, the GASSP decided to establish an 
Authoritative Foundation of existing works that, through their broad acceptance, 
have articulated, in one way or another, the GASSP ofthe information security 
profession. Recognizing the hierarchic nature of principles, it was determined 
to use the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Information Security Principles, with their international acceptance, as the 
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model for the foundation of the GASSP hierarchy, the Pervasive Principles, and, 
through a careful analysis and mapping ofthe Authoritative Foundation and 
derivative works, to develop Broad Functional Principles, as accepted and 
supported by consensus of the IT industry and profession. Finally the GASSP 
will develop Detailed Principles, including "how to" guidance. 
The development of a consensus-building process is central to the success of 
this approach. Other key tasks include the establishment of linkages to the 
Common Criteria and the (Isci sponsored CISSP designation. 
Finally, two essential elements, which will be evolutionary in nature, are to be 
developed. The first is the definition and establishment of an authoritative 
infrastructure, or governing body. This effort has been initiated. Second is the 
development of models for legislative/regulatory initiatives that have the 
support ofthe profession, industry, and government. Their purpose will be to 
establish the "glue" that effectively binds the consolidation of these complex 
issues internationally. 
OBJECTIVES: 
1) The international harmonization of culturally neutral information security 
2) The elimination of artificial barriers to the free flow of information 
worldwide 
3) The definition and implementation of a principled foundation for an 
industry, the success of which is critical to the future of the Information 
Age and its ramifications for privacy and security 
4) Provision for the rapidly evolving nature of information security methods, 
issues, and technology, and their articulation in principle 
5) Recognition and correlation to related management issues. (The 
International Information Security Foundation (I2SF), 1991, p.3). 
The CISSP was based in part on the GASSP results (Grimaila & Kim, 2002). 
Curriculum Design 
The 21 st century will see significant changes in information technology. E-
commerce, broadband technology for the home, home based networking, and video 
conferencing are representative ofthese changes. The IT professional will be tasked to 
keep up with these changes through continuous education and training. Lightfoot (1999) 
observed that educational institutions should shoulder the burden for the preparation of 
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infonnation technology professionals for the vibrant environment ofthe upcoming 
century. 
It is the responsibility of the education system, particularly at the college 
undergraduate level, to prepare future infonnation technology professionals for 
the dynamic environment ofthe 21 st century. This preparation has a dual purpose. 
First, it must give students the necessary skills in current industry practices to 
satisfy requirements for an entry level position. Second, it must provide students 
with the fundamental background and abilities to learn new skills throughout their 
career. In effect, teaching current skills helps student secure their first job, 
whereas teaching fundamentals helps them get subsequent jobs (PA3). 
Lightfoot (1999) identified problems that institutions face due to the speed of change 
in infonnation technology. He cited research which indicated that technology courses 
emphasizing fundamentals were being scaled back in favor of other less technical 
offerings. 
Basically, the problem is one of balance between the dual purposes of a college 
level education. The temptation is to overemphasize the current trendy topics at 
the expense of more mundane, fundamentals-based curriculum (pA3). 
However, businesses had a very pragmatic view of infonnation technology 
curriculum. They would prefer that colleges and universities generate a steady stream of 
graduates with expertise in tools and applications so that entry level students were 
productive upon hiring (Lightfoot, 1999). 
Lightfoot (1999) identified three basic categories of curriculum design and discussed 
the pros and cons of each: 
A large amount of excellent research has been perfonned to detennine the proper 
curriculum design for an undergraduate college level IS program. The research of 
this type can generally be grouped into three categories: 
1. Proposed model curricula generated by professional organizations 
2. Surveys to detennine the specific skills that academics or professionals 
think an IS student should have for the future 
3. Case studies of curriculum in a specific IS department (p.50). 
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This research was most concerned with category two "Surveys to determine the 
specific skills that academics or professionals think an IS student should have for the 
future". Lightfoot (1999) identified specific problems he felt were associated with this 
method of curriculum development. Lightfoot (1999) stipulated that it did not take into 
consideration the time lag needed to actually produce graduates. Depending on the 
institution it can take anywhere from one to three years to implement a new program, 
with between five to eight years before a student graduates with the new skill set. 
According to Lightfoot (1999) the major problem with future-oriented IS curriculum 
survey research was that: 
It forces the department to use a short-term perspective to implement long-term 
planning. It is doomed to fail in most cases and places IS curriculum designers in 
a position of constantly chasing a moving target. The conclusions from the 
literature concerning new, emerging skills and obsolete, sundown skills make this 
point. There will always be new skills on the horizon that businesses want. The 
curriculum design process should not be regulated to "chasing rainbows" to 
satisfy business (p.59). 
In IT curriculum development academic institutions must consider how organizations 
implement IT training. Foreign competition, increased efficiency, and the speed of 
technological advances have forced businesses to take a close look at the role end-users 
and end-user training play in the organization. In the age of knowledge workers, white 
collar college-educated employees were the future users of information technology. The 
prime objective of end-user technology training was to help the organization achieve its 
goals through the optimum use of its personnel. As technology expanded, the knowledge 
required to use this technology expanded and training became more important. Desai and 
Von Der Embse (2001) stated that due to this expansion oftechnology, end-user 
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computer skills become obsolete in a short period oftime. Effective training can reduce, 
if not eliminate, the difference between actual and desired end-user performance. 
End-user computing required not only a firm background in information technology, 
but an understanding of various organizational functions: 
Thus, a student who aspires to be an information systems manager must have both 
the business knowledge and the technical ability to apply the tools used in 
business. If an MIS curriculum is totally based on IT, it might produce an 
acceptable IT expert. However, this expert is not sufficiently versed on its 
implications for business process and functions (Desai & Von Der Embse, 2001, 
p.553). 
Information technology education and its interrelationship with businesses were key 
variables in the success of information technology curriculum. Information technology in 
this instance referred to any technology that, directly or indirectly, made information 
available to the end-user in any organization or in society. This included information 
security. Whenever this new technology was introduced to an organization its members 
were required to retrain their skills to maintain their performance level. As a result most 
organizations have used one or more of the following approaches to accomplish this 
retraining: 
1) Self-training or On the Job Training (OJT) - refers to the training an 
employee gets while at work. This type of end-user training can be 
obtained via manuals, a mentor/tutor, or distance learning, intranet, or by 
trial and error. 
2) In-house training - denotes formal training an individual's employer 
provides via scheduled instruction on their organizational premises. 
Organizations such as Texas Instruments and EDS have in-house training 
programs for their end-users of IT. 
3) Outside training- many organizations outsource some part of formal 
training to outside training consultants. The outside training may be due to 
unavailability of or greater cost of in-house expertise for a specific 
technology. 
4) Formal education - in some cases, employees may be required to pursue a 
formal degree program (Desai & Von Der Embse, 2001, p.555). 
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In light of the above approaches, many universities began to revisit their strategy for 
developing information technology curriculum and began to provide specific training to 
their students such as preparation for specific certifications. To be successful institutions 
were required to differentiate information technology education from specific 
information technology training. An integrated approach was needed incorporating 
specific training, conceptual education, and business management education. In 
educational institutions this integration required a partnership between information 
technology educators, business educators, and business managers. Information 
technology faculty should have assessed industry trends for specific future information 
technology requirements. 
This synergistic approach to information technology curriculum development will be 
very useful to future graduates in an information technology program. This approach also 
validated the requirements for the development of a baseline common body of knowledge 
for information security. 
Bishop (2000) began his keynote speech to the National Colloquium on Information 
Systems Security with the following statement: 
The last four years have seen an explosion in the concern for the security of 
information. People are becoming aware of how much information is publicly 
available, as stories in the national news media discuss the ease with which 
identities are stolen. On a less personal note, compromises of information 
involving people authorized to access that information show that both companies 
and governments have problems in securing information. With this awareness has 
grown an understanding of our dependence on accurate, confidential information 
as well as the fragility of the infrastructure we use to secure that information. Of 
all the questions emerging, the fundamental one is; how can we secure 
information (p.l)? 
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In this speech Bishop (2000) defined the current practice in infonnation security 
education as meeting the National Plan for Infonnation Systems Protection. However, 
this plan has yet to define infonnation security education in any meaningful way. He 
stipulated that: 
The report makes cursory mention of the interdependence of the various fonns of 
education, and focuses primarily on training, awareness, and providing support 
for government and industry, and for academic programs that support the efforts 
of the government's plan directly (p.l). 
The document clearly underscored that the education being discussed was training, 
although support for undergraduate work was provided through Scholarship for Service. 
This speech further defined the goals and advantages of good undergraduate 
education. Bishop (2000) stipulated that the goal of undergraduate education was to learn 
broad principles and apply them. The advantage of obtaining this goal was the breadth of 
learning obtained. There was an emerging interest in improving the state of infonnation 
systems security education. The desired improvements included establishing core 
curricula and integrating computer security into more aspects of infonnation technology 
education. NSA was on the forefront of this drive with it Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Infonnation Assurance Education Program: 
Specifically, the Centers of Academic Excellence in Infonnation Assurance 
Education has as one evaluation criterion that the academic program demonstrates 
infonnation security is not treated as a separate discipline, but as a 
multidisciplinary science with the body of infonnation assurance knowledge 
incorporated into various disciplines (Bishop, 2000, p.8). 
NSA stipulated the goals of this program were to create a climate of independent research 
in infonnation assurance. 
Bishop (2000) outlined the goals of infonnation security education and discussed the 
progress being made in meeting these goals: 
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1) We are making minimal progress in integrating information security into 
other parts of our curricula. 
2) We have not learned from our mistakes, and continue to repeat errors from 
the past. 
3) We have not improved how we design systems and programs to account 
for security constraints, nor have we reduced the number of security 
patches necessary. 
4) We are learning how to abstract the requisite characteristics of a system 
towards this end, but we have much to learn. 
5) We do not understand how humans interact with systems, how security 
problems arise from this interaction, and therefore cannot use this 
knowledge to build systems that minimize the possibility and effects of 
errors (p.l 0). 
His final statement in this speech supported the need for a comprehensive and definitive 
baseline in the skills needed for information security curricula: 
All forms of education, from basic research to training are critical to responding 
effectively to the information security crisis we face now. In addition to focusing 
our efforts on training, we should focus our efforts on basic research and higher 
education. The latter two will provide the teachers and researchers to train 
systems administrators, business executives, and management in the intricacies of 
information security that affect them and their organizations. Further, the 
emphasis on basic research will lead to more research faculty in the area of 
information security, thereby seeding more universities and academic institutions 
with people who can teach and do research in that area (Bishop, 2000, p.ll). 
Information Systems Security Curriculum 
Dr. Cynthia Irvine, on faculty at the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), was 
instrumental in developing the information security curriculum at NPS and has written 
extensively on its implementation. The school designed the program as a track within its 
computer science curriculum. This track conveyed vital concepts in current information 
security concepts (Irvine, Warren, & Clark, 1997). Irvine's article, Goalsfor Computer 
Education, identified two different approaches to computer security education. One 
approach was to treat security as an ad hoc set of functions. The second approach was to 
build security into systems using an engineering-oriented approach based on fundamental 
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principles (Irvine, 1996). One significant issue faced by infonnation security curriculum 
developers using an engineering-oriented approach was whether to stress basic 
fundamentals or current applications that tend to be vendor specific. Lightfoot (1999) 
suggested that a combination of the two should be included in any curriculum 
development process. In his keynote speech to the National Colloquium on Infonnation 
Systems Security Education Bishop (1997) identified the problems with current 
infonnation systems security and outlined the future direction of infonnation systems 
security education needed to ensure success in an infonnation systems security 
environment. He stated the past curriculum was concerned with the application of 
principles and operational issues whereas the emphasis has been on the analysis of the 
principles themselves. 
Carnegie Mellon University supported the contention that there is no set of skills 
identified as being necessary in infonnation security curriculum development: 
There apparently is no systematic agreement on the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities required to fonnulate a curriculum for infonnation assurance and security 
professionals that enjoys a broad-based support across organizations 
("Infonnation Assurance Curriculum", 1999). 
There was pressure from the government to provide some minimum level of 
competence for systems and network professionals working in the field of infonnation 
assurance. One initiative that attempted to address this problem was NSA's development 
of the National INFOSEC Education and Training Program which established the 
Infonnation Assurance Courseware Evaluation Process. This process was intended to 
assess the degree to which various institutions, colleges, and university curricula satisfied 
the NSTISSI standards. 
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Many professional organizations began to recognize the importance of information 
security for their membership by offering certifications in information security. 
The International Federation of Information Processing (IFIP) has issued a 
statement on information security assessment and certification as part of an effort 
to establish international certification standards for individuals accessing 
information technology systems and the information security management of 
those systems. IFIP held the First World Conference on Information Security 
Education in Stockholm in June 1999. 
The Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) provides the 
Certified Information Systems Auditor Program. The American Society of 
Industrial Security (ASIS) provides certification for general security management. 
USENIX Systems Administrator's Guild (SAGE) has a certification 
subcommittee currently studying certification for systems administrators 
("Information Assurance Curriculum", 1999). 
Other organizations worked with accreditation institutions to ensure a viable 
information security curriculum. 
The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) and the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) have relationships established with 
organizations that are involved with accreditation of higher-education computer 
science and engineering programs. However, accreditation does not get to the 
level of granularity that includes requirements for information security curricula 
("Information Assurance Curriculum", 1999). 
Many other professional organizations offer courses and conferences to their members 
as part of a continuing education process. For example, Information Systems Security 
Association (ISSA) provides continuing technical education forums and conferences. 
More and more universities are offering graduate and undergraduate programs in 
information security. In 1999 there were fewer than six universities conforming to 
NSA's criteria for becoming a Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education. In 2002 there were 37 universities meeting the criteria required by the NSA 
("Centers of Academic Excellence", 2002). 
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The business community recognized the need for information security. However, a 
majority of information security training in the private sector was vendor specific. 
Some vendors, such as Cisco Systems, have curriculum tracks that cluster 
technology specializations and provide certification designations, such as "Cisco 
Certified Network Professional" with a specialization in security ("Information 
Assurance Curriculum", 1999). 
Bishop (2000), in his report to the National Colloquium on Information System 
Security stated that to rely on vendor specific education would not provide a well 
rounded information systems security professional. 
The NSA developed a program to recognize colleges and universities with information 
assurance programs meeting published criteria based on training standards established by 
the NSTISSC. The overall curriculum has to be mapped to NSTISSI 4011 National 
Training Standards for Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Professionals. As this 
document was developed in June of 1994, a comparison of the CISSP domains and this 
standard revealed serious gaps in the requirements as dictated by the NSA ("Centers of 
Academic Excellence", 2002). NSA is afflicted with an image problem due, in part, to its 
mandate to be able to break into, as well as protect systems. These conflicts have been 
epitomized in controversies relating to its cryptographic policy (Blumenthal, 1999). 
Golshani, F., Panchanathan, S., Friesen, 0., Park, Y., and Song, J. (2001) observed 
that a formal definition of the basic principles of information security did not exist and 
that this lack contributed to an unstructured approach to information security. Yang 
(2001) discussed the need of higher education to become involved in training both 
university students and on-the-job professionals. His analysis of what should be taught 
was based on an analysis of existing certification requirements of the following major 
agencies: 
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1) Certified Infonnation Systems Auditor 
2) Certified Infonnation Systems Security Professional 
3) System and Network Assurance Program 
4) Systems Administration, Networking, and Security. 
As of2002, infonnation systems curriculum was driven by the NSA's Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Infonnation Assurance Education. The award of this designation 
was dependent upon meeting 10 specific criteria for measurement. In a review of the 
curriculum for the 37 universities designated as Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Infonnation Assurance Education, Logan (2002) found that undergraduate education was 
not a popular option for curriculum in infonnation security. 
Recognizing the connection between infonnation security and emerging infonnation 
technologies, John Hopkins University created the Infonnation Security Institute which 
conducted research, offered classes and degree programs, created business relationships, 
and held open forums in broad topics centered on infonnation security (piazza, 2001). 
The chairman of John Hopkins University's Computer Science Department described the 
new program as interdisciplinary: 
We see the development of new types of hybrid degrees taking a holistic approach 
to the infonnation security area, in recognition that it's not only a technical field 
but deals with issues in policy, standards, law, ethics, and many other areas. 
Customized degrees might include a cross between an MBA and a computer 
science degree. In addition, the institute will address a range of issues from 
critical infrastructure protection to national and international economics to 
intellectual property protection. Many other degree combinations are possible 
among these disciplines (pAO). 
Recognition by the NSA as a Center of Academic Excellence in Infonnation 
Assurance Education required individual courses be mapped to NSTISSI4012, National 
Training Standard for Designated Approving Authority, NSTISSI 4013 National Training 
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Standardfor Systems Administrators in Information Systems Security, NSTISSI4014 
National Training Standard for Information Systems Security Officers, and NSTISSI 4015 
National Training Standard for Systems Certifiers. In 1997 the term "assurance" was 
propagated because of its ambiguity for most people and its meaning to information 
systems security professionals (Blumenthal, 1999). 
Protection of information assets had been a major challenge from the beginning of the 
computer age. Given the widespread use of information technology for day-to-day 
business operations, and the continued use of the Internet to conduct business, the need to 
protect our business infrastructure was critical. University graduates who are information 
security literate and are equipped with the proper knowledge can alleviate many of the 
issues regarding information security. The task of integrating information security into 
existing computer science programs is complicated. Yang (2001) suggested that 
information security curriculum designers address the following questions prior to 
developing their curriculum: 
1) How would we prepare our students so they would be security literate? 
2) Given the fast advancement of computer technology, how would a faculty 
member become security aware and capable ofteaching the new tools and 
techniques? 
3) In addition to technical solutions of computer security (such as firewalls, 
encryption, access controls, audit trails, training, benchmarking, 
interoperability, et al), should and how would the curriculum cover non-
technical aspects such as social, cultural, political, legal, economic, and 
organizational issues? 
4) Should computer security be integrated throughout the curriculum, or should 
special courses and/or tracks be created to address the needs? 
5) Should alternative curriculum delivery mechanisms be used? Examples 
include Web based delivery, continuing education courses, corporate training, 
distance education, et al (p.236). 
He has also identified seven basics of computer security education: 
1) Understand and comply with security policy and laws 
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2) Recognize potential security problems in their environment 
3) Know how to be proactive in preventing security problems 
4) React appropriately to an occurrence of a security problem 
5) Know where to find additional help or information 
6) Make informed decisions on security matters 
7) Speak the language (p.239). 
Yang (2001) made seven specific observations regarding the development of an 
information security curriculum: 
Observation #1: Involvement of higher education in computer security is urgently 
needed in training both college students and on-the-job professionals, in order to 
meet the challenges of protecting the information infrastructure. 
Observation #2: It is important to address the ethical and cultural issues in the 
computer security curriculum. 
Observation #3: A majority of computer security curriculum involves extension of 
traditional Computer Science curriculum, such as networking, programming, 
databases, et al. 
Observation # 4: Computer security education is more than just providing training 
on technical topics. It should contain components that address business and 
managerial aspects of computer security, such as law, investigations, ethics, 
physical security, and business continuity and disaster recovery. 
Observation # 5: Similar to other computer professions, the abilities of the 
students to recognize and analyze a problem and get a "handle" on it is critical for 
being successful in the profession of computer security. 
Observation # 6: Similar to integrating any new major technology into the 
Computer Science education, the integration of computer security into the 
undergraduate programs requires strong support from the Administration. 
Observation # 7: The process of integrating computer security into a program is a 
continuous process and involves the faculty's involvement in multiple activities, 
including research, professional development, curricular design, and teaching 
(p.240). 
The integration of computer security into existing computer science was complicated; 
however, it was urgently required. Yang's (2001) observation #4, in particular, supported 
the need for the development of a common body of knowledge in information security 
which contained elements oflaw, investigations, ethics, physical security, and business 
continuity and disaster recovery. 
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Sumner and Werner's (1997) research examined information systems ethics in a 
networked environment as part of an information security curriculum. They believed that 
ethical issues attracted increased attention in the past few years. They categorized ethical 
issues into privacy, accuracy, property, and accessibility. Privacy dealt with what 
information a person must reveal to others. Accuracy identified who was responsible for 
authenticity of the information. Property considered who owns the information, as well as 
fair price for the use of the information. Accessibility was the information someone has 
the right to retrieve, under what conditions, and with what safeguards. Using survey 
research Sumner and Werner (1997) found that management information systems (MIS) 
professionals demonstrated a greater sensitivity to information systems ethical issues than 
college students. 
Similar to many organizations, academic computing enjoyed rapid growth. In many 
colleges and universities academic computing consisted of multiple open access 
computers and computerized classrooms which provided access to a shared network 
drive, the internet, e-mail servers, library databases, and printing. According to Sumner 
and Werner (1997) some of the problems that occurred regularly in a networked 
environment were: 
1) Abuse of public computing resources, including tying up open-access 
workstations, disk space, network printers, and other shared resources. 
2) Invasion of privacy, such as gaining unauthorized access to other people's 
electronic mail, by breaking passwords or spoofing. 
3) Improper use of computer systems, including harassment, commercial use of 
instructional facilities, and misrepresentation of user communications (p.1). 
These problems were supposedly addressed by acceptable use policies (AUP); 
however, in many educational institutions the question of restrictions, consequences, and 
punishments were less clear and not understood. It was extremely important that 
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educational institutions educated electronic learners with regard to their rights and 
responsibilities. This included providing knowledge of the electronic privacy policies that 
existed. In a statement included in the American Association for Higher Education's 
(AAHE) Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for Electronic Learners the issue of privacy 
was addressed: 
1) Since the electronic community of learners is based upon the integrity and 
authenticity of information, it shall be each citizen's personal responsibility to 
be aware of the potential for and possible affects of manipulating electronic 
information, to verify integrity and authenticity, and to assure the security of 
information that he or she compiles or uses. 
2) Each citizen, as a member ofthe electronic community oflearners, is 
responsible to all other citizens in that community, to respect and value the 
rights of privacy for all, to recognize and respect the diversity of the 
population and opinion in the community, to behave ethically, and to comply 
with legal restrictions regarding the use of information resources (Sumner & 
Werner, 1997, p.l). 
Questions of ethics in information systems were prevalent in the computer industry. 
However, the information systems profession had not raised attention to the broader 
aspects of the social and ethical impacts of information technology. The prevalence of 
software piracy, satellite interceptions, hacker intrusions, implanted bugs, viruses, Trojan 
horses, and trap doors indicated that ethics and the management of information 
technology were contradictory terms (Sumner & Werner, 1997). 
In general, the students were more lenient than the information systems practitioners 
in which the intent was not malicious. However, Sumner and Werner (1997) found: 
on a number of issues the students and practitioners were in agreement on a 
number of unacceptable behavior including: 1) tying up a computer by playing 
games when another student needed to do homework, 2) not destroying pirated 
software, 3) intentionally swamping a mail hub, 4) spreading a destructive virus, 
5) mimicking a high-ranking official on the network without explanation, and 6) 
copying another student's file without authorization (p.6). 
The research demonstrated the need for integrating concepts of ethics in information 
systems education. 
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Rapid advances in information systems gave users enormous capabilities to process, 
store, and transmit digital data. This capability increased the requirement for managing 
information security. In addition to confidentiality, integrity, and availability the 
principles of responsibility, personal integrity, trust, and ethicality also held the key for 
successfully managing information security. While technical controls were vital, the uses 
of information had to be considered (Sumner & Werner, 1997). 
The degree of internetworking has transformed traditional centralized, hierarchical 
organizations into a loosely coupled network of departments and functions characterized 
by cooperation instead of autonomy and control. This structure facilitated the sharing of 
information, as well as interpersonal and inter-organizational connectivity. In order to be 
efficient, effective, and responsive, organizations gave prominence to the use of networks 
and computer based information systems. Fearing competitive pressure, organizations 
embraced information technology without regard to the planning or implementation of 
information security (Dhillon & Blackhouse, 2000). 
In light ofthis evolving information technology environment the role of information 
security was changing. The focus has shifted to the organization as a whole and the 
soundness of the information systems. As information systems are operated by people 
Dhillon and Blackhouse (2000) proposed "what we need are principles that require 
observance at all times, and especially when there may not be any relevant rules to 
follow". Traditional computer science programs had little to offer in this regard. 
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Curriculum in information security needed to include organizational theory, 
management science, and emerging technologies in information systems. Information 
systems security had to address not just the data, but the changing organizational context 
in which it was interpreted and used (Dhillon & Blackhouse, 2000). 
Along with the traditional information security principles of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability information security should have included responsibility, personal 
integrity, trust, and ethicality. Dhillon and Blackhouse (2000) defined these new 
principles as follows: 
1. Responsibility is the understanding of roles and responsibilities inherent in 
a job. Employees are expected to develop work practices on a basis of a 
clear understanding of their responsibilities. 
2. Personal integrity evaluates how a member of an organization divulges 
proprietary information to a third party. Business-sensitive information 
has great value, and organizations need to consider whom they allow to 
enter the fraternity. 
3. Trust is where the emphasis is less on external control and supervision and 
more self control and responsibility. 
4. Ethicality presupposes that fellow members will act in accordance with 
some ethical practices that are not company rules and can be applied to all 
formalized procedures (p.38). 
Technical controls were vital with regard to users who accessed systems, but new 
concepts of information security should have considered the behavioral aspects involved 
with organizational change (Dhillon & Blackhouse, 2000). Research indicated new 
information security programs must include aspects of management, behavior, law, and 
business. 
Many professional organizations have recommended model curriculum guides used by 
schools, colleges and universities in the design of programs in information technology. 
The Joint Task Force on Computing Curricula, comprised of members from both the 
IEEE Computer Society and the Association for Computing Machinery, developed the 
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curricula model Computing Curricula 2001 in Computer Science which identified a 
computer science body of knowledge with core topics. This body of knowledge consisted 
of 132 topics of which four were security related ("The Joint Task Force", 2001). Office 
Systems Research Association (OSRA) has redefined its model curriculum for 
organization and end-user information systems, has recognized the need for an 
introductory course in information systems security, and has conducted research on a 
common body of knowledge required for this course (S. Hunt, personal communication, 
February 20, 2003). 
The need for rigorous and scholarly research into the development of an information 
security curriculum was further emphasized by Longmore-Etheridge's (2000) paper 
describing the Fourth Annual AcademiclPractitioner Symposium, which convened to 
create an undergraduate/graduate curriculum model for an area of concentration in 
information security. This symposium consisted of 40 experts from the field, whose goal 
was to develop six to eight three credit courses for an information security concentration. 
Although a survey was used to develop a baseline for the course development it was 
neither rigorous nor empirical in nature. 
In information security two models of information security education were apparent. 
These models were provided by: 
1) Private certifying organizations such as the federal government, International 
Information Systems Security Certificate Consortium, Systems Administration, 
Network and Security and the International Association of Computer 
Investigations Specialist; and 
2) Proprietary sources. 
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The International Information Systems Security Certificate Consortium (ISC2) model 
represented and attempted to standardize information security into a Common Body of 
Knowledge (CBK) (Logan, 2002). This organization's CISSP examination was an 
attempt to ensure that information systems security professionals met standard criteria of 
knowledge and continued to upgrade that knowledge (Krutz & Vines, 2001). 
The University of Maryland recognized the CISSP as being instrumental in identifying 
a common body of knowledge for implementation in its business management 
curriculum. Although Hazari (2002) admitted that it did not provide sufficient course 
work in finance, organization or strategy, it did lay the ground for basic information 
security. 
Kim and Choi (2002) came close to identifying the work actually performed by 
information systems security professionals in the field. Their research on identifying the 
educational requirements for information systems security professionals in Korea 
identified the following as essential for practitioners of information security. In order of 
importance they were: 
I) establishing information security policy 
2) establishing managerial security measures 
3) analyzing security environments 
4) risk analysis and assessment 
5) understanding basic cryptology 
6) acknowledging laws and regulations 
7) testing vulnerabilities in information security systems 
8) designing physical security measures 
9) coping with hacking 
10) managing intrusion check and detection 
11) privacy and ethics 
12) handling computer viruses 
13) knowledge of information security standards 
14) managing security education programs 
15) knowledge of security system evaluation (p.250). 
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The determination of key educational requirements for information systems security 
professionals by security experts was an important contribution to the improvement of 
information security program development (Kim and Choi, 2002). Kim and Choi's 
(2002) study gave impetus to the need for more rigorous and empirical research in 
defining the skills and attributes of information system security professionals in the field. 
Summary 
The introduction contained procedures for identifying, reviewing, and documenting 
applicable research completed in the field of information security, information security 
requirements, and information security curriculum. An historical overview documented 
information security and education beginning in the 1960s. This section also identified 
the areas most pertinent to the objectives and goals of this literature search which 
included: 
1) Information Technology 
2) Information Systems Security 
3) Certification 
4) Curriculum Design 
5) Information Systems Security Curriculum 
Since rigorous and empirical research is beyond the scope of many research projects, 
most of the examined documented research addressed only limited information security 
requirements, or relied on existing and outdated certification or training standards. 
Although there were a number of certifications, many were vendor specific. While 
there were some broad, non-vendor specific certifications the CISSP was considered the 
only top-down approach to identifying specific requirements and was considered by 
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many to be the defacto certification. Research indicated information security curriculum 
fitting into two broad categories: 
1) developed using the expertise of faculty, or 
2) based on the training standard identified by NSA in its Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance program. 
Both categories did not consider the actual requirements of information systems 
security professionals in an information systems security work environment. The review 
of literature supported the need for a rigorous and empirical study to determine the actual 
tasks performed in an information systems security work environment and to compare 
these requirements to existing curriculum. 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
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Kim and Choi (2002) stated that the determination of key educational requirements for 
information systems security professionals by experts in the field was important in the 
development of an information security curriculum. Golshani, et al. (2001) observed that 
a formal definition of the basic principles of information security did not exist and that 
this lack contributed to an unstructured approach to information security. As of2002, 
information systems curriculum was driven by the NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education. The award of this designation was dependent upon 
meeting 10 specific criteria for measurement. The first criteria for designation mandated 
that the academic program of the university be tied to NSTISSI 4011; however, none of 
the criteria for this designation evaluated the skills and attributes currently employed in 
an information systems security work environment. 
This research performed a rigorous review of information systems security skills and 
attributes and provided answers to the following questions: 
1) Are the skills and attributes identified in the CISSP employed in an information 
systems security work environment? 
2) Are universities designated as NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education providing these skills? 
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These questions were answered by the examination ofthe 10 CISSP domains from 
within the information systems security work environment to determine which skills were 
necessary and the examination of existing NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education curriculum to determine which skills and attributes 
from within the 10 domains were being taught. Using empirical methods the goal of this 
research was to determine if existing curriculum in colleges and universities designated 
as NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education was 
consistent with the needs of an information systems security work environment. 
The null hypotheses tested were: 
1) HoI: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed 
in an information systems security work environment. 
2) Ho2: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as being 
employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education. 
Research Methods 
Data collection was accomplished by using sampling survey research. In the design of 
this research two issues were addressed: 1) identifying a sufficient sample size, and 2) 
instrument reliability and validity. 
In their article on determining sample size Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001) listed 
four ways of estimating popUlation sample size: 1) take the sample in two steps, and use 
the results from the first to determine the number of additional samples needed, 2) use a 
pilot study, 3) use data from a previous study, or 4) use logical mathematical formulas to 
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estimate the size. They included a table for determining minimum required sample sizes 
based on mathematical formulas, which used a margin of error of .03, an alpha of .05, 
and a t of 1.96. Using Bartlett, et al. 's (200 1) table the minimum required responses for a 
sample size from a population of 4,700 was 119. To ensure a representative return rate 
this research selected 800 respondents in a randomly sorted list of information systems 
security professionals. 
There were 323 faculty members in the target population. Bartlett, et al. (2001) 
identified 85 responses as being representative of a population numbering 300. To ensure 
an adequate sample size, all 323 respondents were surveyed. 
Procedures Used to Develop the Survey 
The data used in this descriptive study was collected through a researcher developed 
survey. The survey method of data collection was chosen over the interview method due 
to geographic distribution ofthe population. The following procedures were used to 
develop the survey instrument: 1) develop the conceptual framework, 2) develop the 
operational definitions, 3) select the scaling technique, 4) review of items,S) develop 
response format, 6) develop directions, 7) prepare draft and distribute pilot, 8) analyze 
pilot data and revise instrument (if required), 9) produce instrument, 10) conduct 
reliability and validity analysis, and 11) distribute survey (Bartlett, et al. 200 1). 
Develop the Conceptual Framework 
The Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISCi was instrumental 
in the development ofthe Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), 
which was considered the most comprehensive certification for information systems 
security professionals (Dugan & Prencipe, 2001). Although CISSP was not the only 
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certification available for infonnation systems security professionals it was the only 
broad top-down certification covering theoretical knowledge of 10 domains, with specific 
tasks recognized to be required for infonnation security certification. It was this 
theoretical requirement that was selected as the baseline to identify skills and attributes 
for a common body of knowledge in infonnation security and to identify whether 
academia was providing education in this common body of knowledge. 
Develop the Operational Definitions 
The CISSP domains cover the following areas of infonnation security responsibilities: 
1) Access Control Systems and Methodology, 2) Telecommunications and Network 
Security, 3) Security Management Practices, 4) Applications and Systems Development 
Security, 5) Cryptography, 6) Security Architecture and Models, 7) Operations Security, 
8) Business Continuity Planning and Disaster Recovery Planning, 9) Laws, 
Investigations, and Ethics, and 10) Physical Security. The CISSP domains were chosen 
as the defining criteria for the development ofthe operational definitions after an 
extensive review ofliterature which included research studies, journal articles, books, and 
text books in the field of infonnation security. 
Select the Scaling Technique 
Scales typically are used to obtain responses that will be comparable to one another. 
This research used a verbal frequency scale which differed from the Likert in that it 
indicated how often an action had been taken. According to Alreck and Settle (1995) 
there were two incentives to using verbal frequency scaling: I) the ability to array 
activities across a multiple category spectrum for data description, and 2) the ease of 
making comparisons among different actions for the same sample of respondents. This 
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research was concerned with the frequency of use of specific skills within the infonnation 
systems security professional's work environment and the frequency of teaching these 
skills in an academic environment. The scaling of: 1) always, 2) often, 3) sometimes, 4) 
rarely, and 5) never, was deemed an acceptable frequency range for this research. 
Review of Items 
According to Alreck and Settle (1995) effective survey questions have three defining 
characteristics: 1) focus, 2) brevity, and 3) simplicity. The initial review of the CISSP 
domains identified 63 specific skills and attributes in which infonnation systems security 
professionals should be proficient. Although 63 questions met the characteristic of focus, 
it fell short in brevity and simplicity. A thorough review of the CISSP domain 
descriptions identified specific categories where identified skills and attributes could be 
combined without losing focus. The breakdown of the 63 questions was accomplished 
during an initial pilot survey committee (see Appendix A) meeting. These combined 
skills and attributes allowed the development of a 24 question survey in the following 
categories: 
Domain 1, Access Control Systems and Methodology, requires competencies in the 
following skills: 1) access control techniques and administration including mandatory 
access control, discretionary access control, and non-discretionary access control and 
combinations, 2) access control models including Bell-Lapadula, Biba, Clark and Wilson, 
Non-Interference, State Machine, and Access Matrix and Infonnation Flow Model, 3) 
identification and authentication techniques such as knowledge based password, Personal 
Identification Numbers (PINs), characteristic-based, tokens, tickets, one-time passwords, 
biometrics, and single sign-on, 4) access control methodologies including 
centralized/remote authentication and decentralized access controls, 5) file and data 
ownership and custodianship, 6) methods of attack, 7) intrusion, and 8) penetration 
detection. These skills were combined to form four questions relating to Domain 1. 
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Domain 2, Telecommunications and Network Security, requires competencies in the 
following skills: 1) International Standards Organization, 2) Open Systems 
Interconnection layers and characteristics, 3) communications and network security, 4) 
Internet/lntranet/Extranet, 5) E-mail security, 6) facsimile security, 7) secure voice 
communications, 8) security boundaries, 9) policy and controls, and 10) network attacks 
and countermeasures. These skills were combined to form one question relating to 
Domain 2. 
Domain 3, Security Management Practices, consists ofthe following skills: 1) security 
management concepts and principles, 2) change control and management, 3) data 
classification, 4) employment policies and practices, 5) policies, 6) standards, guidelines 
and procedures, 7) roles and responsibilities, 8) security awareness training, and 9) 
security management. These skills were combined to form three questions relating to 
Domain 3. 
Domain 4, Applications and Systems Development Security, consists of the following 
skills: 1) application issues, 2) database and data warehousing, 3) data and information 
storage, 4) knowledge based systems, 5) systems development controls, 6) malicious 
code, and 7) methods of attack. These skills were combined to form two questions 
relating to Domain 4. 
Domain 5, Cryptography, consists of the following skills: 1) cryptographic concepts, 
2) methodologies and practices, 3) private key algorithms, 4) public key algorithms, 
5) public key infrastructure, 6) system architecture for implementing cryptographic 
functions, and 7) methods of attack. These skills were combined to form two questions 
relating to Domain 5. 
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Domain 6, Security Architecture and Models, consists ofthe following skills: 1) 
principles of common computer and network organizations, 2) architectures and design, 
3) principles of common security models, 4) architectures and evaluation techniques, 5) 
common flaws and security issues associated with confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, and 6) systems architecture and design. These skills were combined to form 
three questions relating to Domain 6. 
Domain 7, Operations Security, consists of the following skills: 1) administrative 
management, 2) security concepts, 3) control types, 4) operations controls, 5) resource 
protection, 6) audit trails, 7) monitoring tools and techniques, 8) intrusion detection, 9) 
penetration detection techniques, 10) inappropriate activities, threats, counter measures, 
and 11) violations, breaches and reporting. These skills were combined to form two 
questions relating to Domain 7. One question was later identified by the validity process 
as being unnecessary and was removed leaving only one question relating to Domain 7. 
Domain 8, Business Continuity Planning (Bep) and Disaster Recovery Planning 
(DRP), identifies skills to counteract interruptions to business activities and protect 
critical business processes from the effects of major failures or disasters. These skills 
were combined to form two questions relating to Domain 8. 
Domain 9, Laws, Investigations and Ethics, consists ofthe following skills: 1) major 
categories and types oflaws, 2) investigations, 3) major categories of computer crime and 
incident handling, and 4) ethics. These skills were combined to form three questions 
relating to Domain 9. 
Domain 10, Physical Security, consists ofthe following skills: 1) facility 
requirements, 2) technical controls, 3) environment/life safety, 4) physical security 
threats, and 5) elements of physical security. These skills were combined to form two 
questions relating to Domain 10. 
Develop Response Format 
The survey response format consisted of two parts: 1) validation data, and 2) 
competencies data. 
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The validation section obtained professional background data from the survey 
respondents. It ensured that participants met the requirements to complete the survey. A 
"no" response in this section sent the participant to an exit page. 
In the competency section the 24 statements were listed. The competency statements 
were later reduced to 23 by the validity process. The respondents were asked to rate each 
statement according to its use in an information systems security environment (for the 
information systems security professional survey) or teaching in an information systems 
security curriculum (for the information systems security faculty survey). Each question 
had a verbal frequency response consisting of: 1) all the time, 2) some of the time, and 3) 
never, which was later changed during the pilot phase to: 1) always, 2) often, 3) 
sometimes, 4) rarely, and 5) never, identified by a radio button corresponding to a linear 
numeric scale and assigned to a discrete table in a database, which provided interval data. 
Defining each question as a discrete field in this table allowed: 1) the data to be easily 
separated for compilation and analysis, and 2) the capture of data from partial 
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completions. This allowed the use of the skills in a work environment, as determined by 
information systems security professionals, to be compared to the teaching of the skills in 
an information systems security curriculum. 
Develop Directions 
The directions informed the respondent how to respond to the question. According to 
Alreck and Settle (1995), the minimum directions a survey should include are: 1) what 
items to rate, 2) what standard to use, 3) how to use the scale, and 4) how to record the 
responses. It is better to provide more thorough instructions to ensure all respondents 
understand what is needed. There were no special instructions required in this research. 
Prepare Draft and Distribute Pilot 
Using the scaling techniques, operational definitions, and directions a draft survey was 
prepared (see Appendix C), as a pilot, for distribution to six Information Systems faculty 
from Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania. 
The cover letter (see Appendix B), the pilot survey (see Appendix C), the evaluation 
procedures (see Appendix D) and comments and responses (see Appendix E) were 
distributed to six Information Systems faculty members from Bloomsburg University of 
Pennsylvania (see Appendix A), consisting of one full professor, four associate 
professors and one assistant professor, each familiar with information security concepts. 
The pilot survey used the following specific questions, identified by Litwin (1995), as 
being essential in a pilot study: 
1) Were there any typographical errors? 
2) Were there any misspelled words? 
3) Did the numbers make sense? 
4) Was the type size big enough to easily read? 
5) Was the vocabulary appropriate for the respondents? 
6) Was the survey too long? 
7) Was the style of the items too monotonous? 
8) Did the survey format flow well? 
9) Were the items appropriate for the respondents? 
10) Were the items sensitive to possible cultural barriers? 
11) Was the survey in the best language for the respondents? Of further interest to this 
research were the questions: 1) Did the survey adequately address the skills in an 
information systems security environment? 2) Were there any skills that should be 
added? 3) What was the time for completion? 
All six committee members completed the survey in the same manner as the actual 
popUlation in the study was requested to do. 
Analyze Pilot Study and Revise Instrument (if required) 
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The pilot survey was analyzed to identify errors in form or presentation, or identify 
shortcomings within the questions. The survey was changed to address these issues and 
then re-administered to the pilot survey committee for additional comments. Upon 
finishing the sUrvey, the committee members were interviewed individually to ascertain 
their reaction and comments. As a result of the pilot survey minor changes in format and 
content were made. 
Produce Instrument 
At the completion of the successful pilot survey the instrument was produced in a 
form suitable for reliability and validity testing. 
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Conduct Validity and Reliability Analysis 
The survey was reviewed for both face and content validity. Litwin (1995) described 
face validity as the casual review of how good an item or group of items appear, while 
content validity is a formal review by experts in some aspect of the subject under study. 
In face validity the survey, cover letter, and comment sheet were distributed to five 
Business Education/Office Information Systems faculty members from Bloomsburg 
University of Pennsylvania (see Appendix F), consisting of two full professors, two 
associate professors, and one assistant professor, each having performed and published 
survey research. A meeting was held with the face validity committee and the surveys 
discussed. At the completion of the face validation meeting, minor changes in format and 
grammar were made. 
Content validity was evaluated by using a panel of 100 experts, drawn randomly from 
the population of information systems security professionals, who were considered to 
have knowledge and/or skills in information security by virtue of their CISSP 
certification. This random panel of 100 experts was removed from the popUlation. 
Table 1, Qualifications of Content Validity Panel 
Members holding CISSP Members publishing 
certification articles pertaining to 
information security 
99 35 
Members presenting 
papers pertaining to 
information security 
58 
This research used a modified Delphi technique to assess the content validity of the 
survey. The modified Delphi approach consisted of identifying a select group of 
information systems security professionals who, by successive rounds, collaborated on 
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the development of a survey to identify specific competencies, taken from the CISSP 
exam, in use in an infonnation systems security work environment. These 100 randomly 
selected infonnation systems security professionals were contacted via e-mail. Thirty-
five e-mails were returned as invalid addresses. Of the remaining 65 valid e-mails, 18 
(27%) responded to the request to participate in the content validity review. 
In round one of the content validity phase, access to the survey was provided to the 18 
reviewers (see Appendix G). The survey identified 24 infonnation security questions 
based on the CISSP domains (see Appendix H). These questions used a five point verbal 
frequency as follows: 1) always, 2) often, 3) sometimes, 4) rarely, and 5) never. The 
survey was set up on a secure Web site with a validation page to ensure the reviewers met 
specific requirements. These requirements were: 1) published textbook(s) or article(s) in 
the area of infonnation security, 2) participation in at least one national or state 
convention as a speaker or panel member discussing the topic of infonnation security, 3) 
a member of the faculty of an accredited university with a viable infonnation security 
curriculum, or 4) held a CISSP certification. Ofthe 18 reviewers 100% held CISSP 
certifications, three (16%) had published textbooks or articles pertaining to infonnation 
security, and three (16%) had participated in at least one national or state convention as a 
speaker or panel member discussing the topic of infonnation security. Each of the 
reviewers was asked to rate the questions as follows: 1) the question correctly identifies 
the need, 2) the question is incorrectly stated; needs revision or 3) do not use, 
competency inappropriate. A section for reviewer comments was provided. To facilitate 
statistical analysis the reviewer scale was assigned the following weights: 1) three points 
for correctly identifies the need, 2) two points for incorrectly stated; needs revision, and 
76 
3) one point for do not use, competency inappropriate. Any question in which 20% or 
more ofthe reviewers felt the question needed revision andlor the mean and the lower 
limit ofthe confidence interval fell below 2.5, on a scale of 1 to 3, was considered 
incorrectly stated and was revised for submission to the reviewers in round two. Any 
question in which 70% or more of the respondents stated the question inappropriate was 
removed from the survey. 
The results of round one (see Appendix 1) were analyzed using the Statistical Package 
for Social Science (SPSS). The statistics used for analysis determined the Mean, Standard 
Deviation (SD), Standard Error ofthe Mean (SE), and a 95% Confidence Interval (CI). 
As a result of this analysis question 23 was removed from the survey and questions 5, 14, 
and 20 were revised and submitted to round two. 
In round two of the content validity phase an e-mail (see Appendix J) was sent to 18 
validity committee members of whom 16 responded. Two responses were returned as 
invalid e-mails so no reminder e-mails were sent. The round two content validity survey 
(see Appendix K) was set up on a secure Web site. Each of the validity committee 
members were asked to rate the questions as: 1) accept the revision, no comments, 2) 
accept the revision, with comments or 3) reject the revision, with comments. A section 
for reviewer comments was provided. To facilitate statistical analysis the reviewer scale 
was assigned the following weights: 1) three points for accept the revision, no comments, 
2) two points for accept the revision, with comments, and 3) one point for reject the 
revision, with comments. As a result of round two (see Appendix L) the revisions of 
questions 5, 14, and 20 were accepted. 
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In the reliability phase the survey was tested for split-half reliability. The split-halves 
method consisted of administering the survey to 200 randomly selected members of the 
population, who were then removed from the population as a whole, and split in half for 
scoring. The procedure used obtained a score based on the odd numbered items in the test 
and a score based on the even numbered items in the test for each individual response. 
The correlation coefficients between the odd and even numbered scores were then 
calculated. This correlation coefficient, however, was not the reliability coefficient of the 
test. The total test was twice as long as each half, so an adjustment was made to obtain 
the reliability of the total test. Litwin (1995) stated the split-halves method "is generally 
accepted as being as good as administering the different forms to the same sample at 
different time points". 
These 200 randomly selected information systems security professionals were 
contacted via e-mail (see Appendix N). Forty-one e-mails were returned as invalid 
addresses. Of the remaining 159 valid e-mails sent, 16 (10 %) responded and completed 
the reliability survey. Because ofthe low response rate a second e-mail was sent ten days 
after the initial request. The responses from the first e-mailing were gathered into a 
database, and an initial query was run to identify and remove the invalid responses from 
the respondent sample. An additional query was developed to identify those subjects who 
had responded and remove them from the sample. The remaining popUlation samples 
were then identified as non-respondents and were selected to receive the reminder e-mail 
(see Appendix N). This second e-mailing resulted in an additional 10 responses to bring 
the total to 26 (16%). Of the 26 reviewers 100% held CISSP certifications, four (15%) 
had published textbooks or articles pertaining to information security, and ten (38%) had 
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participated in at least one national or state convention as a speaker or panel member 
discussing the topic of information security. The instrument was deemed to be reliable 
based on the split-halves method (see Table 1). Using SPSS to perform the split-halves 
computation the following results were noted: Guttman split-half =.8572, unequal-length 
Spearman-Brown = .8614. 
Table 2, Split-halves Results for Reliability Phase 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 26 N of Items = 23 
Correlation between forms = .7562 Equal-length Spearman-Brown = .8612 
Guttman split-half = .8572 Unequal-length Spearman-Brown = .8614 
12 Items in part 1 11 Items in part 2 
Alpha for part 1 = .8334 Alpha for part 2 = .8719 
To confirm the split-halves reliability, a computation ofCronbach's was performed 
(see Table 3). The standardized alpha for the 23 question scale was 0.9141, indicating a 
high degree of internal consistency. 
Table 3, Cronbach's Alpha 
Reliability Analysis 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases = 26.0 N of Items = 23 
Alpha = .9141 
The individual scale item statistics confirmed this finding of a high degree of internal 
consistency, with all items exhibiting a positive Corrected Item-Total Correlation. 
Because deleting any item would have no significant effect on the overall scale 
reliability, all 23 items were justified for retention. 
Distribute Surveys 
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Both surveys were made available on a secure Web server using forms developed 
using Microsoft FrontPage®. The responses from these forms were sent to a database on 
the Web server with separate tables for each of five response areas: 1) information 
systems security faculty validation, 2) information systems security professionals 
validation, 3) information systems security faculty survey, 4) information systems 
security professionals survey, and 5) respondent's request for survey results. Responses 
were tracked using randomly assigned Personal Identification Numbers (PINs). At the 
conclusion of data collection all references relating PINs to e-mail addresses were deleted 
in compliance with IRB (see Appendix M) requirements. 
From the sample of 4700 (=N) information systems security professionals a random 
sample of 800 (=n) was drawn. There were 165 invalid e-mail addresses identified. 
Subtracting the invalid e-mail addresses provided a usable sample of 635. There was a 
non-response rate of80%.The non-respondents did not differ from the respondents with 
regard to important characteristics. The statistical analyses had taken into account both 
the sampling design, and the response probabilities. The initial survey e-mail was 
distributed on November 21,2003. This distribution resulted in a return of94 (14%). A 
second reminder e-mail was distributed on December 1,2003. This distribution resulted 
in an additional 27 responses bringing the total to 121 (19%). A third reminder e-mail 
was distributed on December 11, 2003. This distribution resulted in an additional four 
responses for a total response of 125 (20%). 
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The validation process was developed to ensure that only CISSP certification holders 
completed the survey. Of further interest to this research were the number of respondents 
who had published books or articles relating to information security, the number of 
respondents who had participated as panel members in conferences relating to 
information security, and the number of respondents who had presented papers relating to 
information security. Of the respondents 125 (100%) held CISSP certifications, 34 (27%) 
had published articles or books relating to information security, 51 (40%) had 
participated as panel members in discussions relating to information security, and 3 
(.03%) had presented papers relating to information security. 
From the sample of321 (N) information systems security faculty the total 321 (n) 
were used. There were 20 invalid e-mail addresses identified. Subtracting the invalid e-
mail addresses provided a usable sample of 301. There was a non-response rate of 67%. 
The non-respondents did not differ from the respondents with regard to important 
characteristics. The statistical analyses had taken into account both the sampling design, 
and the response probabilities. The initial survey e-mail was distributed on November 21, 
2003. This distribution resulted in a return of 60 (20%). A second reminder e-mail was 
distributed on December 1,2003. This distribution resulted in an additional 36 responses 
bringing the total to 96 (31 %). A third reminder e-mail was distributed on December 11, 
2003. This distribution resulted in an additional three responses bringing the total to 99 
(33%). 
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The validation process was developed to ensure that only faculty teaching in NSA 
Schools of Excellence in Information Assurance completed the survey. Of further interest 
to this research were the number of respondents who held a CISSP certification, the 
number of respondents who had published books or articles relating to information 
security, and the number of respondents who had presented papers relating to information 
security. Of the respondents 99 (100%) were teaching in NSA Schools of Excellence in 
Information Assurance, 6 (6%) held a CISSP certification, 35 (35%) had published 
articles or books relating to information security, and 58 (59%) had presented papers 
relating to information security . 
. Discussion 
Collecting data via a Web based survey eliminated the data input stage required in 
paper samples; however, care was taken to ensure that the Web based surveys were 
accessible to all. During data collection one respondent had trouble initially completing 
the survey due to using an Apple based browser. The Web site was reconfigured to accept 
all browsers allowing this respondent to complete the survey. 
This research indicated that both information systems security professionals (27%) 
and information systems security faculty (35%) were active in publications relating to 
information systems security; however information systems security faculty (59%) 
presented more often than information systems security professionals (.03%). Panel 
membership (40%) was high among information systems security professionals, while 
CISSP certification (6%) was low among information systems security faculty. 
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Formats for Presenting Results 
The database results were exported to an Excel spreadsheet. The raw spreadsheet data 
(see Appendix R) was then migrated to SPSS for analysis. Data analysis required the use 
of statistical tools to reduce the amount of detail collected, summarizing it and making 
the most important facts and relationships apparent. 
As the data from each survey question was considered a variable this research began 
the analysis with univeriate statistics. The data comparing the competencies taught 
against the competencies required used biveriate statistics. 
Initially, this research used frequency and percentage tables to evaluate the 
distribution of responses. In order to identify the appropriate statistical tool the scale of 
the data was first identified. In this research the data collected was considered to be an 
interval scale as the interval between scale points was equal. As such the descriptive 
statistics included the mean, median, and mode. The spread identified the standard 
deviation, range, maximum, and minimum. The shape identified skewness and kurtosis. 
This research assumed a 95% confidence level to ensure a valid degree of reliability. 
As the data was identified as interval, the statistical measure of association between 
what was taught and what was required evaluated the data using discriminate analysis 
and correlation of analysis. As no causality was implied and the focus was strictly on the 
degree of association, this research did not designate dependent and independent 
variables. 
The specific tools for the analysis of the taught and required consisted of: 1) cross-
tabulation which indicated the relationship between variables without the need for 
dependent or independent variable identification, and 2) correlation analysis which 
showed how much the two variables moved together. 
Resource Requirements 
There were no additional resource requirements. The survey was deployed on an 
existing educational Web site. All participants were notified via e-mail. 
Summary 
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This research examined the correlation between competencies employed in an 
information systems security work environment and the competencies taught in academic 
institutions designated as NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance Education. 
Data collection was accomplished using sampling survey research. In the design of the 
sampling survey two issues were addressed: 1) identifying a sufficient sample size, and 2) 
instrument reliability and validity. 
The information systems security faculty survey (see Appendix 0) consisted of two 
sections: 1) validation data, and 2) competencies data. The validation section ensured 
participants were currently teaching, or had taught an information systems security 
course. Each question in the CISSP competencies area was assigned to a discrete table in 
the faculty database. Each question had a response identified by a radio button 
corresponding to a linear numeric scale which provided interval data. The submission of 
each response sent the participant to the next question. At this point the participant was 
advised of the number of remaining questions. 
The information systems security professional survey (see Appendix P) consisted of 
two areas: 1) validation data, and 2) competencies data. The validation section ensured 
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participants were currently working in an information systems security work environment 
and held a CISSP certification. Each question in the CISSP competencies area was 
assigned to a discrete table in the information systems security professional database. 
Each question had a response identified by a radio button corresponding to a linear 
numeric scale which provided interval data. The submission of each response sent the 
participant to the next question. At this point the participant was advised of the number of 
remaining questions. 
Chapter 4 
Results 
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The first section of this chapter describes the statistical tools used to analyze the 
results of this research. The second section is the statistical analysis and findings of the 
comparisons of each of the questions answered by information systems security 
professionals in a survey with a comparison to the ten domains of the CISSP. This section 
also statistically compares the results of the questions answered in a survey by 
information systems security professionals to the results of the questions answered in a 
survey by information systems security faculty to ascertain any degree of association 
between the two. The final section summarizes the results ofthe analysis of both the 
comparisons to the CISSP and the degree of association between what was taught at NSA 
Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education and what was 
employed in the information systems security work environment. 
Statistical Tools Used in Analysis 
The research questions were: 
1) Are the skills and attributes identified in the CISSP employed in an information 
systems security work environment? 
2) Are universities designated as National Security Agency Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education providing these skills? 
The null hypotheses tested were: 
1) HoI: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are 
employed in an information systems security work environment. 
2) Ho2: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as being 
employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance Education. 
86 
All questions were evaluated using measures of central tendencies and inferential 
statistics. The Chi Square was used to test the statistical significance of differences of the 
relationship between what information systems security professionals employed and what 
information systems security faculty taught (two-way classification). Ifthe calculated P-
value was less than 0.05, then there was a statistically significant relationship between the 
two classifications. 
The ordinal data in this study was tested for significance using the Kendall's tau-b and 
the Wilcoxon-Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks statistical tests. The Kendall's tau-b statistic 
test was used as a measure of agreement between what information systems security 
professionals employed and what information systems security faculty taught. The 
Wilcoxon-Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test is typically used to compare the averages of 
two independent groups. Using the ~ score and the p value this statistic was used to test 
the difference between the two groups. The measures of central tendencies and skewness 
of the questions were employed to evaluate hypothesis Ho 1: The skills and attributes 
identified in the ten domains ofthe CISSP are employed in an information systems 
security work environment. The Chi-Square, Kendall's tau-b and Wilcoxon Matched-
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Pairs Signed-Ranks tests were used to evaluate hypothesis H02: There is no association 
between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems 
security work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. The level of significance was 
set at 0.05 for rejection of the null hypothesis. The data was evaluated using Statistical 
Package for Social Science (SPSS), a computer based statistical analysis program. The 
results of the analysis of the employment and teaching of the domains of the CISSP 
follow. The printouts from the statistical analysis program are contained in Appendix Q. 
Statistical Analysis and Findings 
Domain 1 Analysis 
Four questions were used to evaluate Domain 1, Access Control Systems and 
Methodology. For information systems security professionals these questions were 
designated: 
1. Pro 1, how often do you employ access control techniques, access control 
administration, and access control models? 
2. Pro2, how often do you employ identification and authentication techniques? 
3. Pro3, how often do you employ intrusion detection monitoring and penetration 
testing? 
4. Pr04, how often do you employ International Standards Organization/Open 
Systems Interconnection, layers and characteristics? 
For information systems security faculty these questions were designated: 
1. Edul, how often do you teach access control techniques, access control 
administration, and access control models? 
2. Edu2, how often do you teach identification and authentication techniques? 
1. Edu3, how often do you teach intrusion detection monitoring and penetration 
testing? 
2. Edu4, how often do you teach International Standards Organization/Open 
Systems Interconnection, layers and characteristics? 
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The scaling ofthe survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
According to the descriptive statistics access control techniques, access control 
administration, and access control models (prol) with a mean (M) of 4.6080 were 
employed more than access control techniques, access control administration, and access 
control models (edu 1) with a mean of (M) of 3.7172 were taught. The negative skewness 
of pro 1 (-1.550) and edul (-.839) indicated a greater number oflarger values. The small 
standard error of mean indicated the means of pro I (SE = .05553) and edul (SE = 
.13005) were good estimators of the population mean and indicated the null hypothesis, 
HoI: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in 
an information systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although information systems security professionals employed access control 
techniques, access control administration, and access control models (prol) to a greater 
extent than information systems security faculty taught access control techniques, access 
control administration, and access control models (edul) the Chi-Square test showed no 
statistically significant correlation (X 2 (9, N = 99) = 2.843,;e = .970,;e > .05) which 
indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
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environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of access control techniques, access 
control administration, and access control models (pro 1) and the teaching of access 
control techniques, access control administration, and access control models (edu1), (1 (N 
= 99) = -.013, 1 < .10) indicated no statistically significant association which indicated 
the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes 
identified as being employed in an information systems security work environment and 
those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance Education, was not rej ected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of access control 
techniques, access control administration, and access control models (pro 1) and the 
teaching of access control techniques, access control administration, and access control 
models (edu1) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (W ill = 99) 
= -5.486, £. = .000, £. < .05) indicated the difference was not coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics identification and authentication techniques 
(pr02) with a mean (M) of 4.6080 were employed more than identification and 
authentication techniques (edu2) with a mean (M) of= 3.8990 were taught. The negative 
skewness ofpr02 (-.990) and edu2 (-1.220) showed a greater number of larger values. 
The small standard error of mean indicated the means of pro2 (SE = .04580) and edu2 
(SE = .12639) were good estimators of the popUlation mean which indicated the null 
hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are 
employed in an information systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
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Although information systems security professionals employed identification and 
authentication techniques (pro2) to a greater extent than information systems security 
faculty taught identification and authentication techniques (edu2) the Chi-Square test 
showed no statistically significant correlation (X 2 (8, N = 99) = 4.198,.e = .839,.e > .05) 
which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of identification and authentication 
techniques (pro2) and the teaching of identification and authentication techniques (edu2), 
(1 (N = 99) = .109, 1 < .10) indicated no statistically significant association which 
indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of identification and 
authentication techniques (pro2) and the teaching of identification and authentication 
techniques (edu2) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (W (N = 
99) = -5.116,.e = .000,.e < .05) indicated the difference was not coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics intrusion detection monitoring and penetration 
testing (pr03) with a mean (M) of 4.0080 were employed more than intrusion detection 
monitoring and penetration testing (edu3) with a mean (M) of3.7576 were taught. The 
negative skewness of pro3 (-1.115) and edu3 (-.653) showed a greater number of larger 
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Although information systems security professionals employed identification and 
authentication techniques (pr02) to a greater extent than information systems security 
faculty taught identification and authentication techniques (edu2) the Chi-Square test 
showed no statistically significant correlation (X 2 (8, N = 99) = 4.198, :e = .839, :e> .05) 
which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of identification and authentication 
techniques (pr02) and the teaching of identification and authentication techniques (edu2), 
(1 eN = 99) = .109, 1 < .10) indicated no statistically significant association which 
indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of identification and 
authentication techniques (pr02) and the teaching of identification and authentication 
techniques (edu2) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (WeN = 
99) = -5.116, :e = .000, :e < .05) indicated the difference was not coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics intrusion detection monitoring and penetration 
testing (pro3) with a mean (M) of 4.0080 were employed more than intrusion detection 
monitoring and penetration testing (edu3) with a mean (M) of3.7576 were taught. The 
negative skewness ofpr03 (-1.115) and edu3 (-.653) showed a greater number oflarger 
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values. The small standard error of mean indicated the means ofpr03 (SE = .08762) and 
edu3 (SE = .12275) were good estimators ofthe popUlation mean which indicated the 
null hypothesis, Ho I: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP 
are employed in an information systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although intrusion detection monitoring and penetration testing (pr03) was employed 
to a greater extent than information systems security faculty taught intrusion detection 
monitoring and penetration testing (edu3) the Chi-Square test showed no statistically 
significant correlation (X 2 (16, N = 99) = 17.762,.e = .338,.e > .05) which indicated the 
null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified 
as being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rej ected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of intrusion detection monitoring and 
penetration testing (pr03) and the teaching of intrusion detection monitoring and 
penetration testing (edu3), (1 eN = 99) = .052, 1 < .10) indicated no statistically 
significant association which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association 
between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems 
security work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of intrusion detection 
monitoring and penetration testing (pr03) and the teaching of intrusion detection 
monitoring and penetration testing (edu3) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
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Signed-Ranks, (W eN = 99) = -2.096,;e = .036,;e < .05) indicated the difference was not 
coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics International Standards Organization/Open 
Systems Interconnection, layers and characteristics (pro4) with a mean (M) of 4.1840 
were employed more than International Standards Organization/Open Systems 
Interconnection, layers and characteristics (edu4) with a mean (M) of3.6768 were taught. 
The positive skewness ofpr04 (.347) indicated the response showed a greater number of 
the middle values while the negative skewness of edu4 (-.691) showed a greater number 
of larger values. The small standard error of mean confirmed the means of pr04 (SE = 
.04455) and edu4 (SE = .10336) were good estimators of the population mean which 
indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains 
of the CISSP are employed in an information systems security work environment, was 
not rej ected. 
Although International Standards Organization/Open Systems Interconnection, layers 
and characteristics (pr04) were employed to a greater extent than information systems 
security faculty taught International Standards Organization/Open Systems 
Interconnection, layers and characteristics (edu4) the Chi-Square test showed no 
statistically significant correlation (X 2 (16, N = 99) = 4.410,;e = .818,;e > .05) which 
indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rej ected. 
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Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of International Standards 
Organization/Open Systems Interconnection, layers and characteristics (pro4) and the 
teaching of International Standards Organization/Open Systems Interconnection, layers 
and characteristics (edu4), (1 eN = 99) = .104, 1 > .10) indicated a statistically weak 
association. This association was significantly low, and combined with the results of the 
Chi-Square statistic, indicated the null hypothesis, Ho2: There is no association between 
the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security 
work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of International 
Standards Organization/Open Systems Interconnection, layers and characteristics (pro4) 
and the teaching of International Standards Organization/Open Systems Interconnection, 
layers and characteristics (edu4) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-
Ranks, (W eN = 99) = -4.424, .e = .000, .e < .05) indicated the difference was not 
coincidental. 
Domain 1 Findings 
The statistics indicated that information systems security professionals employed the 
skills and attributes identified in Domain 1 ofthe CISSP, Access Control Systems and 
Methodology, in an information systems security work environment. The statistical 
analysis of the questions representing Domain 1 indicated the null hypotheses, Ho 1: The 
skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an 
information systems security work environment, and Ho2: There is no association 
between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems 
security work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, were not rejected. 
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Of particular interest is the Kendall's tau-b statistic for pr04 and edu4 (1 (N = 99) = 
.104, t > .10) which identified a statistically weak association. The Wilcoxon Matched-
Pairs Signed-Ranks statistic indicated the association was not coincidental (W ill = 99) = 
-4.424, ~ = .000, ~ < .05). However, the result of the Kendall's tau-b statistic (1 ill = 99) 
= .104, t > .10) was significantly small, and combined with the results of the other 
statistics indicated that the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the 
skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
Domain 2 Analysis 
One question was used to evaluate Domain 2, Telecommunications and Network 
Security. For information systems security professionals this question was designated: 
1. Pr05, how often have you employed security controls when addressing 
communications and network security, Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail security, 
facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security boundaries? 
For information systems security faculty this question was designated: 
1. Edu5, how often do you teach security controls when addressing communications 
and network security, Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail security, facsimile 
security, secure voice communications, and security boundaries? 
The scaling ofthe survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
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According to the descriptive statistics security controls when addressing 
communications and network security, Intemetllntranet/Extranet, e-mail security, 
facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security boundaries (proS) with a 
mean (M) of 4.3920 were employed more than security controls when addressing 
communications and network security, Intemet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail security, 
facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security boundaries (eduS) with a 
mean (M) of3.9S96 were taught. The negative skewness of proS (-.74S) and eduS (-.676) 
showed a greater number of larger values. The small standard error of mean indicated the 
means of proS (SE = .0641S) and eduS (SE = .1OS43) were good estimators of the 
population mean which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes 
identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an information systems 
security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although security controls when addressing communications and network security, 
Intemet/lntranet/Extranet, e-mail security, facsimile security, secure voice 
communications, and security boundaries (proS) were employed to a greater extent than 
information systems security faculty taught security controls when addressing 
communications and network security, Intemet/IntranetiExtranet, e-mail security, 
facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security boundaries (eduS) the Chi-
Square test showed the correlation was not statistically significant (X 2 (6, N = 99) = 6.213 
~ = .400, ~ > .OS) which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association 
between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems 
security work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
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Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of security controls when addressing 
communications and network security, Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail security, 
facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security boundaries (pro5) and the 
teaching of security controls when addressing communications and network security, 
Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail security, facsimile security, secure voice 
communications, and security boundaries (edu5), (! eN = 99) = -.072, ! < .10) indicated 
no statistically significant association, which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho2: There is 
no association between the skills and attributes identified as being used in an information 
systems security work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of security controls 
when addressing communications and network security, Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail 
security, facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security boundaries (pro5) 
and the teaching of security controls when addressing communications and network 
security, Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail security, facsimile security, secure voice 
communications, and security boundaries (edu5) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-
Pairs Signed-Ranks, (W (N = 99) = -2.840,.e = .005,.e < .05) confirmed the difference 
was not coincidental. 
Domain 2 Findings 
The statistics indicated that information systems security professionals employed the 
skills and attributes identified in Domain 2 ofthe CISSP, Telecommunications and 
Network Security, in an information systems security work environment. The statistical 
analysis of the questions representing Domain 2 indicated the null hypotheses, Ho 1: The 
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skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an 
information systems security work environment, and H02: There is no association 
between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems 
security work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, were not rejected. 
Domain 3 Analysis 
Three questions were used to evaluate Domain 3, Security Management Practices. For 
information systems security professionals, these questions were: 
1. Pro6, how often do you employ implementation and management of change 
control? 
2. Pro7, how often do you employ the development or implementation of 
information security employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and 
procedures? 
3. ProS, how often do you employ security awareness training and management? 
For information systems security faculty these questions were: 
1. Edu6 how often do you teach implementation and management of change 
control? 
2. Edu7, how often do you teach the development or implementation of information 
security employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures? 
3. EduS, how often do you teach security awareness training and management? 
The scaling of the survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
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According to the descriptive statistics implementation and management of change 
control (pro6) with a mean (M) of 4.000) was employed more than implementation and 
management of change control (edu6) with a mean (M) of 2.7778) was taught. The 
negative skewness of pr06 (-.426) showed a greater number of larger values while the 
positive skewness of edu6 (.401) showed a greater number oflower values. The small 
standard error of mean indicated the means ofpro6 (SE = .07449) and edu6 (SE = 
.14398) were good estimators of the popUlation mean which indicated the null 
hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are 
employed in an information systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although implementation and management of change control (pr06) was employed to 
a greater extent than information systems security faculty taught implementation and 
management of change control (edu6) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was not 
statistically significant (X 2 (6, N = 99) = 9.433 £ = .398, £ > .05) which indicated the null 
hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of implementation and management of 
change control (pr06) and the teaching of implementation and management of change 
control (edu6), (1 eN = 99) = -.035, 1 < .10) indicated no statistically significant 
association which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the 
skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
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environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
Although descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of 
implementation and management of change control (pro6) and the teaching of 
implementation and management of change control (edu6) were different, the Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (WeN = 99) = -5.800, £ = .000, £ < .05) indicated the 
difference was not coincidental. 
The development or implementation of information security employment policies, 
practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures (pro7) with a mean (M) of 4.1760) were 
employed more than the development or implementation of information security 
employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures (edu7) with a mean 
(.M} of 4.0303) were taught. The negative skewness ofpr07 (-.265) and edu7 (-1.067) 
showed a greater number of larger values. The small standard error of mean indicated the 
means ofpr07 (SE = .06331) and edu7 (SE = .12878) were good estimators of the 
popUlation mean which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes 
identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an information systems 
security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although the development or implementation of information security employment 
policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures (pr07) were employed to a 
greater extent than information systems security faculty taught the development or 
implementation of information security employment policies, practices, standards, 
guidelines, and procedures (edu7) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was not 
statistically significant (X 2(6, N = 99) = 8.735 £ = .365, £ > .05) which indicated the null 
hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rejected. 
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Kendall's tau-b analysis ofthe employment of the development or implementation of 
information security employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and 
procedures (pro7) and the teaching of the development or implementation of information 
security employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures (edu7), (1 
eN = 99) = .003, 1 < .10) indicated no statistically significant association which indicated 
the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes 
identified as being employed in an information systems security work environment and 
those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of the development 
or implementation of information security employment policies, practices, standards, 
guidelines, and procedures (pro7) and the teaching of the development or implementation 
of information security employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and 
procedures (edu7) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (W (N = 
99) = -.628, r = .530, r > .05) indicated the difference may be coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics security awareness training and management 
(pro8) with a mean (M) of 3.8240) was employed less than security awareness training 
and management (edu8) with a mean (M) of 3.8889) was taught. The negative skewness 
ofpro8 (-.129) and edu8 (-1.009) showed a greater number oflarger values. The small 
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standard error of mean indicated the means ofpro8 (SE = .07625) and edu8 (SE = 
.11566) were good estimators of the population mean which indicated the null 
hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are 
employed in an information systems security work environment, was not rej ected. 
Although security awareness training and management (pr08) was employed to a 
lesser extent than information systems security faculty taught security awareness training 
and management (edu8) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was not statistically 
significant (X 2 (12, N = 99) = 6.152 £ = .908, £ > .05) which indicated the null 
hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being used in an information systems security work environment and those being taught 
in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, 
was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of security awareness training and 
management (pro8) and the teaching of security awareness training and management 
(edu8), (1 eN = 99) = .089, t < .10) indicated no statistically significant association which 
indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being used in an information systems security work environment 
and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of security awareness 
training and management (pro8) and the teaching of security awareness training and 
management (edu8) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, Ci{ eN = 
99) = -1.165, £ = .244, £ > .05) indicated the difference may be coincidental. 
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Domain 3 Findings 
The statistics indicated that information systems security professionals employed the 
skills and attributes identified in Domain 3 of the CISSP, Security Management 
Practices, in an information systems security work environment. The statistical analysis 
of the questions representing Domain 3 confirmed the null hypotheses, HoI: The skills 
and attributes identified in the ten domains ofthe CISSP are employed in an information 
systems security work environment, and Ho2: There is no association between the skills 
and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, were not rejected. 
Of interest to this research was the positive skewness of question edu6 (.401). The 
frequency table of edu6 showed that although the skewness was positive it was due to the 
lack of responses in the often (4) scale. 
Table 4, Frequency Table for Edu6 
Freguenc~ Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1.00 23 18.4 23.2 23.2 
2.00 22 17.6 22.2 45.5 
3.00 31 24.8 31.3 76.8 
5.00 23 18.4 23.2 100.0 
Total 99 79.2 100.0 
Missing System 26 20.8 
Total 125 100.0 
Domain 4 Analysis 
Two questions were used to evaluate Domain 4, Applications and Systems 
Development Security. For information systems security professionals these were: 
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1. Pr09, how often do you employ information security involving database and data 
warehousing, and information storage? 
2. Pro I 0, how often do you employ information security regarding knowledge based 
systems and development controls? 
For information systems security faculty these questions were: 
1. Edu9, how often do you teach information security involving database and data 
warehousing, and information storage? 
2. Edul0, how often do you teach information security regarding knowledge based 
systems and development controls? 
The scaling ofthe survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
According to the descriptive statistics information security involving database and 
data warehousing, and information storage (pr09) with a mean (M) of 4.0080 was 
employed more than information security involving database and data warehousing, and 
information storage (edu9) with a mean (M) of3.6768 was taught. The negative 
skewness ofpro9 (-.963) and edu9 (-.448) showed a greater number oflarger values. The 
small standard error of mean indicated the means of pro9 (SE = .08230) and edu9 (SE = 
.11998) were good estimators of the population mean which indicated the null 
hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are 
employed in an information systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
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Information security involving database and data warehousing, and information 
storage (pr09) was employed to a greater extent than information systems security faculty 
taught information security involving database and data warehousing, and information 
storage (edu9). The Chi-Square test showed the correlation was statistically significant 
(X 2 (16, N = 99) = 37.058 r = .002, r < .05) which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: 
There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in 
an information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of information security involving 
database and data warehousing, and information storage (pr09) and the teaching of 
information security involving database and data warehousing, and information storage 
(edu9), (1 ill = 99) = .127, 1>.10) indicated a statistically weak association which 
indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of information 
security involving database and data warehousing, and information storage (pr09) and the 
teaching of information security involving database and data warehousing, and 
information storage (edu9) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, 
(W ill = 99) = -2.463, r = .014, .e < .05) indicated the difference was not coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics information security regarding knowledge based 
systems and development controls (prol0) with a mean (M) of3.4560 were employed 
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more than information security regarding knowledge based systems and development 
controls (edulO) with a mean of(M) of 3.2222) were taught. The negative skewness of 
pro 1 0 (-.147) showed a greater number of larger values while the positive number of 
edu 10 (.251) showed a greater number of smaller values. The small standard error of 
mean indicated the means ofpro10 (SE = .09538) and edu10 (SE = .10507) were good 
estimators of the population mean which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills 
and attributes identified in the ten domains ofthe CISSP are employed in an information 
systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Information security regarding knowledge based systems and development controls 
(pro 1 0) was employed to a greater extent than information systems security faculty taught 
information security regarding knowledge based systems and development controls 
(edulO). The Chi-Square test showed the correlation was statistically significant (X 2 (16, 
N = 99) = 22.802 ~ = .029, ~ < .05) which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of information security regarding 
knowledge based systems and development controls (pro10) and the teaching of 
information security regarding knowledge based systems and development controls 
(edu10), (! (N = 99) = .121, ! > .10) indicated a statistically weak association which 
indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
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environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of information 
security regarding knowledge based systems and development controls (pro 10) and the 
teaching of information security regarding knowledge based systems and development 
controls (edul0) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (W eN = 
99) = -2.146, f = .032, f < .05) indicated the difference was not coincidental. 
Domain 4 Findings 
The statistics indicated that information systems security professionals employed 
the skills and attributes identified in Domain 4 ofthe CISSP, Applications and Systems 
Development Security, in an information systems security work environment and there 
was a correlation between what was employed and what was taught. The statistical 
analysis of the questions representing Domain 4 indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The 
skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an 
information systems security work environment, was not rejected, but the null hypothesis, 
H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as being used in 
an information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was rejected. 
Of interest to this research was the difference in skewness of question prolO (-.147) 
and edulO (.251). A review ofthe frequency table (see Table 5) showed that although the 
skewness was almost normal it was due to the lack of responses in the often (4) scale, 
whereas pr06 (see Table 6) indicated the significant number of responses were in the 
sometimes (3), often (4) and always (5) scales. 
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_Table 5, Freguency Table for Edul 0 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.00 7 5.6 7.1 7.1 
2.00 4 3.2 4.0 11.1 
3.00 68 54.4 68.7 79.8 
5.00 20 16.0 20.2 100.0 
Total 99 79.2 100.0 
Missing System 26 20.8 
Total 125 100.0 
Table 6, Frequency Table for ProlO 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.00 3 2.4 2.4 2.4 
2.00 22 17.6 17.6 20.0 
3.00 39 31.2 31.2 51.2 
4.00 37 29.6 29.6 80.8 
5.00 24 19.2 19.2 100.0 
Total 125 100.0 100.0 
Domain 5 Analysis 
Two questions were used to evaluate Domain 5, Cryptography. For information 
systems security professionals these questions were: 
1. Pro11, how often do you employ cryptographic concepts, methodologies and 
practices, private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure? 
2. Pro12, how often do you employ system architecture for implementing 
cryptographic functions? 
For information systems security faculty these questions were: 
1. Edu 11, how often do you teach cryptographic concepts, methodologies and 
practices, private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure? 
2. Edul2, how often do you teach system architecture for implementing 
cryptographic functions? 
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The scaling ofthe survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
According to the descriptive statistics cryptographic concepts, methodologies and 
practices, private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure (pro 11) with a 
mean (M) of3.6960 were employed less than cryptographic concepts, methodologies and 
practices, private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure (edull) with a 
mean (M) of 4.0808 were taught. The negative skewness of pro 11 (-.419) and edu11 (-
1.350) showed a greater number of larger values. The small standard error of mean 
indicated the means of pro 11 (SE = .07023) and edu11 (SE = .13055) were good 
estimators of the popUlation mean which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills 
and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an information 
systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although cryptographic concepts, methodologies and practices, private and public key 
algorithms, and public key infrastructure (pro 11) were employed to a greater extent than 
information systems security faculty taught cryptographic concepts, methodologies and 
practices, private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure (edu11) the 
Chi-Square showed the correlation was not statistically significant (X 2 (16, N = 99) = 
16.371 r. = .427, r. > .05) which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education security 
curriculum, was not rejected. 
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Kendall's tau-b analysis ofthe employment of cryptographic concepts, methodologies 
and practices, private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure (pro 11) 
and the teaching of cryptographic concepts, methodologies and practices, private and 
public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure (edu11), (! eN = 99) = -.057, ! < .10) 
indicated no statistically significant association which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: 
There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in 
an information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not 
rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of cryptographic 
concepts, methodologies and practices, private and public key algorithms, and public key 
infrastructure (pro 11) and the teaching of cryptographic concepts, methodologies and 
practices, private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure (edu11) were 
different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (WeN = 99) = -2.538, r. = .011, r. 
< .05) indicated the difference was not coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics system architecture for implementing 
cryptographic functions (pro12) with a mean (M) of3.3200 was employed more than 
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system architecture for implementing cryptographic functions (edu12) with a mean (M) 
of3.0505 was taught. The negative skewness ofpro12 (-.377) and edu12 (-.038) showed 
a greater number of larger values. The small standard error of mean indicated the means 
ofpro12 (SE =.08843) and edu12 (SE = .13031) were good estimators ofthe population 
mean which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the 
ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an information systems security work 
environment, was not rejected. 
Although system architecture for implementing cryptographic functions (pro 12) was 
employed to a greater extent than information systems security faculty taught system 
architecture for implementing cryptographic functions (edu12) the Chi-Square test 
showed the correlation was not statistically significant (X 2 (16, N = 99) = 13.451 £ = 
.640, £ > .05) which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho2: There is no association between 
the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security 
work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis ofthe employment of system architecture for implementing 
cryptographic functions (pro12) and the teaching of system architecture for implementing 
cryptographic functions (edu12), (1 eN = 99) = .039, 1 < .10) indicated no statistically 
significant association which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association 
between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems 
security work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
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The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of system 
architecture for implementing cryptographic functions (prol2) and the teaching of system 
architecture for implementing cryptographic functions (edul2) were different. The 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (W eN = 99) = -1.953,.e = .051,.e > .05) 
confinned the difference may be coincidental. 
Domain 5 Findings 
The statistics indicated that infonnation systems security professionals employed 
the skills and attributes identified in Domain 5 of the CISSP, Cryptography, in an 
infonnation systems security work environment. The statistical analysis ofthe questions 
representing Domain 5 indicated the null hypotheses, Ho 1: The skills and attributes 
identified in the ten domains ofthe CISSP are employed in an infonnation systems 
security work environment, and H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an infonnation systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Infonnation Assurance Education, were not rejected. 
Domain 6 Analysis 
Three questions were used to evaluate Domain 6, Security Architecture and Models. 
For infonnation systems security professionals these were: 
1. Pro 13, how often do you employ principles of common computer and network 
organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques? 
2. Pro14, how often are you confronted with common flaws and security issues 
associated with systems architecture and design? 
3. Prol5, how often do you employ systems architecture evaluation techniques? 
112 
For information systems security faculty these questions were: 
1. Edu13, how often do you teach principles of common computer and network 
organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques? 
2. Edu14, how often do you teach common flaws and security issues associated with 
systems architecture and design? 
3. Edu15, how often do you teach systems architecture evaluation techniques? 
The scaling of the survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
According to the descriptive statistics principles of common computer and network 
organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques (pro13) 
with a mean (M) of3.9440 were employed less than principles of common computer and 
network organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques 
(edu13) with a mean (M) of3.9798 were taught. The negative skewness ofpro13 (-.418) 
and edu13 (-1.190) showed a greater number of larger values. The small standard error of 
mean indicated the means ofpro13 (SE =.07388) and edu13 (SE = .13993) were good 
estimators of the population which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and 
attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an information 
systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although principles of common computer and network organizations, principles of 
common security models, and evaluation techniques (pro13) were employed to a lesser 
extent than information systems security faculty taught principles of common computer 
and network organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation 
techniques (edu13) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was not statistically 
significant (X 2 (16, N = 99) = 17.137 ~ = .145, ~ > .05) which indicated the null 
hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rejected. 
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Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of principles of common computer and 
network organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques 
(pro 13) and the teaching of principles of common computer and network organizations, 
principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques (edu13), (1 eN = 99) = 
.095, ! < .10) indicated no statistically significant association which indicated the null 
hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of principles of 
common computer and network organizations, principles of common security models, 
and evaluation techniques (pro 13) and the teaching of principles of common computer 
and network organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation 
techniques (edu13) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (WeN = 
99) = -.576, ~ = .564, ~ > .05) indicated the difference may be coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics common flaws and security issues associated 
with systems architecture and design (pro 14) with a mean (M) of 4.1520 were confronted 
more than common flaws and security issues associated with systems architecture and 
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design (edu14) with a mean (M) of3.9091 were taught. The negative skewness ofpro14 
(-.344) and edu14 (-1.106) showed a greater number oflarger values. The small standard 
error of mean indicated the means ofpro14 (SE =.05909) and edu14 (SE = .14001) were 
good estimators of the population mean which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The 
skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an 
information systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although common flaws and security issues associated with systems architecture and 
design (pro14) were confronted to a greater extent than information systems security 
faculty taught common flaws and security issues associated with systems architecture and 
design (edu14) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was not statistically significant 
(X 2 (16, N = 99) = 13.126.e = .360, .e> .05) which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: 
There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in 
an information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not 
rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the confrontation of common flaws and security issues 
associated with systems architecture and design (pro14) and the teaching of common 
flaws and security issues associated with systems architecture and design (edu14), (1 (N 
= 99) = .063, 1 < .10) indicated no statistically significant association which indicated the 
null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified 
as being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rej ected. 
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The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the confrontation of common flaws 
and security issues associated with systems architecture and design (proI4) and the 
teaching of common flaws and security issues associated with systems architecture and 
design (eduI4) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (WeN = 99) 
= -1.371,.e = .170,.e > .05) indicated the difference maybe coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics systems architecture evaluation techniques 
(proI5) with a mean (M) of3.5680 were employed more than systems architecture 
evaluation techniques (eduI5) with a mean (M) of3.1313 were taught. The negative 
skewness ofpro15 (-.064) and edu15 (-.060) showed a greater number oflarger values. 
The small standard error of mean indicated the means ofpro15 (SE =.07815) and edu15 
(SE = .11633) were good estimators of the population mean which indicated the null 
hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are 
employed in an information systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although systems architecture evaluation techniques (pro 15) were employed to a 
greater extent than information systems security faculty taught systems architecture 
evaluation techniques (edu15) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was not 
statistically significant (X 2(16, N = 99) = 9.281 .e = .901,.e > .05) which indicated the 
null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified 
as being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of systems architecture evaluation 
techniques (pro 15) and the teaching of systems architecture evaluation techniques 
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(edulS), (1 ill = 99) = .132, 1 > .10) indicated a statistically weak association which when 
compared with the other statistical tests indicated the null hypothesis, Ho2: There is no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employment in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not 
rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of systems 
architecture evaluation techniques (pro IS) and the teaching of systems architecture 
evaluation techniques (edulS) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-
Ranks, (W ill = 99) = -3.176, £ = .001, £ < .OS) indicated the difference was not 
coincidental. 
Domain 6 Findings 
The statistics indicated that information systems security professionals employed the 
skills and attributes identified in Domain 6 of the CISSP, Security Architecture and 
Models, in an information systems security work environment. The statistical analysis of 
the questions representing Domain 6 indicated the null hypotheses, Ho 1: The skills and 
attributes identified in the ten domains ofthe CISSP are employed in an information 
systems security work environment, and Ho2: There is no association between the skills 
and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, were not rejected. 
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Domain 7 Analysis 
Two questions were used to evaluate Domain 7, Operations Security. For information 
systems security professionals these were: 
1. Pro 16, how often do you employ administrative management concepts, resource 
protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and 
reporting? 
2. Pro 17, how often do you employ monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion 
detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures? 
For information systems security faculty these questions were: 
1. Edul6, how often do you teach administrative management concepts, resource 
protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and 
reporting? 
2. Edul7, how often do you teach monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion 
detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures? 
The scaling of the survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
According to the descriptive statistics administrative management concepts, resource 
protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and reporting 
(proI6) with a mean (M) of 4.1200 were employed more than administrative 
management concepts, resource protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, 
violations, breaches, and reporting (eduI6) with a mean (M) of3.4343 were taught. The 
small positive skewness ofpro16 (.069) showed the numbers were clustered around the 
middle values, while the negative skewness ofedu16 (-.283) showed a greater number of 
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larger values. The small standard error of mean indicated the means of pro 16 (SE 
=.04899) and edu16 (SE = .13932) were good estimators ofthe population mean which 
indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains 
of the CISSP are employed in an information systems security work environment, was 
not rejected. 
Although administrative management concepts, resource protection, audit trails, 
inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and reporting (pro 16) were employed to a 
greater extent than information systems security faculty taught administrative 
management concepts, resource protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, 
violations, breaches, and reporting (edu16) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation 
was not statistically significant (X 2 (6, N = 99) = 5.867 £ = .438, £ > .05) which indicated 
the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes 
identified as being employed in an information systems security work environment and 
those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis ofthe employment of administrative management concepts, 
resource protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and 
reporting (pro 16) and the teaching of administrative management concepts, resource 
protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and reporting 
(edu16), (1 (N = 99) = .177, 1> .10) indicated a statistically weak association which, 
When combined with the results ofthe Chi-Square statistic, indicated the null hypothesis, 
H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as being 
employed in an information systems security work environment and those being taught in 
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designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, 
was not rej ected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of administrative 
management concepts, resource protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, 
violations, breaches, and reporting (pro 16) and the teaching of administrative 
management concepts, resource protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, 
violations, breaches, and reporting (eduI6) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Ranks, (W eN = 99) = -4.367, £ = .000, £ < .05) indicated the difference was not 
coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion 
detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures (pro 17) with 
a mean (M) of 4.0480 were employed more than monitoring tools and techniques, 
intrusion detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures 
(eduI7) with a mean (M) of3.9495 were taught. The negative skewness ofpro17 (-1.142) 
and edu17 (-.802) showed a greater number of larger values. The small standard error of 
mean indicated the means ofpro17 (SE =.07776) and edu17 (SE = .13266) were good 
estimators of the population mean which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills 
and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an information 
systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion detection and penetration 
detection techniques, threats and counter measures (pro 17) were employed to a greater 
extent than information systems security faculty taught monitoring tools and techniques, 
intrusion detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures 
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(edu17) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was statistically significant (X 2 (12, N 
== 99) = 22.077 r = .037, r < .05) which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of monitoring tools and techniques, 
intrusion detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures 
(pro 17) and the teaching of monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion detection and 
penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures (edu17) , (1 ill = 99) = 
.109,1> .10) indicated a statistically weak association which, when combined with the 
results of the Chi-Square statistic, indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means ofthe employment of monitoring tools 
and techniques, intrusion detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and 
counter measures (pro17) and the teaching of monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion 
detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures (edu17) 
were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (W ill = 99) = -1.071, r = 
.284, r > .05) indicated the difference may be coincidental. 
Domain 7 Findings 
The statistics indicated that information systems security professionals employed the 
skills and attributes identified in Domain 7 of the CISSP, Operations Security, in an 
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information systems security work environment. The statistical analysis of the questions 
representing Domain 7 indicated the null hypotheses, Ho 1: The skills and attributes 
identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an information systems 
security work environment, and H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, were not rejected for questions pr016 and edu16. 
However, the statistical analysis of questions pro17 and edu17 indicated the null 
hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was rejected. 
Domain 8 Analysis 
Two questions were used to evaluate Domain 8, Business Continuity Planning (BCP) 
and Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP). For information systems security professionals 
these were: 
1. Pro 18, how often do you employ protection of critical business processes? 
2. Pro19, how often do you employ procedures for emergency response, extended 
back-up and post-disaster recovery? 
For information systems security faculty these questions were: 
1. Edu18, how often do you teach protection of critical business processes? 
2. Edu19, how often do you teach procedures for emergency response, extended 
back-up and post-disaster recovery? 
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The scaling ofthe survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
According to the descriptive statistics protection of critical business processes (pro 18) 
with a mean (M) of 4.1680 was employed more than protection of critical business 
processes (edu18) with a mean (M) of3.3838 was taught. The negative skewness of 
pro18 (-.520) and edu18 (-.221) showed a greater number oflarger values. The small 
standard error of mean indicated the means ofpro18 (SE =.06695) and edu18 (SE = 
.13824) were good estimators ofthe population mean which indicated the null 
hypothesis, HoI: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are 
employed in an information systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although protection of critical business processes (pro 18) was employed to a greater 
extent than information systems security faculty taught protection of critical business 
processes (eduI8) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was not statistically 
significant (X 2 (9, N = 99) = 10.944 ;e = .280, ;e> .05) which indicated the null 
hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of the protection of critical business 
processes (pro 18) and the teaching of protection of critical business processes (eduI8), 
(! eN = 99) = -.109, ! > .1 0) indicated a statistically weak association, which when 
combined with the results of the Chi-Square statistic, indicated the null hypothesis, H02: 
There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in 
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an information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not 
rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means ofthe employment of the protection of 
critical business processes (pro 18) and the teaching of the protection of critical business 
processes (eduI8) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (W eN = 
99) = -4.220, £ = .000, £ < .05) indicated the difference was not coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics procedures for emergency response, extended 
back-up and post-disaster recovery (pro 19) with a mean (M) of3.6800 were employed 
more than procedures for emergency response, extended back-up and post-disaster 
recovery (eduI9) with a mean (M) of3.6970 were taught. The negative skewness of 
pro19 (-.275) and edu19 (-.914) showed a greater number oflarger values. The small 
standard error of mean indicated the means ofpro19 (SE =.08546) and edu19 (SE = 
.14174) were good estimators ofthe population mean which indicated the null 
hypothesis, HoI: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are 
employed in an information systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although procedures for emergency response, extended back-up and post-disaster 
recovery (proI9) were employed to a greater extent than information systems security 
faculty taught procedures for emergency response, extended back-up and post-disaster 
recovery (eduI9) the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was not statistically 
significant (X 2 (16, N = 99) = 15.355 £ = .499, £ > .05) which indicated the null 
hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rejected. 
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Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of procedures for emergency response, 
extended back-up and post-disaster recovery (pro19) and the teaching of procedures for 
emergency response, extended back-up and post-disaster recovery (edu19), (1 eN = 99) = 
-.089,1< .10) indicated no statistically significant association which indicated the null 
hypothesis, Ho2: There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education, was not rej ected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of the procedures for 
emergency response, extended back-up and post-disaster recovery (pro19) and the 
teaching of procedures for emergency response, extended back -up and post-disaster 
recovery (edu19) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (WeN = 
99) = -.783, r = .434, r> .05) indicated the difference may be coincidental. 
Domain 8 Findings 
The statistics indicated that information systems security professionals employed the 
skills and attributes identified in Domain 8 of the CISSP, Business Continuity Planning 
(BCP) and Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP), in an information systems security work 
environment The statistical analysis ofthe questions representing Domain 8 indicated the 
null hypotheses, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP 
are employed in an information systems security work environment, and Ho2: There is no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, were not 
rejected. 
Domain 9 Analysis 
Three questions were used to evaluate Domain 9, Laws, Investigations and Ethics. 
For information systems security professionals these were: 
1. Pr020, how often do you address the issue of computer crime? 
2. Pro21 , how often do you employ information security incident handling and 
investigations? 
3. Pr022, how often do you employ the concepts of computer ethics? 
For information systems security faculty these questions were: 
1. Edu20, how often do you teach the issue of computer crime? 
2. Edu21, how often do you teach information security incident handling and 
investigations? 
3. Edu22, how often do you teach the concepts of computer ethics? 
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The scaling of the survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
According to the descriptive statistics the issue of computer crime (pro20) with a 
mean (M) of3.0320 was addressed less than the issue of computer crime (edu20) with a 
mean (M) of 4.3030 was taught. The positive skewness ofpro20 (.294) showed a greater 
number of middle values. The negative skewness of edu20 (-1.476) showed a greater 
number of larger values. The small standard error of mean indicated the means of pro20 
(SE =.07356) and edu20 (SE = .09132) were good estimators of the population mean 
which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten 
domains of the CISSP are employed in an information systems security work 
environment, was not rej ected. 
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Although the issue of computer crime (pro20) was addressed to a lesser extent than 
information systems security faculty taught the issue of computer crime (edu20) the Chi-
Square test showed the correlation was not statistically significant (X 2 (16, N = 99) = 
14.883 :e = .533,:e > .05) which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not 
rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of addressing the issue of computer crime (pro20) and the 
teaching of the issue of computer crime (edu20), (1 (N = 99) = -.028, 1 < .10) indicated no 
statistically significant association which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not 
rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of addressing the issue of computer 
crime (pr020) and teaching the issue of computer crime (edu20) were different. The 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (Jl (N = 99) = -7.124,:e = .000,:e < .05) 
confirmed the difference was not coincidental. 
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According to the descriptive statistics infonnation security incident handling and 
investigations (pro21) with a mean (M) of 3.4480 were employed slightly more than 
infonnation security incident handling and investigations (edu21) with a mean (M) of 
3.4444 were taught. The negative skewness ofpro21 (-.236) and edu21 (-.562) indicated 
a greater number of larger values. The small standard error of mean indicated the means 
ofpr021 (SE =.08832) and edu21 (SE = .16194) were good estimators of the population 
mean which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the 
ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an infonnation systems security work 
environment, was not rejected. 
Although infonnation security incident handling and investigations (pr02l) were 
employed to a greater extent than infonnation systems security faculty taught infonnation 
security incident handling and investigations (edu21) the Chi-Square test showed the 
correlation was not statistically significant (X 2 (16, N = 99) = 20.343 £ = .205, £ > .05) 
which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an infonnation systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Infonnation Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of infonnation security incident handling 
and investigations (pr021) and the teaching of infonnation security incident handling and 
investigations (edu21), (1 eN = 99) = -.057, t < .10) indicated no statistically significant 
association which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no association between the 
skills and attributes identified as being employed in an infonnation systems security work 
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environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of the employment of information 
security incident handling and investigations (pr021) and the teaching of information 
security incident handling and investigations (edu21) were different. The Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, (WeN = 99) = -.089, r = .929, r < .05) indicated the 
difference may be coincidental. 
According to the descriptive statistics concepts of computer ethics (pro22) with a 
mean (M) of 3.7440 were employed slightly more than concepts of computer ethics 
(edu22) with a mean (M) of3.5556 were taught. The negative skewness ofpr022 (-.227) 
and edu22 (-.747) showed a greater number oflarger values. The small standard error of 
mean indicated the means ofpr022 (SE =.08644) and edu22 (SE = .16696) were good 
estimators of the popUlation mean which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills 
and attributes identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an information 
systems security work environment, was not rejected. 
Although the concepts of computer ethics (pro22) were employed to a greater extent 
than information systems security faculty taught the concepts of computer ethics (edu22) 
the Chi-Square test showed the correlation was not statistically significant (X 2(16, N = 
99) = 7.994 r = .949, r > .05) which indicated the null hypothesis, H02: There is no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not 
rejected. 
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Kendall's tau-b analysis of the employment of the concepts of computer ethics (pro22) 
and the teaching of the concepts of computer ethics (edu22), (1 eN = 99) = -.026, 1 < .10) 
indicated no statistically significant association which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho2: 
There is no association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in 
an information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not 
rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of employment of the concepts of 
computer ethics (pro22) and the teaching of the concepts of computer ethics (edu22) were 
different. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks, oy. eN = 99) = -.777,..e = .437,..e < 
.05) indicated the difference may be coincidental. 
Domain 9 Findings 
The statistics indicated that information systems security professionals employed 
the skills and attributes identified in Domain 9 of the CISSP, Laws, Investigations and 
Ethics, in an information systems security work environment. The statistical analysis of 
the questions representing Domain 1 indicated the null hypotheses, Ho 1: The skills and 
attributes identified in the ten domains ofthe CISSP are employed in an information 
systems security work environment, and Ho2: There is no association between the skills 
and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, were not rejected. 
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Of interest to this research was the difference in skewness of questions pr020 (.294) 
and edu20 (-1.476). As shown in Table 7, the frequencies ofpr020 showed that the 
skewness is almost normal due to the number of responses in the sometimes (3) scale. 
As shown in Table 8, information systems security faculty taught the concept of 
computer crime significantly more than the concept of computer crime was employed in 
industry. 
Table 7, Frequency Table for Pro20 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.00 3 2.4 2.4 2.4 
2.00 24 19.2 19.2 21.6 
3.00 71 56.8 56.8 78.4 
4.00 20 16.0 16.0 94.4 
5.00 7 5.6 5.6 100.0 
Total 125 100.0 100.0 
Table 8, Frequency Table for Edu20 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.00 2 1.6 2.0 2.0 
2.00 2 1.6 2.0 4.0 
3.00 12 9.6 12.1 16.2 
4.00 31 24.8 31.3 47.5 
5.00 52 41.6 52.5 100.0 
Total 99 79.2 100.0 
Missing System 26 20.8 
125 100.0 
Domain 10 Analysis 
One question was used to evaluate Domain 10, Physical Security. For information 
systems security professionals this question was: 
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1. Pro23, how often do you employ the concepts of protection from physical security 
threats? 
For information systems security facuIty this question was: 
2. Edu23, how often do you teach the concepts of protection from physical security 
threats? 
The scaling of the survey was as follows: always (5), often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), 
and never (1). 
According to the descriptive statistics concepts of protection from physical security 
threats (pr023) with a mean (M) of3.9040 were employed slightly more than concepts of 
protection from physical security threats (edu23) with a mean (M) of3.6768 were taught. 
The negative skewness ofpr023 (-.058) and edu23 (-.765) showed a greater number of 
larger values. The small standard error of mean indicated the means of pro23 (SE 
=.07571) and edu23 (SE = .13908) were good estimators ofthe population mean which 
indicated the null hypothesis, Ho 1: The skills and attributes identified in the ten domains 
of the CISSP are employed in an information systems security work environment, was 
not rej ected. 
Although concepts of the employment of protection from physical security threats 
(pr023) were employed to a greater extent than information systems security facuIty 
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taught concepts of protection from physical security threats (edu23) the Chi-Square test 
showed the correlation was not statistically significant (X 2 (16, N = 99) = 7.893 .e = .793, 
.r. > .05) which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho2: There is no association between the 
skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
Kendall's tau-b analysis ofthe employment of the concepts of protection from 
physical security threats (pro23) and the teaching of the concepts of protection from 
physical security threats (edu23), (1 eN = 99) =-.045,1 < .10) indicated no statistically 
significant association which indicated the null hypothesis, Ho2: There is no association 
between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems 
security work environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, was not rejected. 
The descriptive statistics indicated the means of employment of the concepts of 
protection from physical security threats (pro23) and the teaching of the concepts of 
protection from physical security threats (edu23) were different. The Wilcoxon Matched-
Pairs Signed-Ranks, (WeN = 99) = -.839,.e = .402,.r. < .05) indicated the difference may 
be coincidental. 
Domain 10 Findings 
The statistics indicated that information systems security professionals employed the 
skills and attributes identified in Domain 10 of the CISSP, Physical Security, in an 
information systems security work environment. The statistical analysis of the questions 
representing Domain 10 indicated the null hypotheses, Ho 1: The skills and attributes 
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identified in the ten domains of the CISSP are employed in an information systems 
security work environment, and Ho2: There is no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, were not rejected. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
Conclusions 
This research examined the 10 CISSP domains to determine if the skills and attributes 
identified in these domains were being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and then examined existing NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education to determine if these skills and attributes were being 
taught. 
Four questions were used to evaluate Domain 1, Access Control Systems and 
Methodology, covering the following skills and attributes: access control techniques, 
access control administration and access control models; identification and authentication 
techniques; intrusion detection monitoring and penetration testing; and International 
Standards Organization/Open Systems Interconnection, layers and characteristics. The 
results of comparing the skills and attributes employed with those being taught indicated 
that the skills and attributes in Domain 1 were being employed by information systems 
security professionals in an information systems security work environment and there 
was no association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. 
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One question was used to evaluate Domain 2, Telecommunications and Network 
Security, covering the following skills and attributes: security controls when addressing 
communications and network security, Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail security, 
facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security boundaries. The results of 
comparing the skills and attributes employed with those being taught indicated that the 
skills and attributes in Domain 2 were being used by information systems security 
professionals in an information systems security work environment and there was no 
association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. 
Three questions were used to evaluate Domain 3, Security Management Practices, 
covering the following skills and attributes: implementation and management of change 
control; the development or implementation of information systems security employment 
policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures; and security awareness training 
and management. The results of comparing the skills and attributes employed with those 
being taught indicated that the skills and attributes in Domain 3 were being employed by 
information systems security professionals in an information systems security work 
environment and there was no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education. 
Domain 4 was the only domain that confirmed a correlation between skills and 
attributes used in an information systems security work environment and those being 
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taught. Two questions were used to evaluate Domain 4, Applications and Systems 
Development Security, covering the following skills and attributes: information security 
involving database and data warehousing, and information storage; and information 
systems security regarding knowledge based systems and development controls. The 
results of comparing the skills and attributes employed with those being taught indicated 
that the skills and attributes in Domain 4 were being employed by information systems 
security professionals in an information systems security work environment and there 
was a statistically significant association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education. 
Two questions were used to evaluate Domain 5, Cryptography, covering the following 
skills and attributes: cryptographic concepts, methodologies and practices, private and 
public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure; and system architecture for 
implementing cryptographic functions. The results of comparing the skills and attributes 
employed with those being taught indicated that the skills and attributes in Domain 5 
were being employed by information systems security professionals in an information 
systems security work environment and there was no association between the skills and 
attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education. 
Three questions were used to evaluate Domain 6, Security Architecture and Models, 
covering the following skills and attributes: principles of common computer and network 
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organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques; 
common flaws and security issues associated with systems architecture and design; and 
systems architecture evaluation techniques. The results of comparing the skills and 
attributes employed with those being taught indicated that the skills and attributes in 
Domain 6 were being employed by information systems security professionals in an 
information systems security work environment and there was no association between the 
skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education. 
Two questions were used to evaluate Domain 7, Operations Security, covering the 
following skills and attributes: administrative management concepts, resource protection, 
audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and reporting; and monitoring 
tools and techniques, intrusion detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and 
counter measures. The results of comparing the skills and attributes employed with those 
being taught indicated that the skills and attributes in Domain 7 were being employed by 
information systems security professionals in an information systems security work 
environment and there was no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education. 
Two questions were used to evaluate Domain 8, Business Continuity Planning (BCP) 
and Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP) which cover the following skills and attributes: 
protection of critical business processes, and procedures for emergency response 
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extended back-up and post-disaster recovery. The results of comparing the skills and 
attributes employed with those being taught indicated that the skills and attributes in 
Domain 8 were being employed by information systems security professionals in an 
information systems security work environment and there was no association between the 
skills and attributes identified as being employed in an information systems security work 
environment and those being taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education. 
Three questions were used to evaluate Domain 9, Laws, Investigations and Ethics, 
which cover the following skills and attributes: the issue of computer crime; information 
systems security incident handling and investigations; and the concepts of computer 
ethics. The results of comparing the skills and attributes employed with those being 
taught indicated that the skills and attributes in Domain 9 were being employed by 
information systems security professionals in an information systems security work 
environment and there was no association between the skills and attributes identified as 
being employed in an information systems security work environment and those being 
taught in designated NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
Education. 
One question was used to evaluate Domain 10, Physical Security covering the 
following skills and attributes: the concepts of protection from physical security threats. 
The results of comparing the skills and attributes employed with those being taught 
indicated that the skills and attributes in Domain 10 were being employed by information 
systems security professionals in an information systems security work environment and 
there was no association between the skills and attributes identified as being employed in 
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an infonnation systems security work environment and those being taught in designated 
NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Infonnation Assurance Education. 
Implications 
A search of existing literature supported the need for a standard curriculum in 
infonnation systems security. Bishop (2000), in particular, identified this need in 
his presentation to the National Colloquium on Infonnation Systems Security 
where he defined infonnation systems security as it applied to academia and 
stated the goal of undergraduate, graduate, and doctorate education was to "learn 
broad principles, and see how to apply them" (Bishop, 2000). This dissertation is 
a start at identifying and addressing the skills and attributes needed in an 
infonnation systems security curriculum. The outcomes indicate that academia 
continues to ignore the need for teaching the broad principles of infonnation 
systems security as identified by professionals in the field. These principles, as 
identified by the skills and attributes being employed in an infonnation systems 
security work environment, are not, with one exception, taught in NSA Centers of 
Academic Excellence in Infonnation Assurance Education. The one domain that 
is the exception is Domain 4, Applications and Systems Development Security, 
covering the following skills and attributes: infonnation systems security 
involving database and data warehousing, and infonnation storage and 
infonnation systems security regarding knowledge based systems and 
development controls. This research confinned a correlation, in this one area, 
between skills and attributes employed in an infonnation systems security work 
environment and those being taught in NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education. 
Recommendations 
The following areas are targets for further research. Faculty and curriculum 
developers should review the principles of information systems security, as 
performed by professionals in an information systems security work environment, 
for incorporation into the development of information systems security 
curriculum and programs. NSA should add to its criteria for the designation of 
Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, the 
teaching of skills and attributes of information systems security as identified by 
these professionals. 
Regarding the skills and attributes best identified as being employed in an 
information systems security work environment, the following three questions are 
indicated for further research: 
1) What, if any, are the differences in the skills and attributes identified in 
the various information systems security certifications? 
2) Is there a correlation between the skills and attributes identified in 
each of the information systems security certifications? 
3) What, if any, are the differences in the employment ofthese skills and 
attributes between certified and non-certified information systems 
security professionals? 
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Regarding the skills and attributes best identified as being necessary in an 
information systems security curriculum, the following two questions are 
indicated for further research: 
1. How should existing information systems security curriculum be changed 
to better meet the needs of information systems security professionals 
working in the field? 
2. Should broad principles or specific applications relating to the skills and 
attributes identified in an information systems security work environment 
be taught? 
Regarding the skills and attributes best identified as being taught in an 
information systems security curriculum, the following two questions are 
indicated for further research: 
1. Are the skills and attributes identified in other information systems security 
certifications used in an information systems security work environment? 
2. Are universities with information systems security curriculum teaching these 
skills? 
Summary 
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Although professional certifications in information systems security are based on a 
common body of knowledge, there is still a fundamental difference of opinion as to what 
constitutes this common body of knowledge. Many practitioners of information systems 
security feel that to further define information systems security and to legitimize its 
existence there should be accredited college curriculum (Saita, 2002). Information 
systems security as a field has not matured sufficiently to develop processes associated 
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with perfonning specific infonnation systems security job tasks. Until these tasks are 
identified and related job standards produced, effective standardized infonnation systems 
security curriculum can not be developed (Reynolds, 1998). 
NSA identified 37 universities as meeting the standards required for recognition as 
Centers of Academic Excellence in Infonnation Assurance Education. One of the 
standards for compliance stipulated that schools must have curriculum mapped to 
National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee 
(NSTISSC) 4011 National Training Standardfor Information Systems Security 
(INFOSEC) Professionals, an eight year old document (Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Infonnation Assurance Education, 2002). The NSTISSC focus was to provide 
standards for practical vocational skills. Mainstream colleges and universities have goals 
that mayor may not be compatible with those of the standards dictated by NSTISSC 
(Yasinsac, 1999). The Security Certification Consortium (ISCi was instrumental in the 
development ofthe Certified Infonnation Systems Security Professional (CISSP), the 
most comprehensive certification for infonnation systems security professionals (Dugan 
& Prencipe, 2001). Although CISSP was not the only certification available for 
infonnation systems security professionals it was the only broad top-down certification 
covering theoretical knowledge often domains recognized to be required for infonnation 
systems security certification and for many organizations the CISSP was considered to be 
the gold standard in infonnation systems security. 
This research examined the 10 CISSP domains from within the infonnation systems 
security work environment to detennine which skills were necessary and then examined 
existing NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education to 
determine which skills and attributes from within the 10 domains were being taught. 
Using empirical methods the goal of this research was to determine if existing 
curriculum in colleges and universities designated as NSA Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education was consistent with the needs of an 
information systems security work environment. 
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The skills and attributes within the 10 Domains of the CISSP were represented by 24 
questions, one of which was identified by the validity process as being unnecessary. The 
breakdown of the domain descriptions into questions was accomplished during the pilot 
study phase. Using "The CISSP Prep Guide" (Krutz, 2001) and the CISSP descriptions, 
the pilot study committee identified the sentences that best fit the skills and attributes of 
that domain. These sentences were converted to questions. The validity of these 
questions in addressing the skills and attributes was confirmed in the validity phase. The 
data used in this descriptive study was collected through a researcher developed survey. 
The survey method of data collection was chosen over the interview method due to 
geographic distribution ofthe popUlation. The following procedures were used to 
develop the survey instrument: 1) develop the conceptual framework, 2) develop the 
operational definitions, 3) select the scaling technique, 4) review of items, 5) develop 
response format, 6) develop directions, 7) prepare draft and distribute pilot, 8) analyze 
pilot data and revise instrument (if required), 9) produce instrument, 10) conduct 
reliability and validity analysis, and 11) distribute survey. 
From the sample of 4700 (N) information systems security professionals a random 
sample of800 (n) was drawn. There were 165 invalid e-mail addresses identified. 
Subtracting the invalid e-mail addresses provided a usable sample of635. There was a 
non-response response rate of 80%.The non-respondents did not differ from the 
respondents with regard to important characteristics. The statistical analyses had taken 
into account both the sampling design, and the response probabilities. 
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For information systems security faculty a sample of321 (N) the total 321 (n) was used. 
There were 20 invalid e-mail addresses identified. Subtracting the invalid e-mail 
addresses provided a usable sample of301. There was a non-response rate of67%. The 
non-respondents did not differ from the respondents with regard to important 
characteristics. The statistical analyses had taken into account both the sampling design, 
and the response probabilities. 
This research indicated that information systems security professionals working in an 
information systems security work environment employed or addressed the skills and 
attributes identified in the 10 domains of the CISSP. This research also indicated that the 
skills and attributes taught in the curriculum ofNSA Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education had no association with the skills and attributes 
employed, or addressed, by information systems security professionals with the exception 
of Domain 4. There were two questions used to evaluate Domain 4, covering the 
following skills and attributes: information systems security involving database and data 
warehousing, and information storage; and information systems security regarding 
knowledge based systems and development controls. This research indicated that the 
skills and attributes identified in Domain 4 were used in an information systems security 
work environment and there was an association between what was being employed and 
what was being taught. 
145 
It should be emphasized that this research was designed to evaluate the skills and 
attributes relating to the CISSP certification and existing curriculum in institutions 
designated as Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. It 
did not look at any ofthe many ongoing information systems security programs at 
schools not so recognized by NSA, nor did it consider any of the skills and attributes 
identified by any ofthe other information systems security certifications available. As 
such, the results from this research should be kept in the context of an evaluation ofthe 
skills and attributes identified only in the CISSP and confined to the curriculum in NSA 
designated Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education. 
Appendix A 
Pilot Survey Committee Members 
Name 
Gene M. Gordon, Ph.D. 
Carl J. Chimi, Ph.D. 
Charles J. Hoppel, Ph.D. 
Istvan Molnar, Ph.D. 
A. Rao Korukonda, Ph.D. 
Loreen Butcher-Powell, M.S. 
Position/Experience 
Associate Professor and Chair Computer and 
Information Systems (25 years experience) 
Associate Professor, Computer and 
Information Systems (23 years experience) 
Associate Professor, Computer and 
Information Systems (30 years experience) 
Associate Professor, Computer and 
Information Systems (10 years experience) 
Professor, Computer and Information Systems 
(20 years experience) 
Assistant Professor, Business Education and 
Office Information Systems (4 years 
experience) 
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Appendix B 
Pilot Survey Cover Letter 
«FirstName» «LastName», «Title» 
«Rank» 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, P A 17815 
«Date» 
Dear «FirstName»: 
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As a member of the information systems faculty at Bloomsburg University your expert 
advice is needed to pilot test the attached survey_ This survey will be used to compare the 
tasks performed by information security professionals in the field with the skills being 
taught in information security curriculum. At this time I am not interested in your 
responses to the survey itself, only in the evaluation of the survey format, language, and 
completion time. Any comments you have will be welcome. 
After completing the survey please go to http:/cob.bloomu.edulafundaburk/pilot to 
complete the evaluation form. At this web site you will be asked to evaluate the survey in 
terms of: 1) Are there any typographical errors? 2) Are there any misspelled words? 3) 
Do the numbers make sense? 4) Is the type size big enough to easily read? 5) Is the 
vocabulary appropriate for the respondents? 6) Is the survey too long? 7) Is the style of 
the items too monotonous? 8) Does the survey format flow well? 9) Are the items 
appropriate for the respondents? 10) Are the items sensitive to possible cultural barriers? 
and 11) Is the survey in the best language for the respondents? 
Of further interest to this research will be the questions: 1) Does the survey adequately 
address the skills in an information security environment? 2) Are there any skills that 
should be added? and 3) Is the survey complete? 
Your prompt action in evaluating this survey by August 29, 2003 will be greatly 
appreciated. Thank you for your willingness to participate in this research. 
Web site: http:/cob.bloomu.edulafundaburk/pilot 
User name: evaluator 
The password is: pilottester 
Your PIN is: «PIN» 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Information Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, PA 17815 
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Appendix C 
Pilot Survey 
Information Systems Security Survey 
Start Time ( ) 
The following questions are about information security skills you might need in a typical 
week. How often do you perform the following skills while working in an information 
security environment? Please select one answer from the three categories. 
1. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform access control techniques, time 
access control administration, and [ ] [ ] 
access control models? [ ] 
2. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform identification and time 
authentication techniques? [ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
3. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform intrusion detection time 
monitoring, and penetration testing? [ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
4. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform International Standards time 
Organization/Open Systems [ ] [ ] 
Interconnection, Layers and [ ] 
characteristics? 
5. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform communications and time 
network security, [ ] [ ] 
Internet/IntranetiExtranet, e-mail [ ] 
security, facsimile security, secure 
voice communications, and security 
boundaries? 
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6. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform implementation and time 
management of change control? [ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
7. How often in a week do you perform All the Sometimes Never 
the development or implementation time 
of information security employment [ ] [ ] 
policies, practices, standards, [ ] 
guidelines, and procedures? 
8. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform security awareness training time 
and management [ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
9. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform information security time 
involving database and data [ ] [ ] 
warehousing, and information [ ] 
storage 
10. How often, in a week do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform information security time 
regarding knowledge based systems [ ] [ ] 
and development controls [ ] 
11. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform cryptographic concepts, time 
methodologies and practices, private [ ] [ ] 
and public key algorithms, and [ ] 
public key infrastructure 
12. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform system architecture for time 
implementing cryptographic [ ] [ ] 
functions [ ] 
13. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform principles of common time 
computer and network organizations, [ ] [ ] 
principles of common security [ ] 
models, and evaluation techniques 
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14. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform common flaws and security time 
issues associated with systems [ ] [ ] 
architecture and design [ ] 
15. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform systems architecture time 
evaluation techniques [ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
16. How often, in a week do you perform All the Sometimes Never 
administrative management concepts, time 
resource protection, audit trails, [ ] [ ] 
inappropriate activities, violations, [ ] 
breaches, and reporting 
17. How often, in a week do you perform All the Sometimes Never 
monitoring tools and techniques time 
intrusion detection and penetration [ ] [ ] 
detection techniques, threats and [ ] 
counter measures 
18. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
perform protection of critical time 
business processes and the effects of [ ] [ ] 
major failures? [ ] 
19. How often, in a week, do you use All the Sometimes Never 
Procedures for emergency response, time 
extended back-up and post-disaster [ ] [ ] 
recovery? [ ] 
20. How often, in a week, do you use All the Sometimes Never 
Major categories and types of laws time 
and computer crime? [ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
21. How often, in a week, are you All the Sometimes Never 
involved in incident handling, and time 
investigations? [ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
22. How often, in a week, do you use All the Sometimes Never 
Computer Ethics? time 
[ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
23. How often, in a week, do you use All the Sometimes Never 
facility requirements, environment time 
and life safety? [ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
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24. How often, in a week, do you All the Sometimes Never 
respond to physical security threats, time 
and elements of physical security [ ] [ ] 
[ ] 
End Time ( ). Total time for completion ( ) 
Appendix D 
Pilot Survey Evaluation Procedures 
Please list PIN here: 
Now that you have completed the survey please take the time to answer these 
questions: 
How long did it take you to complete the survey? 
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1. Are there any typographical errors? Yes () No () 
If yes, please describe. 
2. Are there any misspelled words? Yes () No () 
If yes, please describe. 
3. Does the numbering make sense? Yes () No () 
If no, please describe. 
4. Is the type size big enough to easily read? Yes () No () 
If no, please describe. 
5. Is the vocabulary appropriate for the respondents? Yes () No () 
If no, please describe. 
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6. Is the survey too long? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
If yes, please describe. 
7. Is the style of the items too monotonous? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
If yes, please describe. 
8. Does the survey format flow well? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
If no, please describe. 
9. Are the items appropriate for the respondents? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
If no, please describe. 
10. Are the items sensitive to possible cultural barriers? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
If no, please describe. 
11. Is the survey in the best language for the respondents? Yes () No () 
If no, please describe. 
12. Does the survey adequately address the skills in an Yes ( ) No ( ) 
information security environment? 
If no, please describe. 
13. Are there any skills that should be added? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
If yes, please describe. 
14. Is the survey complete? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
If no, please describe. 
Thank you for your time. 
Appendix E 
Pilot· Survey Comments and Responses 
Comments 
1. You need a space after question 19; the capital P and M should be changed. 
Response: Changed. 
2. You need at least five anchor responses for variability 
Response: Changed the anchors from: All the time, Some of time, and Never to 
Always, Often, Sometimes, Rarely, and Never. 
3. I question the word "perform" and "USE" on some of the questions. Perhaps 
evaluate or apply i/o perform? 
Response: Substituted the word employ for apply and use. 
4. 'The "in a week" is not needed. This was stated in the directions. 
Response: Removed the term in a week. 
5. Additional line between Q.6 and Q.7. A line is missing between Q.19 and 
Q.20. 
Response: Rewritten 
6. How do you perform Information security? Could this read :How do you 
perform security measures? Also some of the questions contain multiple 
answers. How are you accounting for this? I am not sure about the wording 
of question 12 and 13? 
Response: See item three. Discussed the comment on multiple answers and 
the wording on questions 12 and 13. Upon understanding the population and 
requirements and reviewing the changes this panel member had no further 
comments. 
All changes were reviewed by the panel members and accepted. 
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Appendix F 
Face Validity Committee Members 
Name 
John J. Olivo, Ph.D. 
Loreen Butcher-Powell, M.S. 
Dennis O. Gehris, Ed.D. 
Janice C. Keil, Ed.D. 
Lila D. Waldman, Ed.D. 
Position/Experience 
Professor and Chair, Business Education 
and Office Infonnation Systems (20 years 
experience) 
Assistant Professor, Business Education and 
Office Infonnation Systems (4 years 
experience) 
Professor, Business Education and Office 
Infonnation Systems (28 years experience) 
Associate Professor, Business Education 
and Office Infonnation Systems (20 years 
experience) 
Associate Professor, Business Education 
and Office Infonnation Systems (10 years 
experience) 
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Appendix G 
Validity E-mail Round One 
Subject: University Info Sec Research 
Dear Colleague: 
As an information security professional, I am asking for your assistance in validating the 
content of a survey which will be used to compare the tasks performed by information 
security professionals in the field with the skills being taught in the information security 
curriculum in schools designated as National Security Agency (NSA) Centers of 
Excellence in Information Assurance. 
As a member of this content validity panel you were chosen for your expertise and 
experience in the field of information security and your CISSP certification. Participation 
in this validation process is totally voluntary and should take no longer than 1 0 minutes of 
your time. After validation, the survey will be used as part of a dissertation titled: The 
Education of Information Security Professionals: An Analysis of Industry Needs vs. 
Academic Curriculum in the 2Ft Century. I, as the principal researcher, will be the only 
person viewing the collected data and to ensure anonymity all links to PINs will be 
deleted at the conclusion of data collection. 
The purpose of the survey is to collect data to be used to classify the application of skills 
and attributes that are used in an information security work environment identified in the 
ten domains of the CISSP. These questions use a five point Likert scale for the response 
as follows: Always, Often, Sometimes, Rarely, and Never. As a CISSP professional you 
are asked to fill out a questionnaire about applicability of each of the 24 questions 
contained in the survey. The following rating scale is provided: 
3 = the question correctly identifies the need 
2 = the question is incorrectly stated; needs revision 
1 = do not use; competency inappropriate 
Please log on to http://cob.bloomll.edu/afundaburk!contcnt to participate in this process. 
Usemame: panel 
Password: validate 
PIN: <PIN> 
I appreciate your willingness to act as a panel member in this needed research. If you 
have any questions, please contact me. 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Information Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, P A 17815 
(570) 389-4816 
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AppendixH 
Validity Survey Round One 
Dissertation Research Project: The Education of Information Security Professionals: 
An Analysis of Industry Needs vs. Academic Curriculum in the 21st Century 
Principal Researcher: 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Infonnation Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
(570) 389-9621 
Email: afundabr@bloomu.cdu 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this much needed research. 
The results of this study will contribute significantly to the development of extensive 
infonnation security curriculum and add to the knowledge base concerning the real-world 
needs of infonnation security professionals. Data will be obtained concerning: a) the 
knowledge and skill attributes of security professionals; and b) the effectiveness of 
existing curriculum. 
The survey of security professionals and faculty will focus on the following domains: 
Access Control Systems and Methodology; Telecommunications and Network Security; 
Security Management Practices; Applications & Systems Development Security; 
Cryptography; Security Architecture; Operations Security; Business Continuity Planning 
& Disaster Recovery Planning; Law, Investigations & Ethics; and Physical Security. 
Continue 
The following questions will provide background infonnation of respondents. The 
assignment ofthe PIN allows for individual and institutional anonymity. The participant 
database and survey responses will be kept confidential by the principal researcher. After 
survey completion, the database linking PINs to participants will be deleted--assuring 
participant anonymity_ 
Please select all that apply: 
I have published textbook(s) or article(s) in the area ofinfonnation security. 
I have participated in at least one national or state convention as a speaker or panel 
member discussing the topic of infonnation security. 
I am a member of the faculty of an accredited university with a viable infonnation 
security curriculum 
I hold a CISSP certification 
Click here if none of the above applies to YOU, 
Otherwise please input PIN here ____ and click on submit. 
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The purpose ofthis survey is to validate the survey for the collection data to be used to 
classify the application of the skills and attributes identified in the ten domains of the 
CISSP that are used in an infonnation security work environment. As a participant you 
will be asked to evaluate this survey about the use of specific infonnation security skills. 
This survey is being conducted as part of a dissertation titled: The Education of 
Information Security Professionals: An Analysis of Industry Needs vs. Academic 
Curriculum in the 21st Century. The principal researcher is the only person viewing the 
collected data and all links to PINs will be deleted at the conclusion of data collection. 
Participation in this survey is totally voluntary and should take no longer than 10 
minutes. 
The following questions are about infonnation security skills. Panel members are 
requested to respond to each survey question in tenns of its suitability in an infonnation 
security environment. The following rating scale is provided: 1) the question correctly 
identifies the need, 2) the question is incorrectly stated; needs revision, or 3) do not use; 
competency inappropriate. 
Question 1 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ access control techniques, access control administration, 
and access control models? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
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Question 2 of 24 
Please respond in terms ofthis question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ identification and authentication techniques? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
Question 3 of 24 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ intrusion detection monitoring and penetration testing? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
Question 4 of 24 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms ofthis question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ International Standards Organization/Open Systems 
Interconnection, Layers and characteristics? 
The question correctly The question is incorrectly 
identifies the need (no stated; needs revision 
comment needed) (please comment) 
o o 
Comments: 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Question 5 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ communications and network security, 
Internet/IntranetlExtranet, e-mail security, facsimile security, secure voice 
communications, and security boundaries? 
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The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o o o 
Comments: 
Question 6 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ implementation and management of change control? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
Question 7 of 24 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ the development or implementation of information 
security employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures? 
The question correctly The question is incorrectly Do not use; competency 
identifies the need (no stated; needs revision inappropriate (please 
comment needed) (please comment) comment) 
o o o 
Comments: 
Question 8 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ security awareness training and management? 
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The question correctly The question is incorrectly Do not use; competency 
identifies the need (no stated; needs revision inappropriate (please 
comment needed) (please comment) comment) 
o o o 
Comments: 
Question 9 of 24 
Please respond in terms ofthis question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ information security involving database and data 
warehousing, and information storage? 
The question correctly The question is incorrectly 
identifies the need (no stated; needs revision 
comment needed) (please comment) 
o o 
Comments: 
Question 10 of 24 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ information security regarding knowledge based systems 
and development controls? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Question 11 of 24 
Please respond in terms ofthis question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ cryptographic concepts, methodologies and practices, 
private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure? 
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The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o o o 
Comments: 
Question 12 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ system architecture for implementing cryptographic 
functions? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
Question 13 of 24 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ principles of common computer and network 
organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques? 
The question correctly The question is incorrectly Do not use; competency 
identifies the need (no stated; needs revision inappropriate (please 
comment needed) (please comment) comment) 
o o o 
Comments: 
Question 14 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
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How often do you employ common flaws and security issues associated with systems 
architecture and design? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
Question 15 of 24 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ systems architecture evaluation techniques? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
Question 16 of 24 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ administrative management concepts, resource 
protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and reporting? 
The question correctly The question is incorrectly Do not use; competency 
identifies the need (no stated; needs revision inappropriate (please 
comment needed) (please comment) comment) 
o o o 
Comments: 
Question 17 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
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How often do you employ monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion detection and 
penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures? 
The question correctly The question is incorrectly Do not use; competency 
identifies the need (no stated; needs revision inappropriate (please 
comment needed) (please comment) comment) 
o o o 
Comments: 
Question 18 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ protection of critical business processes? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
Question 19 of 24 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ procedures for emergency response, extended back-up 
and post-disaster recovery? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Question 20 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ the aspects of computer crime? 
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The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o o o 
Comments: 
Question 21 of 24 
Please respond in terms ofthis question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ information security incident handling and 
investigations? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
Question 22 of 24 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ the concepts of computer ethics? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
168 
Question 23 of 24 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ the concepts of facility security requirements, 
environment, and life safety? 
The question correctly The question is incorrectly 
identifies the need (no stated; needs revision 
comment needed) (please comment) 
o o 
Comments: 
Question 24 of 24 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Please respond in terms of this question's suitability in an information security 
environment. 
How often do you employ the concepts of protection from physical security threats? 
The question correctly 
identifies the need (no 
comment needed) 
o 
Comments: 
The question is incorrectly 
stated; needs revision 
(please comment) 
o 
Do not use; competency 
inappropriate (please 
comment) 
o 
Appendix I 
Validity Results Round One 
1. How often do you employ access control techniques, access control 
administration, and access control models? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
100% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
N/A 
2. How often do you employ identification and authentication techniques? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 95% 
Identified Revision Deviation Error Confidence 
Interval 
94.44% 5.56% 0% .2944 .2357 .0556 2.827 -
3.062 
3. How often do you employ intrusion detection monitoring and penetration 
testing? 
Correctly Needs 
Identified Revision 
89% 11% 
Inappropriate Mean 
0% 2.889 
Standard 
Deviation 
.3234 
Standard 
Error 
.0762 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.728 -
3.050 
4. How often do you employ International Standards Organization/Open 
Systems Interconnection, Layers and characteristics? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
90% 5% 5% 2.778 .5438 .1292 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.505 -
3.050 
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5. How often have you employed security controls when addressing 
communications and network security, Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail 
security, facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security 
boundaries? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation 
56% 39% 6% 2.500 .6183 
This question was revised and submitted in round 2 
Standard 
Error 
.1457 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.193 -
2.807 
6. How often do you employ implementation and management of change 
control? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean 
Identified Revision 
94% 6% 0% 2.889 
Standard 
Deviation 
.4714 
Standard 
Error 
.1111 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.654-
3.123 
7. How often do you employ the development or implementation of information 
security employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 95% 
Identified Revision Deviation Error Confidence 
Interval 
83% 16% 0% 2.833 .3835 .0904 2.643-
3.024 
8. How often do you employ security awareness training and management? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 95% 
Identified Revision Deviation Error Confidence 
Interval 
88% 12% 0% 2.889 .3234 .0762 2.728-
3.305 
9. How often do you employ information security involving database and data 
warehousing, and information storage? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
94% 6% 0% 2.944 .2357 .0556 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.827 -
3.062 
10. How often do you employ information security regarding knowledge based 
systems and development controls? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 95% 
Identified Revision Deviation Error Confidence 
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94% 6% 0% 2.944 .2357 .0556 
Interval 
2.827 -
3.062 
11. How often do you employ cryptographic concepts, methodologies and 
practices, private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 95% 
Identified Revision Deviation Error Confidence 
Interval 
94% 0% 6% 2.889 .4714 .1111 2.654-
The researcher assumes the inappropriate response to be a flyer. 
12. How often do you employ system architecture for implementing 
cryptographic functions? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
94% 6% 0% 2.944 .2357 .0556 
3.123 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.827 -
3.062 
13. How often do you employ principles of common computer and network 
organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation 
techniques? 
Correctly Needs 
Identified Revision 
88% 12% 
Inappropriate Mean 
0% 2.889 
Standard 
Deviation 
.3234 
Standard 
Error 
.0762 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.728 -
3.050 
14. How often are you confronted with common flaws and security issues 
associated with systems architecture and design? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
55% 39% 6% 2.500 .6183 .1457 
This question was revised and submitted in round 2 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.193 -
2.807 
15. How often do you employ systems architecture evaluation techniques? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 95% 
Identified Revision Deviation Error Confidence 
Interval 
83% 17% 0% 2.833 .3835 .0904 2.643 -
3.000 
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16. How often do you employ administrative management concepts, resource 
protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and 
reporting? 
Correctly Needs 
Identified Revision 
83% 17% 
Inappropriate Mean 
0% 2.833 
Standard 
Deviation 
.3835 
Standard 
Error 
.0904 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.643 -
3.000 
17. How often do you employ monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion 
detection and penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 95% 
Identified Revision Deviation Error Confidence 
Interval 
100% 0% 0% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
18. How often do you employ protection of critical business processes? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
94% 6% 0% 2.944 .2291 .0526 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.834 -
3.055 
19. How often do you employ procedures for emergency response, extended 
back-up and post-disaster recovery? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
100% 0% 0% N/A N/A N/A 
20. How often do you address the issue of computer crime? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
55% 39% 11% 2.500 .6183 .1457 
This question was revised and submitted in round 2 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
N/A 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.193 -
2.807 
21. How often do you employ information security incident handling and 
investigations? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
94% 6% 0% 2.944 .2357 .0556 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.827 -
3.005 
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22. How often do you employ the concepts of computer ethics? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 
Identified Revision Deviation Error 
94% 6% 0% 2.947 .2233 .0499 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2.834 -
3.052 
23. How often do you employ facility requirements, environment and life safety? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean Standard Standard 95% 
Identified Revision Deviation Error Confidence 
Interval 
0% 0% 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
This item was removed from the survey. 
24. How often do you employ the concepts of protection from physical security 
threats? 
Correctly Needs Inappropriate Mean 
Identified Revision 
100% 0% 0% N/A 
Standard 
Deviation 
N/A 
Standard 
Error 
N/A 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
N/A 
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Appendix J 
Validity E-mail Round Two 
Subject: University Info Sec Research 
Dear Colleague: 
Thank you for submitting your initial response for the content validity survey. This 
response from you and the other content validity panel members identified three 
questions for revision. These questions and the revisions are included at the Web site 
identified below. Please review these revised questions using the following criteria: 
1) Accept the revision, no comments 
2) Accept the revision, with comments 
3) Reject the revision, with comments 
174 
Please log on to http://cob.bloomu.edu/afundaburklcontent to participate in this process. 
Your prompt action in responding by October 13, 2003 will be greatly appreciated 
PIN: <PIN> 
Again, I would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this validation 
process. If you have any questions, please contact me. 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Infonnation Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, P A 17815 
(570) 389-4816 
af1Uldabr(a)b loomu. edu 
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AppendixK 
Validity Survey Round Two 
Question 5 revision: How often have you employed security controls when 
addressing communications and network security, Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-
mail security, facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security 
boundaries? 
Accept the revision, no accept the revision, with reject the revision, with 
comments comments comments 
0 0 0 
Comments: 
Question 14 revision: How often are you confronted with common flaws and 
security issues associated with systems architecture and design? 
Accept the revision, no accept the revision, with reject the revision, with 
comments comments comments 
0 0 0 
Comments: 
Question 20 revision: How often do you address the issue of computer crime? 
Accept the revision, no accept the revision, with reject the revision, with 
comments comments comments 
0 0 0 
Comments: 
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Appendix L 
Validity Results Round Two 
Question 5 revision: How often have you employed security controls when 
addressing communications and network security, Internet/lntranet/Extranet, e-
mail security, facsimile security, secure voice communications, and security 
boundaries? 
Accept the accept the reject the Comments 
.. 
revision, with revision, with reVISIOn, no 
comments comments comments 
93% 7% 0% I believe that the question may be too 
generic. Most organizations employ 
some sort of malicious code 
identifier, but may not use more 
comprehensive security architecture. 
I believe that responses could be 
misleading. 
Question 14 revision: How often are you confronted with common flaws and 
security issues associated with systems architecture and design? 
Accept the accept the reject the Comments 
.. 
revision, with revision, with reVISIon, no 
comments comments comments 
100% 0% 0% N/A 
Question 20 revision: How often do you address the issue of computer crime? 
Accept the accept the reject the Comments 
revision, no revision, with revision, with 
comments comments comments 
93% 7% 0% Suggest you add a generic definition 
of computer crime 
AppendixM 
IRB Approvals 
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Appendix N 
Survey E-Mails 
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Dear Colleague, 
I am in the process of completing my dissertation for a Doctorate in Information Systems. 
I am asking for your assistance in completing a survey which will be used to compare the 
tasks performed by information security professionals in the field with the skills being 
taught in the information security curriculum in schools designated as National Security 
Agency (NSA) Centers of Excellence in Information Assurance. 
You were chosen to participate because you teach in an NSA designated School of 
Excellence in Information Assurance. Participation is totally voluntary and should take 
no longer than 10 minutes of your time. Since the validity of the results depend on 
obtaining a high response rate, your participation is crucial to the success of this research. 
I, as the principal researcher, will be the only person viewing the collected data and to 
ensure anonymity all links to PINs will be deleted at the conclusion of data collection. If 
you know of other faculty, teaching this curriculum, who did not receive this e-mail, 
please forward and have them use the PIN "12345". 
Colleges and universities will be able to use the results ofthis research to improve 
information security courses to address real world needs. In addition, the survey results 
will be made available to the International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium. If you wish to obtain the results of this survey so indicate on the on-line 
form available at the end of the survey. 
Please log on to http://cob.bloomu.eduJafundaburkiinfosecsurvey and use the Personal 
Identification Number <PIN> to participate. Your response by December 21, 2003 will 
be greatly appreciated. 
Thank you for your help in this needed research. If you have any questions, please 
contact me. 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Information Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, P A 17815 
(570) 389-4816 
afundabr@bloomu.edu 
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Dear Colleague, 
I am in the process of completing my dissertation for a Doctorate in Information Systems. 
I am asking for your assistance in completing a survey which will be used to compare the 
tasks performed by information security professionals in the field with the skills being 
taught in the information security curriculum in schools designated as National Security 
Agency (NSA) Centers of Excellence in Information Assurance. 
You were chosen to participate because of your expertise in the field of information 
security and your CISSP certification. Participation is totally voluntary and should take 
no longer than 10 minutes of your time. Since the validity of the results depend on 
obtaining a high response rate, your participation is crucial to the success of this research. 
I, as the principal researcher, will be the only person viewing the collected data and to 
ensure anonymity all links to PINs will be deleted at the conclusion of data collection. 
Colleges and universities will be able to use the results of this research to improve 
information security courses to address real world needs. In addition, the survey results 
will be made available to the International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium. If you wish to obtain the results of this survey so indicate on the on-line 
form available at the end of the survey. 
Please log on to http://cob.bloomu.edu/afundaburk/infosecsurvey and use the Personal 
Identification Number <PIN> to participate. Your response by December 21, 2003 will 
be greatly appreciated. 
Thank you for your help in this needed research. If you have any questions, please 
contact me. 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Information Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, PA 17815 
(570) 389-4816 
afundabr@bloomu.edu 
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Dear Colleague, 
Ten days ago you should have received an online survey concerning tasks taught by 
information security faculty in NSA Schools of Excellence in Information Assurance. 
Your ideas and experience will make a valuable contribution to my dissertation research. 
Will you please take the time now to fill out this short survey? 
Log on to http://cob.bloomu.edulafundaburklinfosecsurvey and use the Personal 
Identification Number <PIN> to participate. Thank you for your help. If you have 
questions, please contact me. 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Information Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, P A 17815 
(570) 389-4816 
afundabr@bloomu.edu 
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Dear Colleague, 
Ten days ago you should have received an online survey concerning tasks performed by 
information security professionals in the field. Your ideas and experience will make a 
valuable contribution to my dissertation research. Will you please take the time now to 
fill out this short survey? 
Log on to http://cob.bloomu.edu/afundaburk/infosecsurvey and use the Personal 
Identification Number <PIN> to participate. Thank you for your help. If you have 
questions, please contact me. 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Information Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, P A 17815 
(570) 389-4816 
afundabr@bloomu.edu 
185 
Dear Colleague, 
Ten days ago you should have received my second request to complete an online survey 
concerning tasks taught by information security faculty in NSA Schools of Excellence in 
Information Assurance. I truly value your ideas and experience. Your taking the time to 
complete this survey will make a valuable contribution to information security research. 
Will you please take the time now to fill out this short survey? 
Log on to http://cob.bloomu.edu/afundaburk/infosecsurvey and use the Personal 
Identification Number <PIN> to participate. Thank you for your help. If you have 
questions, please contact me. 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Information Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, P A 17815 
(570) 389-4816 
afundabr@bloomu.edu 
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Dear Colleague, 
Ten days ago you should have received my second request to complete an online survey 
concerning tasks performed by information security professionals in the field. I truly 
value your ideas and experience. Your taking the time to complete this survey will make 
a valuable contribution to information security research. Will you please take the time 
now to fill out this short survey? 
Log on to http://cob.bloomu.eduiafundaburkiinfosecsurvey and use the Personal 
Identification Number <PIN> to participate. Thank you for your help. If you have 
questions, please contact me. 
Al Fundaburk 
Assistant Professor 
Business Education/Office Information Systems 
Bloomsburg University 
Bloomsburg, P A 17815 
(570) 389-4816 
afundabr@bloomu.edu 
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Appendix 0 
Information Systems Security Faculty Survey 
The following questions will provide background information of respondents. The 
assignment of the PIN allows for individual and institutional anonymity. The participant 
database and survey responses will be kept confidential by the principal researcher. After 
survey completion, the database linking PINs to participants will be deleted assuring 
participant anonymity. 
Please select all that apply: 
() I have published textbook(s) or article(s) in the area of information security. 
( ) I have participated in at least one national or state convention as a speaker or panel 
member discussing the topic of information security. 
( ) I am a member ofthe faculty of an accredited university with a viable information 
security curriculum. 
( ) I hold a CISSP certification. 
Click here if none of the above applies to you, 
Otherwise, please input PIN here: and click on submit. 
Submit 
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The purpose of this survey is to compare the skills and attributes identified in the ten 
domains of the CISSP being taught in a designated NSA "Centers of Excellence" security 
curriculum to the skills and attributes employed by professionals working in an 
information security environment. As a participant you will be asked to fill out a survey 
about your teaching of specific information security skills. This survey is being 
conducted as part of a dissertation titled: The Education of Information Security 
Professionals: An Analysis of Industry Needs vs. Academic Curriculum in the 2 yt 
Century. The principal researcher is the only person viewing the collected data and all 
links to PINs will be deleted at the conclusion of data collection. Participation in this 
survey is totally voluntary and should take no longer than 10 minutes. 
The following questions are about information security skills. How often do you teach the 
following skills in your information security curriculum? Please click on the 
corresponding radio button that identifies the frequency. At the completion of each 
question, click on the submit button to record your answer. 
1. How often do you teach access control techniques, access control administration, 
and access control models? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
2. How often do you teach identification and authentication techniques? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
3. How often do you teach intrusion detection monitoring, and penetration testing? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
4. How often do you teach International Standards Organization/Open Systems 
Interconnection, Layers and characteristics? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
5. How often do you teach communications and network security, 
InternetiIntranetlExtranet, e-mail security, facsimile security, secure voice 
communications, and security boundaries? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
6. How often do you teach implementation and management of change control? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
7. How often do you teach the development or implementation of information 
security employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
8. How often do you teach security awareness training and management? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
9. How often do you teach infonnation security involving database and data 
warehousing, and infonnation storage? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
10. How often do you teach infonnation security regarding knowledge based systems 
and development controls? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
11. How often do you teach cryptographic concepts, methodologies and practices, 
private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
12. How often do you teach system architecture for implementing cryptographic 
functions? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
13. How often do you teach principles of common computer and network 
organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
14. How often do you teach common flaws and security issues associated with 
systems architecture and design? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
15. How often do you teach systems architecture evaluation techniques? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
16. How often do you teach administrative management concepts, resource 
protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and reporting? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
17. How often do you teach monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion detection and 
penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
18. How often do you teach protection of critical business processes? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
19. How often do you teach procedures for emergency response, extended back-up 
and post -disaster recovery? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
20. How often do you teach the aspects of computer crime? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
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21. How often do you teach infonnation security incident handling and 
investigations? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
22. How often do you teach the concepts of computer ethics? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
23. How often do you teach the concepts of protection from physical security threats? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
190 
191 
Appendix P 
Information Systems Security Professional Survey 
The following questions will provide background infonnation of respondents. The 
assignment of the PIN allows for individual and institutional anonymity. The participant 
database and survey responses will be kept confidential by the principal researcher. After 
survey completion, the database linking PINs to participants will be deleted assuring 
participant anonymity. 
To participate in this survey you must be a member ofthe faculty of an accredited 
university with a viable infonnation security program. If not please click here to exit the 
survey. 
Please click on the radio buttons below if applicable: 
() I have published textbook(s) or article(s) in the area ofinfonnation security 
( ) I have participated in national or state convention as a speaker or panel 
member discussing the topic of infonnation security 
( ) I hold a CISSP certification 
To participate please input PIN here: and click on submit. 
Submit 
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The purpose of this survey is to compare the skills and attributes identified in the ten 
domains of the CISSP to the skills and attributes employed by professionals working in 
an information security environment. As a participant you will be asked to fill out a 
survey about your use of specific information security skills. This survey is being 
conducted as part of a dissertation titled: The Education of Information Security 
Professionals: An Analysis of Industry Needs vs. Academic Curriculum in the 21st 
Century. The principal researcher is the only person viewing the collected data and all 
links to PINs will be deleted at the conclusion of data collection. Participation in this 
survey is totally voluntary and should take no longer than 10 minutes. 
The following questions are about information security skills. How often do you employ 
the following skills while working in an information security environment? Please click 
on the corresponding radio button that identifies the frequency. At the completion of 
each question, click on the submit button to record your answer. 
1. How often do you employ access control techniques, access control administration, 
and access control models? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
2. How often do you employ identification and authentication techniques? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
3. How often do you employ intrusion detection monitoring and penetration testing? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
4. How often do you employ International Standards Organization/Open Systems 
Interconnection, Layers and characteristics? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
5. How often have you employed security controls when addressing communications 
and network security, Internet/Intranet/Extranet, e-mail security, facsimile security, 
secure voice communications, and security boundaries? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
6. How often do you employ implementation and management of change control? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
7. How often do you employ the development or implementation of information 
security employment policies, practices, standards, guidelines, and procedures? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
8. How often do you employ security awareness training and management? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
9. How often do you employ infonnation security involving database and data 
warehousing, and infonnation storage? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
10. How often do you employ infonnation security regarding knowledge based 
systems and development controls? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
11. How often do you employ cryptographic concepts, methodologies and practices, 
private and public key algorithms, and public key infrastructure? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
12. How often do you employ system architecture for implementing cryptographic 
functions? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
13. How often do you employ principles of common computer and network 
organizations, principles of common security models, and evaluation techniques? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
14. How often are you confronted with common flaws and security issues associated 
with systems architecture and design? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
15. How often do you employ systems architecture evaluation techniques? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
16. How often do you employ administrative management concepts, resource 
protection, audit trails, inappropriate activities, violations, breaches, and reporting? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
17. How often do you employ monitoring tools and techniques, intrusion detection 
and penetration detection techniques, threats and counter measures? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
18. How often do you employ protection of critical business processes? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
19. How often do you employ procedures for emergency response, extended back-up 
and post-disaster recovery? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
20. How often do you address the issue of computer crime? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
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21. How often do you employ information security incident handling and 
investigations? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
22. How often do you employ the concepts of computer ethics? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
23. How often do you employ the concepts of protection from physical security 
threats? 
Always 0 Often 0 Sometimes 0 Rarely 0 Never 0 
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Appendix Q 
SPSS Statistical Results 
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Questions prol and edul 
Statistics 
PROI EDUI 
N Valid 125 99 
Missing 0 26 
Mean 4.6080 3.7172 
Std. Error .05553 .13005 
of Mean 
Median 5.0000 4.0000 
Skewness -1.550 -.839 
Std. Error .217 .243 
of 
Skewness 
g1!!:-~9.~~r.~ }'-~~!~ ________________________________ . 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi- 2.843a 9 .970 
Square 
Likelihood 3.470 
Ratio 
Linear-by- .173 
Linear 
Association 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
9 .943 
1 .677 
-------------------------------------------------------
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a 9 cells (56.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12. 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Std. Errora Tb Sig. 
-.013 .091 -.141 .888 
99 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.--------------------------
EDUl-
PRO 1 
Z -5.486a 
Asymp. .000 
Sig. (2-
. __ !~iJ~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro2 and edu2 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR02 
125 
0 
4.6480 
.04580 
-.990 
.217 
3.00 
5.00 
EDU2 
99 
26 
3.8990 
.12639 
-1.220 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
.~l?-~ ~~q~~~ J~~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi- 4.198a 8 .839 
Square 
Likelihood 4.681 
Ratio 
Linear-by- 1.073 
Linear 
Association 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
8 .791 
1 .300 
._---------------------------------------------------
197 
a 9 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01. 
~)'!l?-~~!rt~_ M~~~~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Std. Tb Sig. 
.109 
99 
Errora 
.091 1.203 .229 
Cases 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statistics 
._-------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU2-
PR02 
-5.116 
.000 
. __ !?:iJ~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Question pro3 and edu3 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR03 
125 
0 
4.0080 
.08762 
-1.115 
.217 
1.00 
5.00 
EDU3 
99 
26 
3.7576 
.12275 
-.653 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~J:1! =-~q1:L~t? J~ t?~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
17.762a 
Square 
Likelihood 12.850 
Ratio 
Linear-by- 1.052 
Linear 
Associatio 
n 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
16 
16 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.338 
.684 
.305 
-----------------------------------------------------
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a 18 cells (72.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08. 
~_~~!!~~_ M~~~l!~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
.052 
99 
Errora 
.091 .575 .566 
.-.-.-----------------------------------.--------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
bUsing the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.--------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU3-
PR03 
-2.096a 
.036 
. __ !~i).~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro4 and edu4 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR04 
125 
0 
4.1840 
.04455 
.347 
.217 
3.00 
5.00 
EDU4 
99 
26 
3.6768 
.10336 
-.691 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~J:1j:-~q':l~~~}~~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Pearson 
Chi-
Value df Asymp. 
8 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.818 
199 
Square 
Likelihoo 5.915 
d Ratio 
Linear- 1.290 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
8 .657 
1 .256 
.-~--------------------------------------------------
200 
a 8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .16. 
~~~~!!i~_ ~~~~~l}.~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal Kendall's .104 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.082 1.266 .206 
.----------------------.-------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.----------------------.---
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU4-
PR04 
-4.424a 
.000 
. __ !~i}~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Question proS and eduS 
Statistics 
PR05 
N Valid 125 
Missing 0 
Mean 4.3920 
Std. Error .06415 
of Mean 
Median 5.0000 
Skewness -.745 
EDU5 
99 
26 
3.9596 
.10543 
4.0000 
-.676 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
.217 
3.00 
5.00 
.243 
2.00 
5.00 
Q1?-J ~~q~~~~ _I~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Likelihoo 6.4 7 4 
dRatio 
Linear- .550 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
6 
6 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.400 
.372 
.458 
-----------------------------------------------------
201 
a 4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.12. 
~~~~~~_ M~~~l!!~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
-.072 
99 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.089 -.801 .423 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.-------------------------~ 
Z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU5-
PR05 
-2.840a 
.005 
. __ !~iJ~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro6 and edu6 
Statistics 
.-------------.--------------------------------------
N Valid 
Missing 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value 
Pearson Chi- 9.433a 
Square 
Likelihood 11.148 
Ratio 
Linear-by- .332 
Linear 
Association 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
PR06 
125 
0 
4.0000 
.07449 
-.426 
.217 
2.00 
5.00 
df 
9 
9 
1 
EDU6 
99 
26 
2.7778 
.14398 
.401 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.398 
.266 
.565 
202 
a 7 cells (43.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.11. 
~~~~!!"!~_ ~~~~l!!~~ _______________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Std. Approx. Approx. 
Error a T b Sig. 
Ordinal Kendall's -.035 .089 -.389 .697 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
.--------------------.-------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statistics b 
.--------------------------
EDU6-
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
PR06 
-5.800a 
.000 
. __ !~iJ~~L _____________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Question pro7 and edu7 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR07 
125 
0 
4.1760 
.06331 
-.265 
.217 
3.00 
5.00 
EDU7 
99 
26 
4.0303 
.12878 
-1.067 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
Q~j:-~q~~~ _'I~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi- 8.735a 8 .365 
Square 
Likelihood 10.525 
Ratio 
Linear-by- .002 
Linear 
Association 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
8 .230 
1 .968 
._---------------------------------------------------
203 
a 9 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.21. 
~~~!ti~_ M~_~~~~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Std. Errora Tb Sig . 
.003 . 083 .031 .975 
99 
Valid 
Cases 
._-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
---------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU7-
PR07 
-.628a 
.530 
. __ !~i}~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions proS and eduS 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR08 
125 
0 
3.8240 
.07625 
.85255 
-.129 
.217 
2.00 
5.00 
EDU8 
99 
26 
3.8889 
.11566 
1.15077 
-1.009 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~l?-j~~ql:l~~ }~~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson Chi- 6.152a 
Square 
Likelihood 7.382 
Ratio 
Linear-by- .584 
Linear 
Association 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
12 
12 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.908 
.831 
.445 
204 
205 
a 11 cells (55.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .10. 
~~!P;~~~_ ~~~~l!_~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Ordinal Kendall's .089 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Errora 
.087 1.019 .308 
--------.----------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.--------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU8-
PR08 
-1.165a 
.244 
. __ !~}J~_~) _______________ _ 
a Based on negative ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro9 and edu9 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value 
PR09 
125 
0 
4.0080 
.08230 
.92017 
-.963 
.217 
1.00 
5.00 
df 
EDU9 
99 
26 
3.6768 
.11998 
1.19376 
-.448 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
Pearson Chi- 37.058a 
Square 
Likelihood 29.130 
Ratio 
Line ar-b y- 4.245 
Linear 
Association 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
16 
16 
1 
sided) 
.002 
.023 
.039 
206 
a 16 cells (64.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06. 
~~~~!!"!~-~~~~~~~ ---------------- ------- -- ---------- ----------- ------
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal Kendall's .127 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.084 1.503 .133 
.------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.--------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU9-
PR09 
-2.463a 
.014 
. __ !~iJ~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions prolO and edulO 
Statistics 
PROIO 
N Valid 125 
Missing 0 
Mean 3.4560 
Std. Error .09538 
of Mean 
Std. 1.06638 
Deviation 
EDU10 
99 
26 
3.2222 
.10507 
1.04545 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
-.147 
.217 
1.00 
5.00 
.251 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~I:j~~ql:l~~~ _I~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. df 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
22.S02a 
Likelihoo 20.462 
d Ratio 
Linear- 2.659 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.029 
.059 
.103 
12 
12 
1 
._---------------------------------------------------
207 
a 14 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .OS. 
~~!!!~!rt~_ ~~~~~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
.121 
99 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.092 1.304 .192 
._-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
._-------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDUI0 -
PROlO 
-2.146a 
.032 
. __ !~iJ~~t ______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions proll and edull 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PRO 11 
125 
0 
3.6960 
.07023 
.78519 
-.419 
.217 
1.00 
5.00 
EDUll 
99 
26 
4.0808 
.13055 
1.29895 
-1.350 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~l].j:-~ql:l~~_'r~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-16.371a 16 .427 
Square 
Likelihood 19.909 
Ratio 
Linear-by- .187 
Linear 
Association 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
16 .224 
1 .665 
-----------------------------------------------------
208 
a 19 cells (76.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02. 
~_~~!!!~_ M~~~~_~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal Kendall's -.057 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.087 -.655 .512 
-------------------------.-------------------------------.--------------------. 
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
._-------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDUll -
PRO 11 
-2.538a 
.011 
___ !~iJ~qL _____________ _ 
a Based on negative ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro12 and edu12 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR012 
125 
0 
3.3200 
.08843 
.98865 
-.377 
.217 
1.00 
5.00 
EDU12 
99 
26 
3.0505 
.13031 
1.29657 
-.038 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~~j ~~q~~~~ J~~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Likelihoo 15.109 
dRatio 
Linear- .120 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
16 
16 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.640 
.517 
.729 
209 
210 
a 16 cells (64.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .57. 
~x~~t?!!!~_ ~t?_<l:~~!~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Ordinal Kendall's .039 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Errora 
.079 .500 .617 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.--------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU12 -
PR012 
-1.953a 
.051 
___ ~~iJ~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro13 and edu13 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PRO 13 
125 
0 
3.9440 
.07388 
.82603 
-.418 
.217 
2.00 
5.00 
EDU13 
99 
26 
3.9798 
.13993 
1.39225 
-1.190 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~~j~~q~?!~ _'I~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
------ -------- ---------- ------- -----------~jg._Q~--
Pearson Chi-17.137 
Square 
Likelihood 21.288 
Ratio 
Linear-by- 1.012 
Linear 
Association 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
12 
12 
1 
sided) 
.145 
.046 
.315 
._---------------------------------------------------
211 
a 14 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06. 
~~~!!"i~_ M~~~l!!~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
.095 
99 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.080 1.175 .240 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
._-------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU13 -
PRO 13 
-.576a 
.564 
. __ !~i!~~L _____________ _ 
a Based on negative ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro14 and edu14 
Statistics 
PR014 
N Valid 125 
Missing 0 
Mean 4.1520 
Std. Error .05909 
of Mean 
Std. .66060 
Deviation 
EDU14 
99 
26 
3.9091 
.14001 
1.39307 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
-.344 
.217 
2.00 
5.00 
-1.106 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~l].J :-~ql:l~~ _I~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi- 13.126a 12 .360 
Square 
Likelihood 13.846 
Ratio 
Linear-by- .317 
Linear 
Association 
N of Valid 99 
Cases 
12 .311 
1 .573 
-----------------------------------------------------
212 
a 13 cells (65.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03. 
~~~!rt~_ M~~~~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal Kendall's .063 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.077 .829 .407 
._-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.-------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU14 -
PR014 
-1.371 a 
.170 
. __ !~J}~(D _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro15 and edu15 
Statistics 
~-~-------------------------------------------------
PR015 EDU15 
N Valid 125 99 
Missing 0 26 
Mean 3.5680 3.1313 
Std. Error .07815 .11633 
of Mean 
Std. .87378 1.15746 
Deviation 
Skewness -.064 -.060 
Std. Error .217 .243 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 5.00 5.00 
9:j~~ql!~r.~ _T.~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Likelihoo 10.609 
d Ratio 
Linear- 2.224 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
16 
16 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.901 
.833 
.136 
~----------------------------------------------------
213 
a 19 cells (76.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06. 
~~~!!"!~_ M~~~~!~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal Kendall's .132 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.085 1.532 .126 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.-------------------------~ 
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU15 -
PR015 
-3.176a 
.001 
. __ !~iJ~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro16 and edu16 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR016 
125 
0 
4.1200 
.04899 
.54772 
.069 
.217 
3.00 
5.00 
EDU16 
99 
26 
3.4343 
.13932 
1.38624 
-.283 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
QI:! :-~q~~~~ }:.~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Likelihoo 5.790 
d Ratio 
Linear- 3.239 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
6 
6 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.438 
.447 
.072 
214 
215 
a 7 cells (58.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30. 
~-~~~!~~~- ~~-~~~~~----------------------------------------------------
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
.177 
99 
Errora 
.092 1.886 .059 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.--------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU16 -
PR016 
-4.367a 
.000 
. __ !~.iJ~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro17 and edu17 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR017 
125 
0 
4.0480 
.07776 
.86933 
-1.142 
.217 
1.00 
5.00 
EDU17 
99 
26 
3.9495 
.13266 
1.31997 
-.802 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~~.i~~ql:l~~ _I~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp . 
. ------- ----------------------------------~!g.-Q-:: --
Pearson 22.077a 
Chi-
Square 
Likelihoo 18.036 
d Ratio 
Linear- 3.232 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
12 
12 
1 
sided) 
.037 
.115 
.072 
.~---------------------------------------------------
216 
a 13 cells (65.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08. 
~~~!!i~_ ~~~~~~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
.109 
99 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.086 1.261 .207 
.------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
._-------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU17 -
PRO 17 
-1.071 a 
.284 
. __ !~i]~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro18 and edu18 
Statistics 
N Valid 
Mean 
Std. Error 
Missing 
PR018 
125 
o 
4.1680 
.06695 
EDU18 
99 
26 
3.3838 
.13824 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
.74850 
-.520 
.217 
2.00 
5.00 
1.37549 
-.221 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
9.l?-j:-~g_':l?!~ _I~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Cbi-
10.944a 
Square 
Likelihoo 9.075 
d Ratio 
Linear- .741 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
9 
9 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.280 
.430 
.389 
-----------------------------------------------------
217 
a 9 cells (56.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .04. 
~~~~!!!~-~~~~~-~~~----------------------------------------------------
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
-.109 
99 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.093 -1.174 .240 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
._-----_.------------------
EDU18 -
PR018 
Z -4.220a 
. _ ~~~l?: _____ :~9~ ___ _ 
Sig. (2-
. __ !~iJ~~L _____________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Question pro19 and edu19 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR019 
125 
0 
3.6800 
.08546 
.95546 
-.275 
.217 
1.00 
5.00 
EDU19 
99 
26 
3.6970 
.14174 
1.41027 
-.914 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
9?-j=-~q~~~ _I~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
15.355a 
Likelihoo 17.618 
d Ratio 
Linear- .491 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
16 
16 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.499 
.347 
.484 
.----------------------------------------------------
218 
a 15 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02. 
~~~~~~_ !Y!~~~~~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal Kendall's -.089 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.096 -.929 .353 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
.------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.-------------------------~ 
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU19 -
PR019 
-.783a 
.434 
. __ !~_i~~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on negative ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro20 and edu20 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR020 
125 
0 
3.0320 
.07356 
.82243 
.294 
.217 
1.00 
5.00 
EDU20 
99 
26 
4.3030 
.09132 
.90863 
-1.476 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~l:!~~9_l:l~~ }~~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
14.883a 
Likelihoo 13.554 
d Ratio 
Linear- .001 
16 
16 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.533 
.632 
.976 
219 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
------.------.---------------------------------------
220 
a 18 cells (72.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02. 
~~~!ti~_ ~~~~?}.~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
-.028 
99 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.094 -.298 .765 
-----------------------------------------.-------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.--.---------.----------.--
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU20 -
PR020 
-7.124a 
.000 
" __ !~iJ~~t ______________ _ 
a Based on negative ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro21 and edu21 
Statistics 
PR021 
N Valid 125 
Missing 0 
Mean 3.4480 
Std. Error .08832 
of Mean 
Std. .98747 
Deviation 
Skewness -.236 
Std. Error .217 
of 
Skewness 
EDU21 
99 
26 
3.4444 
.16194 
1.61133 
-.562 
.243 
Minimum 
Maximum 
1.00 
5.00 
1.00 
5.00 
Ql?-j:-~q~?:~~ _'r~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Likelihoo 21.934 
dRatio 
Linear- .033 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
16 
16 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.205 
.145 
.856 
.----------------------------------------------------
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a 18 cells (72.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06. 
~~!!'!~!~~_ !Y!~~~~~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal Kendall's .057 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.089 .645 .519 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
._-------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU2l -
PR02l 
-.089a 
.929 
. --!~j~~~) ----------------
a Based on negative ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro22 and edu22 
Statistics 
.-------------------------------.-------.-------.----
PR022 EDU22 
N Valid 125 99 
Missing 0 26 
Mean 3.7440 3.5556 
Std. Error .08644 .16696 
of Mean 
Std. .96640 1.66122 
Deviation 
Skewness -.227 -.747 
Std. Error .217 .243 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 5.00 5.00 
Q1!j :-~9.':l~~~ }_~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
7.994a 
Square 
Like1ihoo 8.674 
d Ratio 
Linear- .034 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
16 
16 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.949 
.926 
.853 
"._.----------------.----._--------------._----------
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a 16 cells (64.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01. 
~~.t!l:~!!~~_ M~~~~!~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Ordinal Kendall's -.026 
by tau-b 
Ordinal 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
Errora 
.090 -.285 .776 
"--------._-_.-----------.-----------------------------------------------.-----
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
bUsing the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.--------------------------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU22 -
PR022 
-.777a 
.437 
. __ !~_iJ~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Questions pro23 and edu23 
Statistics 
N 
Mean 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
PR023 
125 
0 
3.9040 
.07571 
.84647 
-.058 
.217 
2.00 
5.00 
EDU23 
99 
26 
3.6768 
.13908 
1.38379 
-.765 
.243 
1.00 
5.00 
~I:j ~~ql:l~r.~ _I~~!~ ______________________________ _ 
Value df Asymp. 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Likelihoo 7.4 73 
d Ratio 
Linear- .065 
by-Linear 
Associati 
on 
Nof 99 
Valid 
Cases 
12 
12 
1 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
.793 
.825 
.798 
._---------------------------------------------------
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a 11 cells (55.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02. 
~)'l!?-~~!rt<?_ M~~~~!~~ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Value Asymp. Approx. Approx. 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Nof 
Valid 
Cases 
Kendall's 
tau-b 
-.045 
99 
Std. Tb Sig. 
Errora 
.085 -.533 .594 
._---------------------------------------------------------------------.-------
a Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
Test Statisticsb 
.------.----------.--------
z 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
EDU23 -
PR023 
-.839a 
.402 
. __ !~D~~) _______________ _ 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Appendix R 
Raw Data 
225 
Information Security Professionals Raw Data 
p p p p p p p p p p p p P 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 o 1 2 3 
551 4 3 3 4 3 1 131 4 
p p p P 
1 1 1 1 
4 5 6 7 
4 1 4 1 
p p p p p P 
1 1 2 2 2 2 
890 1 2 3 
322 1 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 3 444 3 444 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 344 
2 4 4 4 5 2 4 3 3 3 5 3 3 4 2 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 324 3 4 3 4 3 3 343 
5 5 5 4 5 544 5 3 4 4 4 5 354 4 3 334 4 
54454 5 4 4 4 3 334 544 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 
5 5 544 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 344 3 3 332 3 
4 4 4 4 4 344 4 2 3 2 2 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 3 2 1 4 344 4 4 4 2 2 3 3 
554 554 4 3 3 2 3 3 4 544 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 545 544 555 
55454 4 544 344 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 4 5 4 
452 5 5 4 5 2 3 244 5 4 4 4 4 3 1 1 155 
551433431 131 441 4 1 322 1 3 3 
3 444 544 3 4 2 4 2 4 544 554 2 224 
4 4 545 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 4 5 4 554 524 5 3 
5 5 3 3 5 4 324 3 5 5 5 543 3 442 2 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 344 555 5 4 4 444 5 4 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 
5 5 5 4 5 3 3 544 524 5 5 5 5 553 545 
3 444 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 5 4 5 3 3 4 5 4 
5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 555 555 
555 555 524 3 5 3 3 4 3 4 5 5 3 3 3 5 5 
5 5 344 4 4 4 4 5 4 544 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
5 544 5 4 5 4 534 3 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 3 334 
5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 344 3 3 332 3 
5 544 3 3 334 3 3 3 3 4 334 3 3 3 4 3 3 
4 4 4 4 5 4 3 3 4 442 544 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 
5 5 4 4 4 5 5 2 5 4 3 3 3 4 344 3 344 4 4 
554 544 544 344 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 4 5 4 
5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 544 554 555 
5 5 3 5 5 544 554 443 3 4 344 3 4 3 3 
226 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 544 555 
5 544 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 343 334 3 3 
5 5 5 555 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 545 544 555 
4 534 5 5 554 3 4 334 3 4 4 4 3 2 3 5 3 
5 4 5 4 5 544 4 4 4 4 4 4 444 4 3 3 3 5 5 
544 554 4 344 3 344 3 4 5 5 4 3 334 
5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 553 344 3 5 4 5 5 3 3 3 5 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 344 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 
5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 445 
5 544 5 4 5 4 534 3 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 3 334 
5 524 5 3 5 5 5 3 3 3 5 4 343 5 5 3 335 
5 554 5 544 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 5 3 344 
54454 5 4 4 4 3 334 5 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 
5 5 3 444 4 4 4 5 4 544 3 444 3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 5 5 5 544 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
4 544 5 3 5 3 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 5 4 4 344 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 
553 5 554 4 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 344 3 4 3 3 
4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 343 
5 544 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 2 4 3 4 2 444 4 3 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 4 
5 5 5 4 5 544 5 3 444 5 3 5 4 4 3 3 344 
544 5 544 344 3 344 3 4 5 5 4 3 3 3 4 
5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 
4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 324 3 4 3 4 3 3 343 
5 5 3 4 4 4 444 5 4 544 344 4 3 3 3 3 3 
553 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 4 5 3 4 3 2 2 3 4 
5 544 4 4 4 4 442 2 3 4 3 5 5 5 5 3 545 
4 4 444 3 4 3 4 444 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 
4 4 5 4 5 5 3 3 322 2 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 2 4 5 3 
5 5 3 5 5 544 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 344 3 4 3 3 
5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 554 4 4 5 544 554 555 
5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 524 5 5 5 542 5 5 
3 344 4 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 322 
5 5 5 4 544 5 554 4 5 4 4 4 544 3 4 4 3 
5 5 3 4 444 4 4 5 4 544 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
227 
5 5 555 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 554 4 5 5 5 
4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 334 3 2 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 343 
5 5 544 4 4 344 3 4 3 3 3 5 5 5 3 343 5 
4 4 443 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 343 
553 5 5 544 554 443 3 4 344 3 4 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 44 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 
4 4 2 4 3 2 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 3 4 2 4 3 5 4 
4 4 5 3 3 4 5 4 4 2 2 2 344 5 5 3 324 3 3 
55454 554 4 5 5 1 4 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 544 
55454 4 5 4 4 344 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 4 5 4 
5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 2 5 5 5 5 5 552 243 
5 5 544 4 4 344 343 3 3 5 553 3 4 3 5 
4 4 2 4 3 2 4 5 4 444 4 5 4 4 3 4 2 4 3 5 4 
5 5 544 4 4 344 3 4 3 3 3 5 553 3 4 3 5 
54454 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 544 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 555 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
4 544 5 3 5 3 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 544 344 
554 4 543 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 344 3 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 344 
4 4 4 4 5 4 3 3 3 2 4 4 554 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 
5 5 534 4 4 4 5 3 3 344 3 4 4 3 3 3 343 
5 544 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 334 3 3 3 4 3 3 
5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 344 3 3 3 323 
5 5 3 4 4 4 3 343 3 2 4 4 3 3 344 3 4 3 4 
5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 544 4 544 3 3 3 4 
544 5 5 4 4 3 4 4 3 344 3 4 554 3 3 3 4 
5 524 5 3 5 553 3 3 5 4 3 4 3 553 3 3 5 
5 5 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 
5 5 544 4 4 344 3 4 3 3 3 5 5 5 3 343 5 
5 544 3 3 3 343 3 334 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 
5 5 5 4 544 5 5 544 5 4 4 4 544 3 4 4 3 
5 5 3 4 4 4 444 5 4 544 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 442 2 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 5 
3 4 4 4 5 4 4 3 4 2 4 2 4 544 554 2 2 2 4 
551 334 5 4 5 1 4 1 4 4 4 3 1 451 345 
555 5 5 4 5 5 534 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 555 
228 
5 5 2 4 5 3 5 5 533 354 343 5 5 3 3 3 5 
4 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 3 2 4 2 4 524 532 3 554 
5 5 5 4 544 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 544 344 3 
554 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 234 3 5 5 553 545 
5 5 545 544 534 4 4 5 3 544 3 3 344 
5 5 3 5 5 544 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 344 343 3 
5 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 534 3 4 5 4 4 4 5 533 3 4 
5 5 5 4 544 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 544 344 3 
55444 5 5 4 4 2 534 3 3 5 4 554 545 
444 4 5 4 3 344 4 2 5 4 4 4 444 5 4 5 5 
5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 344 3 444 5 3 3 5 2 
5 4 4 4 5 4 5 544 3 3 5 5 344 5 5 4 4 4 5 
554 4 554 522 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 
3 3 2 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 234 2 4 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 
4444434 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 
4 4 444 3 4 4 4 3 4 444 4 4 4 4 4 2 344 
5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 555 554 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
5 5 5 4 5 554 554 4 4 5 544 5 5 4 5 5 5 
454 4 5 3 5 3 2 2 3 234 3 4 5 544 344 
34243 3 3 3 2 2 3 234 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 
452 5 5 4 5 2 3 2 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 155 
229 
Information Security Faculty Raw Data 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 e1 e1 e1 e1 e1 e1 e1 e1 e1 e1 e2 e2 e2 e2 eeeeeeeee 01234567890123 
32132 
1 1 121 
5 5 321 
1 1 
1 
1 
221 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 1 1 1 111 1 1 1 
5 2 1 1 1 1 141 1 2 
5 5 2 4 5 2 5 5 2 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 5 554 5 
552 4 5 2 5 5 2 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 5 554 5 
3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 332 3 3 3 1 3 
5 524 5 2 552 353 5 5 3 5 2 555 545 
5 524 5 2 552 3 5 3 553 5 2 555 545 
5 5 2 4 5 2 552 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 5 5 545 
5 5 2 4 5 2 5 523 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 5 5 545 
4 5 5 5 5 2 1 122 3 1 4 4 2 2 5 2 3 4 224 
552 4 5 2 5 5 2 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 5 5 545 
5 5 2 4 5 2 552 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 5 5 545 
5 524 5 2 552 3 5 3 553 5 2 5 5 554 5 
3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 332 3 3 3 1 3 
552 4 5 2 552 353 553 5 2 5 5 5 545 
552 4 5 2 552 3 5 3 553 5 2 5 5 554 5 
552 4 5 2 552 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 555 545 
5 524 5 2 552 3 5 3 553 5 2 5 5 5 545 
5 524 5 2 552 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 5 5 545 
552 4 5 2 552 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 5 554 5 
3 3 3 4 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 333 1 1 3 
3 3 343 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 
4 4 2 4 4 2 3 324 2 3 2 222 3 1 211 1 
4443324 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 3 532 545 5 
3 5 5 3 5 5 553 1 5 1 554 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
3 3 343 1 3 333 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 
3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 333 1 3 
3 3 344 533 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 5 533 
4 4 4 4 4 244 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 342 3 4 4 4 4 
3 3 343 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 333 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 
3 3 3 4 3 1 333 3 3 1 333 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 
230 
3 3 343 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 
4 4 2 4 4 2 3 3 2 4 2 3 2 222 3 1 211 1 
444 3 3 2 4 3 3 3 444 543 532 5 4 5 5 
3 553 5 5 5 531 5 1 554 5 5 5 5 5 555 
3 3 3 4 3 1 3 3 333 333 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 
3 3 3 4 3 1 333 3 3 1 
13122413221 
3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 
1 111 141 
3 3 3 3 3 3 331 
1 3 
3 1 
1 3 
444 3 4 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
14121 1 343 1 2 1 1 1 141 141 1 1 
44434 3 5 4 4 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
1 1 422 1 234 3 1 2 1 1 1 141 141 1 1 
44434 3 544 3 5 3 543 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
1 142 2 234 3 1 211 4 1 141 1 1 
44434 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
44434 3 544 3 5 3 543 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
141 2 2 2 343 1 2 1 2 1 141 142 1 2 
44434 354 4 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
1 141 2 1 134 3 1 2 1 1 1 4 141 1 1 
444 3 4 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 534 4 4 5 4 
1 142 2 1 234 3 1 211 141 141 1 1 
444 343 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 534 4 4 5 4 
1 422 1 234 3 1 2 1 141 141 1 1 
44434 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
444 3 4 3 5 4 4 3 5 3 543 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
1 1 422 234 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 4 1 1 
444 3 4 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 444 5 4 
14221 234 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 141 1 1 
44434 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
44434 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
444 3 4 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
14221 234 3 1 2 1 1 1 141 141 1 1 
44434 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
44434 3 544 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
44434 3 5 4 4 3 5 3 5 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 
3 4 544 344 5 3 444 533 534 534 3 
231 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
3 4 544 344 5 3 444 533 5 3 4 534 3 
555 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
3 4 544 344 5 3 4 4 4 5 3 3 534 5 343 
555 555 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 3 5 5 3 5 5 555 
3 4 544 344 5 3 4 4 4 533 534 534 3 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 5 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 5 5 5 555 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 
3 4 544 3 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 5 3 3 5 3 4 534 3 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
3 4 544 344 5 3 4 4 4 5 3 3 534 534 3 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 
3 4 544 344 5 344 4 5 3 3 534 534 3 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 
3 4 544 344 534 4 4 533 534 534 3 
555 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 555 555 
3 4 544 344 5 3 4 4 4 533 534 534 3 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 3 553 5 5 555 
3 4 544 344 534 4 4 533 534 5 343 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 5 5 5 555 555 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 
3 4 544 344 5 3 4 4 4 533 5 3 4 534 3 
555 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 
3 4 544 344 534 4 4 533 534 534 3 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 555 555 555 
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